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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
The dissertation, Derisive Realism: Towards a realist foundation for Humour addresses 
the obstacles as well as the possibilities of thinking of humour highlighted in the 
contemporary theories of humour and wit. This study aims to provide a definition of 
humour which embraces not only human words (as in wit and jokes) but also human 
deeds in its materiality. An attempt from the epistemology of humour to an ontology of 
humour is made which oscillates between human willing of humour to humour abducting, 
capturing and choosing human. The present research does not claim to have found an 
alternative definition for linguistic wit and jokes as offered already in Superiority Theory, 
Relief Theory and Incongruity Theory. Rather it demonstrates that humour itself depicts a 
realism for human subjects that has been eclipsed by the prevailing epidemiology of 
humour. It is argued that if human usage of humour, as these three theories of humour 
roughly demonstrate, is based on a subjective and determined act whether to relieve some 
suppressed energy (Relief Theory of Spencer and Freud), or to imply one’s supremacy 
upon the other (Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes) or an inconsistency in meaning (Locke, 
Hutchenson, Kant), humour itself has an indifferent pre-human sense that can dispense (if 
not exclude) subjective and calculable gestures, it can take place contingently and treat 
subjects in an inevitable and ubiquitous mode. However, it is argued that despite its 
apparent indifference, humour provides subjects with a major criterion: either subjects 
open themselves to it and participate in the joy, smirk, grin served by it, or they will serve 
as a material for the production of humour to entertain others. Using the ideas of Leibniz, 
Gabriel Tarde and Gilles Deleuze and applying it to theories of humour offered by 
German Romantic writer Jean Paul and more modern and contemporary philosophers of 
 
laughter and humour such as Henri Bergson and Georges Bataille a mimetic framework 
for such acceptance/denial of humour has been presented which, in the light of the 
consequent human derision makes one rethink the ethical and ontological facets of living 
with humour. Therefore, it does not suffice to claim (as common among postmodernists) 
that humour unsettles knowledge and subjectivity or belittles human presence in various 
grand narratives; a hypothesis that thinks of humour utterly based on human will and 
intention evacuated from contingency. On the contrary, derisive realism is a thought that 
by prioritising humour claims that humour in its contingency is implied in human 
condition and its relational materialism is not simply steered by the subjective intention. 
Humour intervenes contingently, and the subjects unprepared for it are to be derided. 
 
Such derision is shown against the background of Bergson’s emphasis on inertia inherent 
in laughter as well as Georges Bataille’s conception of laughter as the moment of 
suspension. Nevertheless, for this to be defined and settled in a materialistic sense, it is 
required to extend the Bergsonian and Bataillian frameworks to an immanence which 
pictures the force of this laughter. It stresses the significance of such relation between the 
subjects taking part in laughter to demonstrate that rejecting humour in the hope of 
keeping a rigid and serious stance refers such subjects inevitably back to human 
humiliation. Thus what is being scrutinised and criticized in this study is the 
overwhelming presence of linguistic humour which leaves no room for a realist and 
mimetic model that regards humour in such inhuman entirety. Through Beckett's Watt a 
laughter over such linguistic laughter is presented and elaborated which is then reconciled 
with an affective mode of laughter in Christine Brooke-Rose's Life, End of. Such an 
affective conception of humour paves the way for a mimetics of humour which 
commences with the pragmatic humour of the holy fools. The holy fools as persona for a 
realist humour repeat their humour in order to permeate the rigid and solidified discourse 
of knowledge and morality. But any exclusion or absence of the holy fools makes another 
repetition possible which although looks witty and amusing leads to a relational derision 
of subjects as depicted in Super Sad True Love Story. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation contains five chapters which address, in different ways the plausibility 
of thinking of a realism in relation to humour. Humour has been conceived of as a 
practical and relational phenomenon that runs and flows between human beings. General 
as it is, humour plays a much larger, more effective and more unconscious a role in 
human relations than what we label wit and witticism which is the most noticeable trait of 
intended and conscious humour. To distinguish these two, the first chapter provides us 
with a background of the main theories of humour, in particular the Incongruity Theory of 
humour. The first chapter extends the contemporary reflections in incongruity-based 
approaches to humour in order to highlight their tacit links with the philosophical and 
epistemological dimensions of such conceptions of humour and laughter. This general 
overview of Incongruity Theories of humour leads this research directly to a literary work 
which is filled with a conscious attempt to be witty, namely Beckett’s Watt. Chapter Two 
which is specified to an analysis of Wit in Watt paves the way towards a practical 
manifestation of wit in a literary work. Yet as will be shown, Beckett’s attempt is a 
double one. He introduces us to wit and witticism but enables us to laugh at such 
witticism. Therefore, through Beckett’s Watt, an affective conception of humour and 
laughter replaces a purely linguistic and cognitive one which is normally claimed in the 
contemporary Incongruity Theories of humour. Chapter Three is an elaboration of such 
affective-based conceptualisation of humour in Life, End of which does not remain in a 
merely linguistic mechanism of producing wit. Rather humour is this regard is an 
experience that enables one to transform reactive and negative affects of death and decay 
to active and vital forces. Chapter Four is a step towards the ethical and political facets of 
humour in relation to comedy. By contextualising humour is the framework of holy 
foolery, humour is seen as a pragmatic technique to address the moral fixations. This 
way, although humour is seen in a political and ethical framework, its significance is seen 
in a mimetic manner rather than a conscious and willed attempt to as in witticism. 
Chapter Five maintains the comparison of this mimetic conception of humour with the 
linguistic one as presented in Super Sad True Love Story. 
Chapter One 
 
The Conceptual Foundation of the Derisive Realism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The Question of the Research 
 
 
 
The attempt made in this dissertation is not a general analysis aiming to define humour 
and laughter comprehensively and in its various aspects. Nor is the aim to use structural 
tools to deconstruct humour in some specifically comic works where the manifestation of 
humour is noticeable and traceable. The goal of this study is restricted to one specific 
question: how can we think with humour, rather than thinking about humour? To 
elaborate: what is the force of humour in relation to thought? Admittedly, this gives rise to 
an immediate obstacle as humour has normally been thought of as a result of human 
perception, language and cognition. By defining what we mean by Realism and 
representation, we hone in on the difference between representation and realism with 
regards to humour. The emphasis on realism, which covers the main part of our study, 
starts with the hypothesis that humour, through some historical and social shifts, has been 
understood as a linguistic and imaginary tool and as a result not only its production but 
also its utility have been limited to the scope of perception and language. As a 
consequence, humour as subjective as it is, leaves no ground to be analysed in itself. It 
goes without saying that humour makes constant sense in relation to human beings, but 
the idea that nature has a prominent role in the production of humour has been underrated 
or even neglected. The realism embedded in humour implies that humour has a natural 
rationality, beyond human logic, which determines its purpose among human beings. The 
concept of realism in this study is rooted in the Kantian thought that repudiated any 
analysis of noumen. In effect, Kant made a famous distinction between the realm of 
phenomenon and that of noumen and argued that human knowledge is unable to 
comprehend the noumen. The ultimate capacity of a human being, according to this 
account and as emphasised in Kant‘s Critique of Pure 
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 Reason, is the consideration of phenomenon (Kant A238-9/B298). Against such 
(post) Kantian definition that is notoriously correlationist between thinking and being, 
one is able to define a realism that does not simply leave out the possibility or even 
the existence of noumen. However the task in this study is not commencing with a 
definition of realism and implementing it in our analysis of humour, but starting with 
humour and excavating some parameters for a realism based on humour. This means 
that although humour (and not only its phenomenological manifestations or human 
usages of it) are hardly thinkable but it can contribute a lot to thinking itself especially 
in relation to being. In the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition there is a tacit link that 
correlates being and thinking, in other words, Kantian thought and its influence in its 
post-Kantian derivations by privileging human beings promote a kind of (human) 
idealism that correlates thought with being, to the extent that, ‗This effacement of the 
noumenal continues with phenomenology, as ontology becomes explicitly linked with 
a reduction to the phenomenal realm‘‘(Byrant, 4). 
 
It should be borne in mind that such realism is far from a crude return to reality 
and its limitations but it resists equally the ethereal idealism that everything exists in 
mind or spirit where reality is taken as secondary or at least equal to the human mind. 
This project limits its scope to an understanding of realism in relation to humour, in 
the sense that although humour application finds no room except in relation to human 
subjects, language and perception, its production is not necessarily decided and 
determined by human will. In other words despite the fact that humour is sensible 
only when addressing human beings, it is not simply a production of humanity and it 
cannot always be hindered or terminated by human being‘s decisions. 
 
Admitting the impossibility of thinking of humour in itself has unsurprisingly 
resulted in thinking of humour in its manifestations in human language and perception; 
a claim that leaves no role for humour beyond human beings or sources external to 
itself. This not only motivates us to analyse humour based on its own criteria and as an 
entity independent of human beings, more importantly humour would be regarded as 
precisely the entity that functions in relation to the unknowability of human beings. 
Therefore the aim of this project is not to apply a ready-made framework of realism to 
humour, but to acknowledge humour-in-itself as a pivotal component of 
naturphilosophie, to enter the very process of thinking in order to bring up its own 
realism. It should be stressed, once again, that while numerous 
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phenomenology-inspired theories define humour in the scope of human language, 
imagination and perception, humour and its realism address not only our thoughts and 
perceptions, but also our deeds to the extent that it can deride human beings in a 
contingent mode. 
 
The hypothetical difference between two kinds of humour might sound far-fetched, 
but this study starts off with a leading theoretical framework of humour analysis in its 
contemporary mode and argues that close scrutiny of this framework, general as it is, 
reveals that humour has been made or at least depicted more in the hands of human 
beings and in a representational mode, to the extent that the heavy reliance on linguistic 
and rhetorical tools in the analysis of humour has transformed humour to a semantic 
phenomenon. Such reliance on language, which has influenced not only humour reception 
but also its production, we argue, entails a representational conception of humour. 
Although one is hardly likely to find a purely linguistic analysis of humour, such a 
dependence on semantic and linguistic facets of humour misses the realist significance of 
humour, where humour independent of human beings captures and derides them. This 
leads the study to an emphasis beyond the role human language and imagination play in a 
representational model, of humour in the form of wit and witticism. There is a possibility 
of thinking of humour in a practical sense and in-between human subjects. What is 
illuminated in the first chapter of this dissertation is a limited historical and theoretical 
background for this shift that starts with modern scholars of humour and leads to the 
contemporary analysis of humour in the most dominant and well-known framework, 
namely incongruity theory. It will be shown that the incongruity theory of humour 
depends now more than ever on a formal description of humour production and reception 
and such formal description is very likely to eclipse the realist function of humour which 
is ethically and politically significant. The very cherished and inestimable function of 
humour as a tool to liberate and emancipate human subjects from the obstinate and 
opinionated forms of living and thinking can be easily hindered by a growing reliance on 
this linguistic and rhetorical form of humour. 
 
Admittedly, it is absurd to think of excluding imagination from the texts and pieces 
known for being humorous. Nevertheless, over-emphasising linguistic and rhetorical 
function and construction of humour results in an implicit depreciation of humour in its 
realistic sense. Humour in its realism enables subjects to overstep their boundaries by 
reminding them of the finitude inscribed in the points of view that have constructed their 
identity. It enables one to perpetually redefine one‘s relation to others 
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and to the world and this supplies humour with an inherently participatory component. 
 
Even the ability to laugh at one‘s own follies is the direct result of participating with 
others and leads to the constant rejection of narcissism as implanted in subjects‘ lives and 
views. However, an imaginary conceptualization of humour seems prone to making a 
model of humour that functions regardless of this participatory mode; instead of 
emphasizing such conceivable social, collective and inter-subjective features of humour, 
it invests more heavily in the formal construct of humour in the shape of a cognitive 
recipe. Although inspired by real social, cultural, religious, sexual and other identitarian 
elements, humour as depicted in the majority of incongruity-based theories is the result of 
cognitive and linguistic invention and imagination. A realist project of humour does not 
suggest diminishing the role imagination plays in the construction of humour, but 
advocates an understanding of humour that takes place in the middle of the social domain 
and in relation to other subjects. Starting with the linguistic analysis of humour in some 
different models of incongruity theory, the aim is to illuminate what is meant by a 
representational view of humour. Then we will move in the same chapter and throughout 
our conceptual framework to the construction of a framework that helps define the 
realism of humour. 
 
From a philosophical point of view and in constructing a conceptual framework for 
such realism, there is the seemingly strange fact that philosophers have not devoted a full-
fledged and developed theory of humour and have treated humour and laughter in rather 
ephemeral and cursory ways, which means that this study has to resort to different 
philosophical frameworks in order to illuminate what a realist project of humour can 
claim to be. To start an analysis of such realism and its conceptual foundation, we should 
stress the significance of the contingency of humour. Humour, when imbued with 
contingency, elevates beyond a purely voluntary phenomenon, but furthermore sets itself 
free of a linguistic and mere cognitive conceptualisation . The emphasis on the 
contingency of humour leads the analysis in the current chapter to a demand for a 
conceptualization of humour which dispenses with the highly accentuated role of human 
will and intention in the production of humour. For although incongruity theories rightly 
recognize the role of surprise and unexpectedness as the kernel of humour, this is 
normally restricted to a linguistic or semantic unexpectedness and as a result its 
framework leaves no room for the undecided and unexpected role of humour, beyond 
language and representation. Therefore the framework of this study would be composed 
of two gestures toward humour, including one conceiving of it only 
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semantically and based on a semantic unexpectedness and the other striving for a realism 
steered by the contingency of humour. The attempt made in this study is to shed light on 
both acts of inviting humour and averting humour where ethical and ontological 
implications are taken into consideration. Starting with a critique of imaginary humour in 
different forms of cognitive and linguistic frameworks, the model proposed here is 
composed of two parts. The first part implies embracing humour, which entails revealing 
the wrongness of our expectations and the unveiling of our ignorance. The conception of 
humour here is an affirmative one which attributes an active role for humour to intervene 
in reality. On the other hand, the second part is a denial of such active humour in its 
realist sense and replacing it with linguistic or cognitive humour. This latter appreciates 
an imaginary and fabricated conception of humour and prioritizes it over such realism. 
Limiting humour to a linguistic or cognitive mode does not hinder the existence and 
intervention of humour; yet it has a pivotal ontological consequence. It is argued here 
(and more extensively in the chapters four and five) that averting active humour through 
linguistic and intentional forms not only entails a nihilistic gesture, but also activates a 
derision inherent in humour that through its contingency can befall the subjects as 
cessation or inertia ; the subjects that profess to the use of humour, but appropriate it only 
linguistically. Ontologically speaking, it is claimed that the subjects who profess to tame 
humour and limit it only to language and human will, can be victims of an active humour 
and become ridiculed. Broadly speaking and as described, in the first chapter and through 
the conceptual framework, the main aim of this study is introduced as a double task: on 
the one hand to highlight the significance of humour in its real social mode and, on the 
other hand, to distinguish realist humour from a purely linguistic and cognitive 
conception of humour. 
 
That is why the second chapter is more of an exercise in what is defined as 
incongruity theory in relation to Watt by Samuel Beckett. This provides us with a 
better opportunity to see both the textual and linguistic implications of incongruity 
theory as well as the way a literary text reflects them. What is highlighted in chapter 
two is the way Watt renders the potentials of incongruity theory as an almost 
linguistic approach visible. Watt, as a text, does not exclude the possibility of the 
linguistic wit and produces it in a manner similar to the production of one-liners and 
jokes; Watt uses wit lavishly, to the extent that one can see not only the witty text, but 
also its very production. In a way similar to incongruity theories of humour, Watt 
sheds light on the mechanisms of humour production by using it extravagantly. 
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Chapter three is devoted to a closer analysis of ephemeral humour in Life, End of, a 
novel by Christine Brooke-Rose. This chapter reveals the proximity of humour in its 
smaller aspects.. Life, End of, like Beckett‘s Watt, provides one with the opportunity to 
see how humour functions. Nonetheless, Life, End of takes a more constructive path and 
highlights the ephemeral and transient mode of humour which approximates what we 
called contingency. Life, End of keeps producing and creating humour in the face of 
death, something on which we will elaborate in relation to Bataille‘s conception of 
humour. Although textual and linguistic it is, the humour in Life, End of, by resorting to 
an ephemeral openness, takes a step forward from representational humour. 
 
Chapter four is an attempt to surpass a purely imaginative mode of humour 
towards a yet more realist framework. This leads us to a performative conception of 
humour that contains some historical and speculative elements in stand-up comedy. 
This chapter is an attempt to shed light on the ethical and ontological facets of realist 
humour. To provide this area with some historical background, the chapter analyses 
humour in relation to foolery. The reason for this is that foolery is an example of one 
of the scarce occasions in which humour is traditionally seen to transgresses a simply 
linguistic and rhetorical utility and becomes action-oriented. Foolery, especially holy 
foolery, has been a template for a realist project on humour which appreciates—
against asceticism and any other possibly hypocritical system of morality—an ethics 
in which humour plays a significantly realist role. 
 
Chapter five is an analysis of such realism in its societal and network-based form, 
something that promises to shed light on some ethical consequences of humour 
appreciation or rejection. Through the Super Sad True Love Story, a dystopian novel by 
Gary Shteyngart, a societal understanding of humour is analysed which illuminates the 
aforementioned ridicule that is the direct result of averting humour. Super Sad True Love 
Story presents a society in which the repression of humour becomes ridiculous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 The Background: The Incongruity Theory of Humour 
 
 
The tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humour. For if 
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irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I 
with representation, humour is the co-extensiveness of sense with 
nonsense; humour is the art of surfaces or doubles, of nomad 
singularities and of an always displaced aleatory point (Deleuze, 1990, 
141). 
 
 
Laughter and humour are such vast and confused domains that any attempt to define and 
determine them may look unexpectedly hilarious; this fact that is partly due to the elusive 
and ephemeral character of humour. Nonetheless, different and scattered theories on 
humour make it somehow possible to analyse humour in a more contemporary sense. 
Admittedly, the focus of this study is simply one theory among three main theories of 
humour, namely incongruity theory, which has allegedly attracted more attention among 
modern scholars of humour and has marginalised, to some extent the other two main and 
prevailing approaches to humour, namely superiority and relief theory. Incongruity 
theory, places emphasis on unexpectedness as the main component of humour, whereas 
from a relief theory standpoint, the release of a suppressed energy through humour is the 
ultimate goal, for the proponents of the superiority theory what is of extreme significance 
is the the tacit laughter at the misfortunes of the others. Broadly speaking, Relief theory, 
is associated with the idea that humour is a significant way of releasing the energy that 
has been repressed. One prominent source of this theory is Sigmund Freud (2001). On the 
other hand, Superiority theory of humour has a longer history which can be traced even to 
Plato and Aristotle but its main theorist can be claimed to be Thomas Hobbes. This theory 
of humour and laughter is based on an expression of superiority on the others as the 
objects of laughter. But incongruity theory stress the significance of inconsistency as the 
pivotal source of humour and for that relies on various dimensions in the production of 
humour from epistemic inconsistencies to semantic and cognitive schemata. 
 
 
The dominance of the incongruity model in the theorization of humour and laughter 
can be traced back mainly to England, where thinkers reacted against Thomas 
 
Hobbes‘ idea of supremacy in humour. In effect, by claiming that ‖the passion of laughter 
is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminence 
in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly‖(42). 
Hobbes produces a theory of humour that is based on superiority and supremacy. One can 
go that far to say that this framework of laughter corresponds with his conception of 
politics as an an affair run by some superior elites. Hobbes depicts 
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humans as creatures driven by their egoistic desires and selfish passions, requiring 
some sort of constant disciplining. One can say that the shift from Thomas Hobbes‘ 
elite model of politics to John Locke‘s more democratic framework as a crucial 
political shift has also been reflected in their conceptualisation of humour from a 
superiority theory to a more gentlemanly and equal model of humour; a theory which 
depends crucially on cognitive and linguistic facets in the production of humour. 
According to Michael Billig (62), Incongruity Theory of laughter and humour, by 
emphasizing strongly the gentlemanly code of behaviour which was appreciated by 
 
John Locke and some of his contemporaries, excluded Hobbes‘ theory of superiority. 
 
This attitude not only determines the view Locke takes on humour, but was also 
reflected and developed since then, in numerous models which have tried to explain 
humour through linguistic incongruity. In Hobbes‘ understanding humour and the 
passion in laughter emerge out of a sudden Glory arising from sudden conception of 
some eminence in ourselves by comparison with the inferiority of others, or with our 
own formerly (42). 
 
Incongruity theory sees humour, beyond a superior/ inferior mode, in a linguistic 
and quotidian manner and introduces wit and witticism as in word plays, jokes and one-
liners, instead of the emphasis in the superiority model. Wit finds its way through the 
ideas of James Beattie (An Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition, 1776) and 
Francis Hutchinson (Thoughts on Laughter, 1989) and others. Ideas which to a large 
extent functioned as concerted attempts to neutralize the superiority implication of 
humour and laughter and offer new frames of laughter and humour witch could fit the 
gentlemanly codes of behaviour. However, this view is not only morally correct, but in 
need of philosophical support. For this, Locke, who was already engaged in different 
arguments on the nature of human knowledge , judgment and perception with other 
philosophers such as Leibniz, makes a digression and redefines humour according to his 
theories of human knowledge. This move and its consequences will be discussed a bit 
further on, now it suffices to say that the core of difference between Locke‘s view and 
Leibniz‘s view of knowledge, which Locke utilises to justify more elaborately his theory 
of humour, depends heavily on Locke‘s (1700) strongly held idea that all perception can 
become knowledge whereas for Leibniz (1996) perception can never fully be converted to 
knowledge. Locke commences with such views on knowledge and redefines humour. As 
Michael Billig explains, 
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In the Book Two of Essays, Locke discusses the perceptual basis of 
knowledge. The mind makes judgment on account of what it perceives. 
It must be able to compare present impressions with past moments in 
order to discern whether present perceptions resemble or differ from 
past ones. Locke was arguing that any true judgment depends on the  
‗clear discerning faculty‘ of mind where it perceives two ideas to be 
the same, or different‘...Appearance of similitude can be misleading, if 
there really are differences between two ideas. Thus careful judgment 
consists in ‗separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can 
be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
similitude..If judgment involves carefully distinguishing between 
things that appear to be similar but which are actually different, then 
wit is based on the reverse process. It brings together ideas that are 
different in order to treat them as if they were similar. Accordingly, wit 
operates through ‗the assemblages of ideas, and putting those together 
with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or 
congruity thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions 
in the fantasy (62). 
 
What is noticeable in the context of such a definition of laughter and humour as 
 
offered by John Locke and others as the precursors of a coherent conceptualization of 
 
incongruity theory is the emphasis on the cognitive process of the production of wit. 
 
This emphasis on the howness of humour eclipses to a large extent the whatness of 
 
humour and laughter. As we noticed earlier, although Hobbes‘ theory is also not an 
 
explanation of the whatness of humour, it defines humour and laughter in a social 
 
milieu. As Paul McDonald explains in his Philosophy of Humour, Hobbes‘s theory 
 
‗‘needs to be seen in the context of his general theory of life and his belief that human 
 
beings are in a ceaseless struggle for power that only ends at death; for Hobbes humour 
 
assists individuals in their fight for power‘' (35-36). 
 
Incongruity theory shifts the emphasis from the power relations and social facet 
 
to the cognitive and linguistic processes of laughter and humour. Wit, as defined by the 
 
majority  of  incongruity  theories,  is  mainly  based  on  a  linguistic  and  discursive 
 
ambiguity,  inappropriateness,  novelty  or  any  deviation  from  the  normal.  While 
 
Aristotle is among the first who en passant offers a concise view of incongruity where 
 
he claims something that offers a twist is the best manner to keep an audience laughing 
 
and although figures ranging from René  Descartes and Immanuel Kant to Arthur 
 
Schopenhauer and many others have contributed in one way or another to 
 
understanding humour and laughter by emphasizing the incongruous nature of humour. 
 
The incongruity theory as it exists today in its contemporary form is arguably a result of 
 
such cognitive and linguistic approaches to humour. The approaches which were 
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triggered in the majority of modern frameworks to preclude superiority and derision 
 
tacit in superiority model. But as John Morreall puts it in the first chapter of his Comic 
 
Relief: Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor: 
 
These ―Incongruity Theorists‖ disagreed on several details about 
incongruity, disappointed expectation, absurdity, discrepancy, or 
contradiction, such as how they are related to laughter. So we have to 
be careful in talking about the Incongruity Theory. Nonetheless, the 
name has stuck and today, as mentioned, the Incongruity Theory is the 
most widely accepted account of humor in philosophy and empirical 
psychology (12). 
 
 
An analysis of the incongruity theory of laughter and humour as a theory based 
 
on elements of unexpectedness implies, first of all, that there is a prevailing mechanism 
 
in the formation of humour that this theory tries to explain and explore, a trajectory that 
 
can be followed in contemporary attempts in cognitive sciences and neuroscience. John 
 
Locke‘s approach in rendering humour a more gentlemanly and moderate phenomenon 
 
seems to have paved gradually the way for a more semantic and rhetorical conception 
 
of humour and places less emphasis on its function and its pragmatics. The focus on the 
 
formal facets of humour in Incongruity theories of humour is most suited to describing 
 
verbal humour. According to John Morreall, Plato and Hobbes as the precursors of the 
 
superiority theory were looking for ‗‘psychological causes of laughter and 
 
amusement‘‘, and they concluded that ‗it is by revealing someone‘s inferiority to the 
 
person laughing‘‘  (Morreall, 6-7) that laughter and its psychological causes is 
 
explicable. Morreall goes on to discuss the shift toward a more conceptual analysis: 
 
Today, many philosophers are more concerned with conceptual analysis 
than with causal explanation. In studying laughter, amusement, and 
humor, they try to make clear the concepts of each, asking, for example, 
what has to be true of something in order for it to count as amusing. 
Seeking necessary and sufficient conditions, they try to formulate 
definitions that cover all examples of amusement but no examples that are 
not amusement. Of course, it may turn out that part of the concept of 
amusement is that it is a response to certain kinds of stimuli. And so 
conceptual analysis and psychological explanation may intertwine (7). 
 
Therefore and with some simplification, in contemporary analysis the emphasis 
 
has shifted towards a conceptual investigation of amusement and hence the 
 
unprecedented presence of jokes and their analysis in modern philosophy. In his 
 
Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH), Raskin makes an attempt to provide a 
 
formal framework of humour. Raskin develops his formal theory of humour, based on a 
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key joke which goes like this: 
 
 
Is the doctor at home?‘ The patient asked in his bronchial whisper. ‗No,‘ 
the doctor‘s young and pretty wife whispered in reply. ‗Come right in 
(Raskin, 117-127). 
 
 
According to Raskin, this joke is made up of two parts or scripts, one script targets 
the fact that the patient is unable to speak smoothly and the other implies the fact that the 
wife is awaiting her lover. These scripts look incongruous and yet by reading it again one 
might be able to realize an illicit meaning that links them. The other major theory 
accommodated among Incongruity Theories of humour, is Arthur Koestler‘s theory of 
Bisociation. Bisociation, as described in his The Act of Creation, is founded on an 
analysis of projections that take place between different spheres involved in human 
thought and life. Koestler almost explicitly makes an analogy between humour and 
metaphor which, according to Arvo Krikmann, is then resonated in the ideas of Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner in their seminal work, The way we think: Conceptual 
Blending And The Mind's Hidden Complexities. Moving forward to the findings in 
neuroscience concerning humour, one major hypothesis is the one J. M. Suls introduced 
in his two-stage-incongruity-resolution model where incongruity is created, explored and 
resolved in the final stage of humour. But more recently, it is the model offered by Marta 
Kutas and Seana Coulson under the frame-shifting model that has drawn attention in the 
studies on humour in neuroscience. This idea requires more attention as it shows better 
the metaphoric gist of incongruity theories both in cognitive studies and neuroscience. 
Although Coulson and Kutas offer a model of the comprehension of jokes (rather than 
humour in its entirety) their model, explicitly founded on the ideas already raised by 
Fauconnier and Turner, claims that in order to comprehend a joke, the listener must go 
beyond surprise and create a new and coherent interpretation. This model which is based 
on Seana Coulson‘s PhD thesis published in the same year, under ‗Semantic Leaps: 
Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in 
 
Meaning Construction’ promises the notion of blending in the production of jokes in 
her future work. 
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Figure 1: Fauconnier & Turner‘s basic diagram (2002: 46) which illustrates the central features of 
 
conceptual integration. 
 
 
Although the main concern of that book is meaning in general, Coulson applies 
and extends frame-shifting theory to humour analysis too. The frame-shifting model 
can be explained further by one example Coulson uses: 
 
Interviewer: Were Romeo and Juliet sleeping together? 
Barrymore: They certainly were in Chicago company. (31) 
 
Coulson argues that although the interviewer‘s frame of reference is 
Shakespeare‘s play and characters, Barrymore‘s reference is the actors; the shift in 
frames from one to the other allows the joke to function. These models—frame-
shifting in Coulson, or conceptual blending for Fauconnier and Turner, and even their 
precursor, namely Koestler‘s bisociation theory—have something in common; they all 
explain humour through a metaphoric mechanism. Metaphor is introduced as the very 
leverage on which humour functions between two unexpectedly-juxtaposed spheres. 
What is overlapped between two different frames forms a metaphor that plays the 
prominent role in yielding the humour. 
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Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of Koestler‘s Bisociation Theory (1964 35) 
 
 
An analysis of the incongruity theory of humour reveals primarily that there is a 
core element of surprise and unexpectedness in the formation of humour and 
metaphor is in charge of bridging this unexpectedness. In effect, the unexpectedness 
component that arises out of the juxtaposition of unexpectedly different semantic or 
cognitive scripts and schemata sparks a proximity, a point of overlap which can be 
embodied in a metaphor. 
 
Another implicit facet of incongruity theory is the fact that thanks to such 
metaphoric possibility, humour can be willed and reproduced indefinitely. In other 
words, by speculating on what the majority of incongruity theories present, one can 
notice that the source for surprise which is laid in proximity and juxtaposition of two 
literally different semantic spheres is rooted in imagining a metaphoric overlap. These 
two cognitive or semantic spheres have normally nothing much in common, yet there 
is a will to render these two separate scripts funny and playful. The metaphoric 
characteristic of wit implies an elastic trait: an improbability in meaning or a semantic 
obstacle is produced and then immediately lifted, at least temporarily. In the transition 
between its constituent domains, wit experiences a semantic block. This deforms 
meaning, but as soon as the meaning finds a way out, domains restore their original 
form. Thus, in a materialistic sense, wit faces a degree of stress, deforms and reforms 
elastically, and then returns to its original state. Therefore, what happens in the 
production of humour is that between such discrete and surprisingly different spheres 
of meaning which are juxtaposed, a suspension is created and (to some extent) 
resolved. There are numerous implications for this kind of humour production and 
among them what concerns us is the will to produce humour. The will that calculates, 
plots and produces humour out of two surprisingly different spheres of meaning in 
their juxtaposition. This leads our analysis to the role algorithms play in such human 
and intentional modes of humour production. By taking a simple definition of 
algorithms, one can notice that algorithms can play a prominent role in the production 
of humour in the framework provided by Incongruity theory. 
 
Informally, an algorithm is any well-defined computational procedure that 
takes some values, or set of values as input and produces some values, or 
set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of computational 
steps that transform the input into the output (Comen, 5). 
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In the next part, the role of the imagination in the production of humour on the 
one hand and the connection of this faculty to the incongruity theory of humour is 
further elaborated to see how such reliance on will and imagination as implied in the 
incongruity theory of humour can be contrasted to a realist project of humour which is 
being introduced here. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 From Imagination to Realism 
 
 
What is at stake here is that Incongruity Theory to a large extent invites an algorithmic 
conceptualization of humour and laughter which renders humour, at least tacitly, 
reproducible: an algorithm to create a semantic or cognitive suspension and resolve it. 
The explanation of incongruity theory as the dominant explanatory model of humour and 
its coherent explanation is not constrained to the ideas of John Locke. James Beattie, the 
Scottish poet, proposes in his Essays a link between distress and laughter, introducing it 
along with intensity, incongruity and sympathy. Regarding intensity, 
 
Beattie believes that ‗‘Laughter arises from the view of two or more inconsistent, 
unsuitable or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex 
object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the peculiar manner 
in which mind takes notice of them‘‘ (348). Although Beattie puts laughter in relation to 
other affects instead of isolating it as one single phenomenon, he identifies the element of 
incongruity as the prominent factor in the production of laughter. In other words, 
although he is aware of the affects involved in the production of laughter, Beattie prefers 
to translate them into some cognitive and semantic components which consequently side 
with the incongruity theory of laughter more than a relief theory (based on the 
interrelation of affects). To provide an example, Beattie takes intensity into account and 
claims that ‗‘..the greater the number of incongruities that are blended in the same 
assemblage, the more the more ludicrous it will probably be‘‘ (349). 
 
Quickness, fancifulness and surprise are among the characteristics which are implied 
in such a notion of wit and laughter, along with a combination of two objects which 
are not usually expected to be combined or a juxtaposition which strikes us through a 
mediator metaphor. 
 
The modern tendency in understanding and conceptualizing humour based on 
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and fed by a linguistic or cognitive mechanism is extremely short of a realism 
immanent in humour by which humour is able to be engaged in our everyday life in 
the most pragmatic and materialistic way. Linguistic humour, rooted in the modern 
and gentlemanly code of behaviour, is more than anything an effort of the imagination 
which utilizes different semantic and cognitive realms in order to be entertaining. The 
function of metaphor implied and employed in the production of humour opens 
humour production to an infinite vista which allows any combination of two different 
schemata to interact as long as they yield a sensibly surprising common element. This 
already implies the role that imagination plays in such a kind of humour production. 
Imagination makes it possible to bring an infinite number of otherwise irrelevant and 
inconsistent zones to one common ground bridged by a metaphor. This entails a 
subject who is able to construct the links freely between various fields of meaning and 
who conjoins them or synthesizes them by having recourse to his faculty of 
imagination: a subject supplied with an absolute freedom. Furthermore in the schism 
of finite and infinite, such a subject is able to translate the infinite into the finite by 
synthesizing different finite zones infinitely. At stake is this role played by the 
imagination. The reason to take such a vast area as imagination into account is the 
aforementioned will involve in the mechanism that produces wit and the utterly 
human conception of humour which reduces humour to a linguistic production a 
result of excluding contingency of humour. It is preferable and more comprehensible 
to understand this link in its historical frame; we devote a quick analysis to it. 
 
The shift from the Enlightenment to Romanticism demarcates a move from reason, 
which was fully appreciated in Enlightenment for figures such as Descartes and Kant to a 
freedom among romantic writers and philosophers. The individual reason or Cartesian 
cogito is introduced to another circle of thinkers and poets and transformed and translated 
into an idealism which celebrates mainly human freedom, will, and individual liberty, 
beyond all traditional values. Such an attempt is most evidently shown in Fichte‘s attempt 
and distinction between I and Non-I. For Fichte, in order to approximate and celebrate 
such liberty, one has to do away with any transcendent entity that defines this non-I. 
Influenced by the Cartesian attempt to appreciate the significance of cogito, Romantics 
open the vistas of individual liberty. According to Michael Allen Gillespie (83), this was 
the very inception of nihilism. But what does it have to do with humour? The link might 
be a bit oblique and even vague, but we try to illuminate some touchstones by which one 
can proceed. According to Gillespie, in his 
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comprehensive book Nihilism Before Nietzsche, Romantics were the pioneers of 
embracing nihilism willingly or unwillingly as an aftermath of the emphasis on 
reason which was already made in the Enlightenment: 
 
The imagination is able to accomplish this task, according to Fichte, 
because it has a foot in both the finite and the infinite and wavers 
between them. The imagination attempts to unite them by producing a 
unifying image or metaphor that brings the infinite into appearance 
within the finite, thus allowing the finite to appear as the finite, that is, 
in opposition to the infinite. (WL, SW, 1:207; SK, 193) (84). 
 
 
Gillespie‘s point is historical, but the kernel of his argument is that prior to 
 
Nietzsche and his messianic message of the death of God, nihilism was rooted in the 
thinking of numerous philosophers (179). Although Gillespie‘s standpoint is specific 
to analysing nihilism among such scholars, thinkers and philosophers, what is 
underlined is that Romanticism led to an ‗‘absolute subjectivism‘‘ (109). The relation 
between nihilism and humour will be further elaborated, but it suffices to say that 
incongruity theories of humour are attempts of simultaneous restriction and 
expansion: on the one hand incongruity is restricted to linguistic and cognitive 
incongruity, and on the other hand, this appreciates the possibility of producing 
humour out of any imaginable combination that observes the required incongruity. 
There is an infinite possibility of humour production implied in the models that 
emphasize the metaphoric production of humour. Both results of this view are worth 
analysing: the expansion of scope of humour and its approximate correlation with 
metaphor and the restriction of humour to a linguistic and cognitive one. The 
argument is that the attempts made to reduce/ expand humour in an imaginary mode 
deprives humour of its inherent realism, and although subjects will be able to produce 
humour on their own, this humour stays in an imaginary, willed and subjective 
gesture, bereft of contingency. Celebrating this imaginary function of humour, which 
means the ability to produce it based on metaphoric mechanism, eclipses the 
contingency of humour. While subjects are given the ability to produce imaginary 
humour as they will, and while humour based on human imagination and fabrication 
is exclusively a subjective and cognitive phenomenon, humour in itself, does not 
depend on the will of the subjects; it remains more existential and less linguistic, is a 
relational humour that even though flows between subjects eludes their choice. 
 
By having resort to the concept of assemblages in Deleuze and Guattari it will be 
shown that, such exclusion of the realism in humour does not lead to its disappearance 
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makes it a more derisive phenomenon. Humour as an exclusive act of the imagination 
relies on the two steps of suspension and resolution and this entails a subject that 
sparks the suspension of meaning and chooses it to be resolved. While both imaginary 
and realist humour depend on incongruity, the former, thanks to its reliance on 
imagination fabricates incongruity and the latter encounters in its exposure to 
contingency and embraces the incongruity. This implies a significant difference 
between these two kinds of humour where the former is always expected to bring its 
already produced incongruity to a resolution while the latter does not strive to resolve 
it as it did not choose and produce the incongruity willingly in the first place. 
 
In order to explicate further this difference, this research makes an attempt to 
depict such exclusion of realism in humour in the incongruity theories of humour 
embedded in the appreciation of imaginary humour. In other words, humour in its 
realism does not remain inactive when imaginary humour becomes possible as it 
depends on the choice or will of subjects. Knowing that nothing chocks the laughter 
of such real humour, the answer that this study offers is that not only does imaginary 
and linguistic humour not accounts for the role of realist humour, it actually eclipses 
the significance of realist humour entirely. Nevertheless, as one significant feature of 
realist humour is its immanence, it will be shown that realist humour is not simply a 
rhetoric humour but an existential and actual humour that takes place in a relational 
mode, a relationality that implies the interaction and participation between subjects. 
Thus one main aim of this study is to delineate an outline to define humour in its 
relational and inter-subjective mode. For such a relational manifestation of humour 
we need a model beyond subjects that equally serves its realism beyond an imaginary 
linguistic and utterly subjective act. This does not mean that we do not deal with 
subjective relation to humour or exclude the linguistic and rhetoric side of humour, 
rather it implies that the more subjective humour becomes, the less realistic will be 
the gesture it pertains. Therefore, either humour exists in a realistic mode between 
subjects who allow its permeation between them, or by emptying themselves of such 
realist humour, they entertain themselves with a linguistic and rhetoric humour which 
is driven by the imaginary mechanism tacit in metaphor. 
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1.4 Realist humour 
 
 
Ore, vultu denique ipso toto corpore ridetur (Cicero, 251). 
 
 
In Romanticism, especially German Romanticism, one can find traces of significance 
of humour and irony in philosophy and literature. However, as Manfred Frank 
emphasizes, German Romanticism is not a unified whole to be analysed and 
investigated and treated in the one single manner. More importantly for this study, 
figures in Romanticism enable us to find links to more contemporary philosophers, 
especially Georges Bataille‘s notion of laughter and its relation to knowledge. What is 
at stake for Romantics, and evidently for Schelling in particular, is the relation 
between knowledge and the Absolute. Manfred Frank argues that Schelling, in his 
early writings, is not determined and decisive that knowledge is able at all to take hold 
of the Absolute. Similar to Hölderlin, Schelling in his Identitätsphilosophie accounts 
for more resolution in his ideas where ―Being precedes consciousness so that no 
understanding can exhaust the content of what is meant by Being‖ (Frank, 56). Putting 
it differently and in a very simplified manner, the implication of the Romantic grasp of 
Being is that a kind of absolute unknowing takes the place of the absolute knowing for 
humans. Accordingly, and especially evident in Hölderlin, of Being we have no 
concept but more a sense or a feeling. Influenced by Jacobi, Romantics make a 
difference between Being as predicative or relational Being and existential Being and 
based on this difference, ‗ the relational (or predicative) sense of Being is awakening- 
or disintegration of that sense of Being present in existence. Put another way, 
predicative Being breaks up (or divides [urteilt]) Being which is originally undivided 
and unified; on the other hand, the predicative relation can only be understood from 
relationless existence.‘ 
 
This idea leads to notions among these philosophers where Being is given to 
 
‗feeling‘ rather than thought or as Frank quotes Jacobi, ‗‘Of our existence (Dasein), we 
have only a feeling, but no concept‘‘ (64). This all helps us draw an outline of the role 
humour can have in relation to such (non)understanding of Being. However it should be 
emphasized that what is significant to this analysis is the relational sense of Being that all 
other things which emerge out of it have. Being cannot be grasped as a logical 
determination or form and this has at least two consequences. First, it is only in relation 
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to Being as a unity that any such conception or fixed logical determination would be 
 
made possible, and this entails the relative character of all such forms. Yet there is room 
 
for a second characteristic which is more significant to this project: if Being can be 
 
grasped fully and conceptually, it causes a relational interaction between all its relative 
 
modes of existence that emerge out of it. 
 
 
Much follows as a consequence of this: if ‗Being‘ (qua positing) can no 
longer be understood as something which (as something transcendental, 
as category or quasi-predicate) is a determination of thought or a  
‗logical form‘, then it must be understood as a ‗singular tantum‘- as ‗a 
blessed unity, [as] Being in the true sense of the word, ‗ Hölderlin 
affirms in the prologue of the penultimate edition of Hyperion (KTA 
163: 10). Being must be thought as one and as something unique, 
something to which all else would stand in relation, and which, due to 
its power, would be a being (seienden), next to others. Schelling will 
later speak of a ‗transitive‘ sense of ‗Being‘ to that all being (Seiende), 
insofar as it is, has been of absolute Being in this unique sense, that is, 
it would be contained within Being (Frank, 66). 
 
Then what is the relationship between these beings living next to each other? It 
 
is in this framework that humour can be defined in a relational rationality of its own. In 
 
effect, humour in its realist mode functions between these beings and their relation with 
 
Das Seiende. However this urges a redefinition of humour in a more metaphysical 
 
sense and according to the transitivity characteristic between various relative beings 
 
and Being. Nevertheless, since absolute Being as Jacobi made clear is beyond concept, 
 
humour is introduced here as a channel that at least unveils the insufficiency of 
 
knowledge. This will be illuminated in Georges Bataille‘s conception of laughter and 
 
further in Bergson‘s concept of cessation and automatism. But in order to have a more 
 
dynamic understanding of the relation these different beings have to one another, we 
 
need to beware of the possible substantialist connotation of beings, and in order to 
 
overcome this the Deleuzoguattarian concept of assemblage is prioritised. If we grant 
 
Being with humour and laughter, this humour is only heard in relation between beings 
 
in a dynamic and materialist sense, hence the significance of assemblages. But we need 
 
to explain here the significance of assemblages in relation to humour. As we discussed 
 
earlier, the incongruity theory of humour starts with the co-existence of two (or more) 
 
semantic schemata or scripts that, by blending into one another, make humour possible. 
 
We explained further that at the core of this intermingling of two otherwise separate and 
 
even irrelevant semantic schemata sits metaphor. Metaphor is the common core implied 
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in various theories that render humour possible. This way, humour is more often than 
not depicted as a cognitive or semantic artefact unique to the human imagination. 
However, the claim at the heart of a realist project of humour is that humour is not 
simply a metaphoric discussion between two separate schemata. 
 
Simon Critchley, in his book On Humour takes a crucial step out of such a 
semantic notion of humour by making the point that the cause for humour and laughter 
 
‗‘is the return of the physical into the metaphysical, where the pretended tragic 
sublimity of the human collapses into a comic ridiculousness which is perhaps even 
more tragic‘‘(Critchley, 43). Such a return of the physical reminds one of Gilles 
 
Deleuze‘s emphasis on humour in his Difference and Repetition, as the art of surfaces. 
Before elaborating more on the possibility of a realism out of humour that goes beyond a 
purely semantic notion, it is worthwhile focusing on the significance of humour in the 
thought of Deleuze. To Deleuze, humour not only does not ascend, it brings height to 
surfaces and falls, something that brings thought from heights to the earth. Humour plays 
the role of the fall; fall of what flies high above the earth. This explains to some extent 
why Deleuze‘s philosophy is one of the most proper frameworks to analyse humour, 
especially because of its geological attributes. A realist project of humour by having 
resort to such a Deleuzoguattarian approach to humour not only addresses the imaginary 
kernel of incongruity theory, but also reverses superiority theory of humour as one major 
historical theorization of laughter and humour. It will be explicated throughout this study 
that while superiority theory of humour implies a derisive laughter of some higher 
subjects at some lower others, the realism of humour, by reserving the same degree of 
lowness for all subjects, exempts subjects from such human laughter of superiority and 
yields them instead to an inhuman laughter in a relational sense and between them. In 
effect, humour and its relation to lowness or whatever is low or even banal, whatever is 
emptied of its height and depth, makes it closer to a philosophy that starts with earth. 
Claire Colebrook puts it this way: 
 
Humour falls or collapses: 'down' from meaning and intentions to the 
singularities of life that have no order, no high and low, no before and 
after. Humour can reverse or pervert logic, disrupt moral categories or 
dissolve the body into parts without any governing intention (2004, 
136). 
 
Humour as depicted here is an art of lowness, of coming from heights to surfaces 
and the disruption of expectations. I aim to highlight two points in such a conception of 
humour. Firstly, this humour as mentioned is bound to earth and lowness, and if any 
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expectation is disrupted, it falls or collapses from an inflated and meaningful height to 
a fall. This already surpasses a purely semantic understanding of humour and implies 
some pragmatic facets of humour which do not limit expectations to cognitive or 
semantic ones (as in the Incongruity Theory). 
 
Secondly, and what is equally significant to such realism, humour does not exist in 
isolation as its societal and collective nature makes it hard to think of humour in isolation 
befalling this or that specific entity: humour does not exist except in relation or in 
relationality. Such an immanent understanding of humour makes it possible to seek 
beyond a solely semantic or linguistic framework or a superior mode, a pragmatic 
framework of humour in its materialistic sense. However, it seems that irony and satire 
have their own criteria and their own targets where in irony the aim is to elevate to a 
higher point of view, and satire aims to deepen a superficial meaning, humour equally 
needs criteria to function. If any raison d'être is imagined for humour it is bringing low 
what pretends to height. This makes it evidently different from the raison d'être in irony 
which is based on a higher vantage point. Irony presupposes formed and fulfilled subjects, 
‗‘a subject that must have preceded the act of speaking or narrating- a subject that can 
never be located in this world because he is the author of the world‘‘ 
(Colebrook, 139). 
 
If there is going to be a framework for humour and its (ir)rationality, it is neither 
in heights, nor in depths, but rather located on earth and its surfaces. Following the 
Deleuzoguattarian conception of the Earth in A Thousand Plateaus, we argue that 
earth bears humour inside, however cruel and inhuman, the earth provides a virtuality 
for humour that can constantly be actualized in this or that form. These flows are not 
as subjective and conscious; there are forces gathered together that like strata of the 
earth act upon each other and force an amalgamation of forces which can be thought 
of as what Deleuze and Guattari call assemblages. To define assemblages, it should be 
highlighted that one major characteristic of assemblages is that they are not the result 
of consciousness. It is no surprise because Deleuze ''explicitly directed his reading of 
Nietzsche against Hegelian idealism, his true enemy is the entire tradition of 
philosophy that attempts to interpret life in terms of meanings produced within 
consciousness. Instead, all life can only be understood in terms of relations of forces 
expressed through bodies‘‘ (Goodchild, 29). 
 
 
Therefore prior to stressing the significance of humour in such a philosophy, it 
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should be borne in mind that such relations between assemblages and their constructing 
 
forces are of extreme significance to such a philosophy; relations are given priority to 
 
any essential entity as constituent of subjects. It goes without saying that this entails a 
 
Deleuzoguattarian vitalism which is an attempt to restore to life its significance beyond 
 
conscious and subjective meaning. Defining life in terms of forces and starting with 
 
movement as the crucial component of life has numerous implications not only for 
 
thought but also for living beings, both philosophically and ethically. As Deleuze puts it 
 
in his Cinema 1: The movement-image, 
 
If one had to define the whole, it would be defined by relation. Relation is 
not a property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also 
inseparable from the open, and displays a spiritual or mental existence. 
Relations do not belong to objects, but to the whole, on condition that this 
is not confused with a closed set of objects. By movement in space, the 
objects of a set change their respective positions. But, through relations, 
the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively (19). 
 
 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari‘s definition of assemblages is an attempt in 
 
their materialist orientation to dispense with any transcendent notion of organizing 
 
agents. Assemblages are bits ‗plugged into‘ one another that function without having 
 
been attributed an essence. Assemblages as presented in A Thousand Plateaus do not 
only offer a materialist emphasis but also a vitalist notion that comes from Spinoza
1
. 
 
The emphasis in Deleuze and Guattari‘s notion of assemblages is on the relationality of 
 
all beings but also that beings, by entering into new relations and assemblages, undergo 
 
change and hence are dynamic. Therefore rather than their intrinsic and essential 
 
characteristics, beings are composed of the relations they commence with one another. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari‘s philosophy of difference is founded on a notion of difference 
 
that is not subordinated to identity where by excluding substance from Spinoza‘s 
 
philosophy,  one  comes  across  an  entirely differential  universe.  For  Deleuze  and 
 
Guattari power to act which is puissance (rather than pouvoir which is power to 
 
dominate) is the source of producing assemblages. Deleuze‘s philosophy of difference 
 
leads  to  the  formation  of  assemblages  or  consistencies  that  are  able  to  justify 
 
 
 
1 Baroch Spinoza, in his Ethics and through elaborating affects, introduces joy (laetiti), and sorrow    
(tristitia) to desire (cupiditas). By translating laetiti to joy and cupiditas to wretchedness, one can say 
that these two are forces in relation to one‘s power of existence or puissance: some affects such as 
hatred and bad conscience diminish one‘s power of living and some others develop and boost it as 
positive affects: hence Deleuzoguattarian reliance on the latter which mixed with Nietzsche‘s reading 
of active/ reactive forces, leads to their vitalist project. (de Spinoza, Benedict, and Edwin Curley. 
"The Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I." (1985). 
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complexities and dynamics that exist in life in its materialist sense, without taking 
 
refuge in a transcendent being. Assemblages are created constantly based on ‗relations 
 
of exteriority‘ which by excluding essence imply that bits and parts can be detached 
 
from one assemblages and be attached or ‗plugged‘ into another assemblages. If 
 
transcendent conceptions of life, politics and ontology yield themselves to a notion 
 
where relations are essential and based on interiority (which means necessary relations), 
 
assemblages are founded on a notion of exteriority; a fact that places emphasis on the 
 
contingency of a bit co-habiting with other parts. By eschewing the traditional sense of 
 
interiority, Deleuze and Guattari's materialism advances towards questioning subject as 
 
the formed and stable locus by assemblages. Deleuze‘s rejection of interiority is of 
 
significance in his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, as he argues that, 
 
Every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and 
the fly. So an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with 
the world. The interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a 
projected interior. The speed or slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, 
actions, and reactions link together to constitute a particular individual 
in the world (125). 
 
Assemblages play a prominent role in this philosophy to shed light on 
subjectivation rather than subjects, or multiplicities rather than multiples. The 
 
significance of assemblages as one can notice is not inherent in the being of things or a 
 
fixated and static reality or essence but rather in the ways things are connected and the 
 
way such assemblages affect each other and are affected. However as any assemblage 
 
needs to preserve its connections at least for a short while, in order to exist and interact, 
 
this brings them to the point that assemblages bear territorial features, namely they are 
 
stabilized at least for a while. Nevertheless, this is not a comprehensive conception of 
 
assemblages since there are other facets within assemblages that lead them away from 
 
their current status. If assemblages are territorial, there is a deterritorialising dimension 
 
which fosters becoming in assemblages. The very focus of the latter is on relations and 
 
their becomings in a dynamism which questions any transcendent totalities. In  A 
 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari claim that, 
 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between 
things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is 
alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb ―to be,‖ but the 
fabric of the rhizome is ―and, and, and…(25). 
 
Deleuzoguattarian ‗in-between‘ or intermezzo is the locus of deterritorialisation 
 
and yet it should be added that deterritorialisation eludes any attempt to be defined, 
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delimited and determined. The horizontal axis which contains ‘‘machinic assemblages of 
bodies, actions and passions‘‘ and a ‘‘collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and 
statements, of incorporeal transformations of bodies‘‘(88). is exposed to the horizontal 
axis with ‗territorial sides, or reterritorialised sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges 
of deterritorialisation, which carry it away. Instead of being inclined to transcendence, the 
between renders deterritorialisation immanently possible. Far from attempting an 
epistemology of this ‗between‘, which would contradict the entire Deleuzoguattarian 
pragmatic project, one can still scrutinize this ‗between‘ to see how different relations, 
compositions and assemblages are affected and nurtured by this 
 
‗between‘. Despite the vagueness of between, this study is an attempt to place 
emphasis on how humour can be defined based on a relational and dynamic 
conception of beings which is attributed to assemblages. Thereby, realism in humour 
renders laughter possible in an asubjective mode and between assemblages. 
 
Assemblages are real and are formed perpetually around us and this helps us 
explain how a realist conception of humour that is not limited to discursive 
phenomena is explainable in terms of assemblages. While incongruity theories make 
various attempts to define humour in terms of a metaphoric communication between 
semantic scripts, assemblages negotiate in an intermezzo as the possible candidates 
for humour. Assemblage, as a materialist conception of the vitalist project in Deleuze 
and Guattari, helps dispense with a static as well as a linguistic understanding of 
humour that has recourse to a fixed subject, and the emphasis inherent in assemblages 
is on emergent unities without underestimating the heterogeneity of components. This 
way, humour has a lot to do with becoming and movement; humour is an ability of 
perpetually laughing at the fixed positions attributed to a subject. This vitalist 
understanding conceives of humour in a way which is based on becoming and the 
molecular and ephemeral emergence of humour. But it is no less important to take 
into account the ontological consequences of underestimating or neglecting humour. 
Admittedly a Deleuzoguattarian depiction of humour targets more a political facet 
where humour in its very tiny, minuscule and microscopic presence is a mechanism to 
resist totalitarianism. The significance of humour that results in becoming cannot be 
understood unless its rejection and negation are sufficiently depicted. Rejecting 
humour as a banal and trivial feature has its own ontological consequences that will 
be explained. 
 
The realism offered here argues that although this vitalist conception has a lot to 
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do with humour and can explain humour as the moment when one embraces another 
subject or another system, it does not explain fully the absence or rejection of 
humour. In other words, becoming can easily depict how humour, in its realism and 
not in the metaphoric conception, functions in assemblages and their becomings. But 
the negation of humour and its real consequences, both ethically and ontologically 
should be investigated differently and beyond the vitalist slogan of becoming. The 
main assumption of such realism has it that humour is inexorable for human subjects 
and consequently any rejection of humour only renders another laughter possible: a 
laughter which takes the supposed-subjects as its object of laughter. By defining an 
inhuman laughter that emerges out of repudiation of humour in a specific subject and 
its relation with others this project moves towards excavating a realism from humour-
itself namely a derisive realism. If vitalist humour is founded on the constant opening 
to movement and dispensing with fixed positions defined for a subject, the inhuman 
laughter befalls those subjects who have been rejecting humour and moulds them to 
accessorial for its own laughter. Where vitalist humour opens new vistas of becoming 
and openness for a subject, inhuman laughter is the result of a cessation and halt in a 
subject that by avoiding humour becomes utterly comic. 
 
In order to explain the humour abstention and the ensuing inhuman laughter 
immanently, we have recourse to Leibniz‘ understanding of knowledge and perception 
that was quickly mentioned in contrast to Locke‘s viewpoint. The way humour functions 
within assemblages can be stated as follows: if according to Leibniz‘ framework not all 
perception yields to knowledge, one acknowledges that whatever is fulfilled by an 
assemblage or a subject is not fully comprehensible and even sensible and we introduce 
humour as a tool which is founded on such residuals of perception that cannot be 
transferred to knowledge. In the absence of perpetual moments of humour, an assemblage 
conceals what cannot be transferred to knowledge as its defects and shortcomings and 
under the guise of a serious gesture. Such avoidance of humour sparks and tickles 
inhuman laughter where the same subject or assemblage turns out to be ridiculous. By 
rendering visible the commonly invisible or normally guised and hidden parts that a 
subject or assemblage conceals in order to maintain its serious face, inhuman laughter 
makes another laughter possible. Following Leibniz‘s framework, aside from perceptions 
that yield to knowledge there are ‗petites perceptions‘(Remnant and Bennett, lxxvii) 
which are never fully apperceived, in the same vein, what is concealed by an assemblage 
in its relation to other assemblages which forms the 
 
 
25 
 
invisible part of assemblages is the site of petites perceptions that renders inhuman 
laughter possible, hence a relation between invisible facets of assemblages and 
humour. But to start with this and the idea of petites perceptions in Leibniz and the 
way we make use of it in relation to a realist project of humour and in assemblages, 
we need to highlight the difference between Locke‘s and Descartes‘ understanding of 
mind and the one offered by Leibniz. To the former, mentality and consciousness are 
almost the same thing, in other words there is nothing that skips consciousness, 
whereas for the latter awareness has degrees and for any perception, there are various 
petites perceptions. Such petites perceptions are not unconscious perceptions. In 
effect, Leibniz's text New Essays on Human Understanding is a response to John 
Locke's Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1690), and Leibniz' attempt is to 
show that ''there is in us an infinity of perceptions...of which we are unaware because 
these impressions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying, so 
that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own'' (Leibniz, 53). 
 
We claim that molecular humour is one main mechanism while renders these 
petites perceptions visible; by evading humour, such petites perceptions provoke the 
emergence of inhuman laughter where one becomes the victim of laughter. While 
 
Leibniz‘ theory is to explain monads, by reserving the differences between the two, 
we aim to apply this theory to assemblages and hold that humour is the function by 
which what is unconscious in an assemblage becomes conscious, or better to say what 
is implied in an assemblage becomes explicit. At the same time, the emphasis in a 
realist project of humour should be on the immanent mechanism where it is only in 
relation to other assemblages that what is implied in one assembles becomes explicit. 
 
By relying on such conception of assemblages and their interaction such realism 
claims that humour is realized between assemblages or how new and emergent coming-
together of different components in one assemblage. In effect, the question will be: by 
surpassing subjective humour that is normally willed and intended by subjects, to what 
extent one can look for humour in a non-subjective mode as presented between 
assemblages. What we look for is the conditions of a realism in humour within and 
between assemblages that is not limited to an imaginary conception of humour as stated 
in incongruity theories. By bringing humour to a non-discursive model defined through 
assemblages, we aim for a realism beyond mere textual and rhetorical conceptualization 
and in networks of relations between assemblages. Linguistic and cognitive models of 
humour limit humour to a metaphoric elasticity between semantic 
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or cognitive spheres, whereas in a realist sense, humour is seen as ''the art of surfaces, 
the art of thinking the noises, sensations, affects and sensible singularities, from 
which bodies are composed, bodies that can then have relations‘‘ (Colebrook, 132). 
 
As explained before, the metaphoric depiction of humour leans heavily on 
already-shaped subjects who produce and distribute humour; in contrast, a realist 
understanding of humour pictures humour as a phenomenon that befalls subjects or 
assemblages in their relations and in the midst of their dynamism. What is at stake in 
relation to humour is that the inability to grasp humour in its most microscopic and 
molecular manifestation culminates in the very ridicule of assemblages. Assemblages 
in their constant encountering with one another need to incorporate humour in their 
communication or they will be (gradually) ridiculed by inhuman laughter. Yet 
humour is not something that assemblages will to happen, rather it is something that 
an assemblage admits from the outside in its ethical relation with other assemblages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A hypothetical depiction of assemblages in communication on a socius. This 
socius looks to have been made up of lines, but it is composed of around 70 ovals. 
 
In order to tackle the question in relation between inhuman laughter and 
assemblages Bergson‘s analysis of laughter can be invited into account, a philosopher 
whose vitalist philosophy was a source of influence and inspiration to Gilles Deleuze. 
However, what is curious is that although Deleuze relied a lot on Bergson‘s notions of 
time and movement and becoming, and although he devoted a chapter of Logic of Sense 
to humour, he did not develop any idea concerning humour and laughter based on 
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Bergson‘s book le Rire. Yet, Bergson is among the very few philosophers who have 
written specifically on laughter and humour. It is nearly impossible in the history of 
philosophy to find laughter and humour analysed independently mainly because 
humour was always supposed to be comprehended in its human mode. Although 
Bergson deals explicitly with laughter and humour, one can argue that he is grappling 
with the idea which had for a large part dominated nineteenth century thought, 
namely that of mechanisation. 
 
Le rire by Bergson can be read against the background of his more common key 
term, namely élan vital, a term that was used seven years later in his Creative Evolution 
and requires some elaboration. Bergson introduced élan vital or vital impetus as a 
common impulse that explains all life, species and their creation. One can understand élan 
vital in relation to the Bergsonian understanding of unity of life. In its relation to matter, 
élan vital is constantly and perpetually producing new forms which stand against the 
rigidity and petrification of life. According to this interpretation, evolution and its moving 
principle are implied in élan vital; a concept that questions any determinism in the shape 
of a finalism of life or any mechanistic understanding of life, which were not uncommon 
in nineteenth century. In his Creative Evolution, both the mechanistic conception of life 
and its exclusion of dynamism and change and the teleological implications of finalism 
that profess that everything is pre-given are foregrounded and criticized; the idea of élan 
vital inspired Gilles Deleuze and influenced the entire trajectory of his philosophy. Both 
ideas of multiplicity and duration, as presented by Bergson, play significant roles in 
Gilles Deleuze‘s thought. 
 
The implications of these two concepts are not only visible in Deleuze and Guattari‘s 
concept of machine and assemblage, but prior to that in Deleuze‘s idea of becoming. 
One can argue that Gilles Deleuze‘s attempt to introduce Bergsonian concepts in his 
philosophy was mainly limited to his interest in multiplicity which resulted in a 
vitalism in his thought, and this might be a good reason for Deleuze to leave out 
 
Bergson‘s le Rire, which not only propagates duration but also introduces laughter 
and comedy as the instances where the organic is transformed to the inorganic. 
 
When reading le Rire one can have the impression that if laughter entails a 
mechanism of automatism, this is in effect possible only through pausing and halting 
the vital impulse. Therefore, not only does laughter in le Rire have nothing to do with 
the commonly acknowledged vitalism of the Bergsonian system of philosophy, in 
particular in his Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution, quite the opposite; 
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laughter is introduced as the death factor in the middle of life as it brings the organic 
to an inorganic cessation or automatism. If Bergson insists that ‗‘we laugh every time 
a person gives us the impression of being a thing‘‘ (Bergson. 1911. 53), this implies 
that there is a tacit rigidity attributed to laughter, a rigidity that blocks the vital 
impulse of an organism. In le Rire, the vital force underlying everything or the flux of 
life is analysed in relation to laughter and the comic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Three assemblages in communication and all affected by one another 
 
 
There is another dimension that makes the Bergsonian analysis of laughter even 
more interesting, especially from a Deleuzian perspective. Bergson is again among the 
few scholars who has sufficiently, if not without contradiction, analysed laughter 
without falling into the trap of psychologism. The psychological conception of 
laughter, it must be emphasized, is mostly a positive view of laughter as a 
compensating tool for the soul. The idea has kept its essence in body-politics where 
laughter is a way to keep the body healthy and discard negative energies. Laughter in 
its psychologism is normally reclaimed in a thermodynamic model of affects in which 
the desired goal is balance. What makes the Bergsonian conception of laughter unique 
and singular is his attempt to analyse and delineate laughter in a functional manner. 
Bergson defines a specific utility for laughter and this makes laughter immediately a 
social phenomenon. Thus, one can say with some confidence that social relations play 
a more important role for Bergson than the psychological ones. 
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Figure 5. When two assemblages undergo humour, and the third which has been rejecting humour halts 
comically. Not only this assemblage is not able to incorporate humour in its communication with other 
assemblages, but also it becomes an object of laughter. 
 
 
Although Bergson brings laughter and comedy to a functional front, it must be 
admitted that Bergson‘s use of machine and machinism is evidently different from 
Deleuze‘s. There is something mechanical that permeates in something living. This 
requires due attention since it once more results in a sharper difference from the 
psychologism of laughter. When Bergson explicates how laughter works, he argues that a 
tension is required and this tension, interestingly, is in a living organic laughter body and 
results in an organic moment of cessation. Life, or the organic ‗presents itself to us as 
evolution in time and complexity in space‘(44); it is a flow, an ongoing flow. The main 
interpretation of Bergson is focused on where this mechanical force intervenes in the 
organic flow and stops it in a corrective way. It is something that Bergson himself 
emphasizes as a corrective act to modify what is anti-social. Arguably, what defines 
 
Bergson‘s framework is that laughter is where something living becomes mechanical; 
this is comic and makes us laugh: something that can hold of assemblages and their 
relations. 
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1.5 Automatism 
 
 
Whatever is not cosmic is comic. (Jones, 63) 
 
 
Despite the prominent role Henri Bergson plays in the compilation and configuration of 
 
Gilles  Deleuze‘s  thought,  his classical  book le  Rire  falls  outside  of  Deleuze‘s 
 
appreciation. This becomes more remarkable when seen against the background of 
 
Gilles Deleuze‘s celebration of humour and laughter. Although Deleuze and Guattari 
 
have not developed many philosophical concepts concerning humour and laughter, it 
 
has not escaped their attention and even their practice of philosophy. Humour is 
 
extremely practical and contributes heavily to their immanent conception of desire 
 
which  opposes  the  classical  ironic  gesture  that  culminates  in  transcendence  or 
 
ascension. In his introduction to Anti-Oedipus, Michael Foucault calls the entire book 
 
an attempt or an ‗Introduction to the non-fascist life‘(xlii) and maintains that Deleuze 
 
and Guattari have managed to discern power through ‗neutralizing the effects of it‘(xliii) 
 
and this is all rendered possible through humour. 
 
 
But these are the familiar traps of rhetoric; the latter work to sway the 
reader without his being aware of the manipulation, and ultimately win 
him over against his will. The traps of anti-Oedipus are those of 
humour: so many invitations to let oneself be put out, to take one‘s 
leave of the text and slam the door shut. The book often leads one to 
believe it is all fun and games, when something essential is taking 
place, something of extreme seriousness: the tracking down of all 
varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us 
to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our 
everyday lives (Deleuze and Guattari, xlii). 
 
What is evidently accentuated in Foucault‘s grasp can be traced back to Deleuze‘s 
 
earlier works where, like in his Logic of Sense and the following series on ‗Nonsense 
 
and Paradox‘, he comes to humour and devotes the nineteenth series to humour. 
 
Although Deleuze has extensively utilized and usurped Bergson‘s concepts including 
 
movement, durée and l‘élan vital, the book Laughter does not play any significant role, 
 
at least in Deleuze concerning Deleuze‘s occupation with laughter . 
 
What  counts for Deleuze in his  reading of  Bergson is  more  a question of 
 
movement, while le Rire is, quite to the contrary, a work that highlights halt and 
 
cessation. Therefore, it should not come as surprise to see that this does not fit in 
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Deleuze‘s construction; more importantly, this reading of laughter might even endanger 
components of Deleuze‘s use of Bergson. Once again and in order to explicate how 
Bergson‘s framework contributes to such realism, we start with the implicit axiom in such 
realism of humour, either an assemblage hears laughter in its relation with other 
assemblages and takes part in it or it keeps avoiding humour in its relation with other 
assemblages to the extent of being ridiculed. Realist humour grants the Being the ability 
to laugh. Yet, this inhuman laughter is only heard in relation between different 
assemblages and their immanent disposition to one another. Inhuman laughter depends 
heavily on the Being as it is the only substance that keeps hold of different assemblages 
in the relation to one another; it is the very source of any humour in and within 
assemblages, ‗‘This sole and unique substance is, as such, self-sufficient and infinite 
 
(whereby ‗infinite‘ means that it contains within it all individuals without exception; 
it is omnitudo realitatis)‘‘ (Frank, 67). 
 
In this regard, and since no assemblage has full access to the absolute and is 
imprisoned in its relative state, humour can function to reduce and constrain knowledge 
that any assemblage is able to produce or claim. Being is not based on knowledge as 
Hölderlin insists—rather it is perceived through feeling and what is called intellectual 
intuition. By maintaining its transitive relation through humour, we argue that an 
assemblage increases its ability to interact with other assemblages, whereas by sticking to 
its knowledge, an assemblage is likelier to reduce its transitive ability and potentials in 
relation to Being. In other words, any assemblage through its proximity to such 
transitivity and its openness to Being is able to constantly undergo becoming through 
applying humour to itself. On the other hand, when an assemblage starts losing its 
connection to the transitivity of humour, it does nothing but expand its knowledge but 
remains bereft of intellectual intuition. Such knowledge leads to objectifying other 
assemblages and ignoring their becoming. This process of objectification is a reflective 
one which means once an assemblage loses its transitive ability and commences 
objectifying others; it is the same assemblage which becomes objectified. Although all 
assemblages are conditioned and limited in their production of knowledge, it is only 
through humour in its relation with other assemblages that an assemblage maintains a 
constant relation to the unconditioned which is beyond the reach of any assemblage. 
 
In this respect, the unconditioned is the incomprehensible itself (das 
Unbegreifliche selbst) (for I can never grasp it in conceptual thought). But 
it is not therefore unknown, quite the contrary, it reveals itself as ‗an 
unmediated certainty which not only is no need of any foundations, but 
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also excludes all foundations (Frank, 79). 
 
Since no assemblage functions independently, and they are all  defined  and 
 
diffused on one same ground, their knowledge is incommensurate with that of ground 
 
which functions independent of assemblages. In other words, once any assemblage 
 
seeks any ultimate knowledge, it will be ridiculed by the ground (derided) 
 
This ultimate (or highest) knowledge can not have to seek its real 
ground in something else. Not only is it itself independent of 
something higher, but, since our knowledge proceeds from 
consequence to antecedens or vice versa, that which is the highest and 
for us the principle of all knowledge (Erkennens), must not be 
knowable (erkennbar) through another principle, that is to say that the 
principle of its being and the principle of its being-known have to 
coincide, be one and the same, given that it can not be known but 
precisely because it is itself not something different (Frank, 80). 
 
The inhuman laughter has its own (ir)rationality and realist project on humour 
 
attributes the pivotal function of such laughter to is addressing any positing of the 
 
absolute or any attempt at rendering unconditioned what is conditioned. 
 
Unconditioning what is conditioned is already a flight from the earth than can entail 
 
different degrees of deceit or hypocrisy and it will be met with hilarity and ridicule. 
 
Humour  as  the  art  of  falling  and  descending  will  bring  down  to  the  earth  any 
 
conditioned  state  which  pretends  to  be  unconditioned  yet  when  a  subject  or  an 
 
assemblage rejects such humour, inhuman laughter intervenes and derides it. However, 
 
as we discussed in relation between beings and assemblages, such ridicule does not 
 
apply in a direct and transcendental mode, rather this ridicule takes places immanently 
 
between different assemblages or subjects involved and in relation to one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 (mou) Rire 
 
 
Bergson expands and elaborates his understanding of laughter in order to show that 
 
laughter, in its corrective mode takes place in the movement of being towards being a 
 
thing when we notice that ‗‘something mechanical encrusted upon the living‘‘ (39) The 
 
three main motifs that reveal Bergson‘s concern for laughter are its ‗human attachment‘, 
 
‗the absence of feeling‘ and its ‗social‘ facet. These three components, all significant in 
 
their philosophical reverberation, serve to give Bergson an understanding of laughter 
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and the comedy that corresponds to the dominant mechanization of the nineteenth 
century. Although ‗the lack of elasticity‘ is the main materialist description in 
producing laughter, Bergson avoids to a large extent a psychologism of laughter 
which pre-empts its social role in human life. Instead, Bergson accentuates the 
affinity of laughter and the comic to what is termed automatism: 
 
Because I now have before me a machine that works automatically. 
This is no longer life, it is automatism established in life and imitating 
it. It belongs to the comic (16). 
 
 
Such an emphasis helps Bergson shed light on the transformation caused by 
laughter that brings the living organism to an inorganic rigidity. This adamant 
moment in laughter is emblematic of the absence of élan vital where an organism is 
being veered from the path of life and its inherent flux. Bergson ends his treatment of 
laughter by gathering all three aforementioned characteristics in the corrective face of 
laughter. Yet, one can say that this depiction of ‗[t]his absent-mindedness in men and 
in events‘(87-88) is not so far from one key concepts of Bergson‘s namely flux. The 
notion of machine in Deleuze is not one borrowed from Bergson, yet by applying 
 
Bergson‘s notion of laughter to Deleuze‘s assemblages new vectors arise that resonate 
in the relations assemblages make to one another. Bergson does not designate a 
machine-like role to laughter, but entrenches laughter as a machinic pole that, in 
Deleuzian terms, might bring any machine to a disagreeable halt. 
 
It should be emphasized again that Deleuzoguattarian assemblages, which provide 
an alternative to social configurations, are more faithful to the flux concepts stressed in 
Bergsonian thought and have not much in common with the Bergsonian conception of 
laughter depicted in le Rire. The mosaic and transitory nature of assemblages do not fit a 
human laughter as Bergson describes it, yet there might be a laughter of assemblages 
which may allow us to see how an inhuman laughter is equally plausible. If Bergson 
introduces laughter as the moment when an organic entity becomes inorganic, then 
humour embraced by an assemblage should be distinguished from inhuman laughter 
which occurs in the aftermath of rejecting humour. When an assemblage is able to absorb 
humour and apply it to itself infinitely and in a molecular sense, it would also be able to 
apply it in relation to the other assemblages around it. On the other hand when a rift 
develops between my abilities (Spinozist conatus) and my obligations (morality), I can be 
separated from my power and instead entertained with an illusion of a height or 
transcendence (which as we discussed will be a target of 
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humour). 
 
An assemblage perpetually observes the relation between what it bears inside 
and what it does outside. In effect, this highlights the crucial difference between 
morality and ethics concerning assemblages. While morality is the question of ‗what 
must I do?‘ in relation to constraining rules of transcendent judgements and values, 
ethics contains the question of ‗‘what I can I do?‘‘ (Smith, 67) which implies the 
perpetual and active relation between one‘s being and its beliefs and thoughts. The 
immanence of ethics‘ object of criticism‘‘ is anything that separates a mode of 
existence from its power of acting—and what separates us from our power of acting 
are, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence‘‘(Smith, 68). 
 
Once humour is seen in relation to the question of ethics (and not morality), it does 
not question the authenticity of ethics, rather it reveals how the moral law and of 
representations of moral value in their extreme seriousness emerge out of an ambiguous 
and variable set of repressive and creative processes and humour can set them free 
(James, 150). Instead of taking a judgemental posture outside all actions and events and 
evaluating life from such a vantage point, humour descends to life and its active forces. 
Humour attaches itself to a multiplicity in life and reveals itself in such low multiplicity 
and in the very eruption which is inherent to life. Without taking refuge in reactive forces 
which perform moral judgement. Humour implies active forces simply because it helps 
actualize what is repressed, be it subject or in assemblages. The active/ reactive 
distinction is mainly presented in Nietzsche‘s Genealogy of Morals and is best reflected 
in Gilles Deleuze‘s Nietzsche and Philosophy and other works where becoming and the 
flux of life are contrasted with a rigid and substantial understanding of being closed to 
change. To summarize, an active force sets its aim in freeing the body and reconciling it 
to what it can do, rather than what it should do, whereas reactive forces are made to 
restrict active forces. But the process through which reactive forces function is through 
consciousness. Reactive forces, by producing knowledge, separate active forces from 
what they can do, and this way set some limits to what a body can do. As Deleuze puts it 
in Nietzsche and Philosophy,’’When reactive force separates active forces from what they 
can do, the latter also becomes reactive. Active forces become reactive‘‘ (59). 
 
Humour, as an art of descent replete with forces that can retrieve life in its physical 
and banal flow, is able to reverse reactive forces by activating and realizing what 
consciousness has repressed in the body. Humour can dispense with the ascetic and 
judgemental function in reactive forces. Ethically speaking, if humour and laughter 
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imply the joy that an assemblage, in its becoming, produces, therefore inhuman 
laughter befalls an assemblage that avoids humour: inhuman laughter overwhelms 
and befalls an assemblage which has failed to incorporate molecular humour in its 
becoming; inhuman laughter is provoked by the very reluctance of assemblages to be 
humorous. Bergson‘s thesis concerning social corrective utility of laughter claims that 
 
Laughter is, above all, a corrective. Being intended to humiliate, it must 
take a painful impression on the person against whom it is directed. By 
laughter society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it. It would fail 
in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness (92). 
 
 
As one can see, Bergson‘s social corrective laughter in his Le Rire can be 
transformed to an ontological corrective in the realism of humour. Not unlike Bergson‘s 
definition, inhuman laughter has a corrective function, and it is bereft of sympathy or 
kindness, fitting perfectly with the laughter that befalls an assemblage in the form of 
derision and as a consequence of avoiding humour in the first place. Thus, by elevating 
the social corrective function of laughter implied in Bergson to an ethical or even 
ontological level, we argue that as a result of avoiding molecular humour in its real mode, 
one would be experiencing a corrective side of laughter in terms of derision. While the 
former laughter functions via becoming and perpetual movement, the latter form of 
laughter emerges in cessation and halt. This can be seen if we translate Bergsonian 
laughter, which has a social corrective characteristic into one of a relational humour 
among assemblages as the first attempt towards a derisive realism. In his le Rire, Bergson 
had already emphasized on the absence of emotion from such 
 
‗momentary anesthesia‘ (7). Inhuman laughter, not unlike the Bergsonian depiction 
which highlights the very transformation of an organic entity, towards being inorganic 
and automatic, emphasizes the non-elasticity of an assemblage as the very result of its 
inability to be exposed to humour. In relation between desire and humour, it should be 
borne in mind that although as Colebrook highlights there are human ways of 
bringing a body to the point of zero intensity through punishment, torture and other 
techniques, yet derisive realism sees this zero intensity as an immanent orientation of 
a body which avoids humour. However what is implied in this view is that life and 
death are interwoven, 
 
 
A thought of the desire which is both life (as multiple degrees of 
difference) and death as zero intensity, where we can imagine any life 
form- such as thinking- being reduced to zero, and we can also think of 
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many points in life when this zero degree is approached (in case of 
torture, bodily exhaustion or cultural inanity). In addition to the clear 
and everyday world of positive things there is also the necessary world 
of zero intensities, for we could not imagine any quality unless there 
were the possibility of its zero intensity, the point where it would no 
longer make a difference to be felt (2006, 3). 
 
 
When an assemblage fails in its attempt to become humorous, it comes back to 
 
itself and becomes static. This moment of automatism or rigidity which entails the loss 
 
of dynamic elasticity, brings the assemblage to devenir zero. The Bergsonian definition 
 
of laughter as a cessation is extremely abstract and devoid of any interaction with other 
 
assemblages, whereas in a relational model, it is not that a cessation causes laughter, but 
 
rather that an encounter with another assemblage causes cessation and laughter. 
Inhuman laughter as functions between assemblages can neither be encapsulated in a 
 
representational view where laughter is reduced to a psychologism and cognitivism, 
 
nor can it be depicted as an autonomous entity where nothing beyond a descriptive and 
 
vitalist conception of laughter is possible. Inhuman laughter dispenses with an inherent 
 
interiority and instead emphasizes the exteriority of relations between assemblages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The way an assemblage increasingly becomes inorganic; reducing humour renders 
an assemblage to a line of thought: from humour to idea: the process from becoming-humorous to 
 
becoming-opinionated. 
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Unlike Bergson, who devoted a short book to laughter and comedy, Georges 
 
Bataille wrote here and there about laughter and his reading of laughter is, if not 
 
haphazard, quite sporadic in his various works. Georges Bataille does not simply 
 
segregate laughter from other phenomena which bear traces to transgression and excess 
 
and rather his conception of laughter is defined almost parallel to that of sovereignty 
 
which stretches knowledge to its ends. A dictionary definition of sovereignty is a state 
 
of supremacy or superiority. This implies, in a more philosophical sense, a moment 
 
when something is in a dialectical relation to another person or thing, in which one is 
 
superior and the other being inferior. Georges Bataille takes such Hegelian dialectics as 
 
occurring  between  two  sides  which  are  interdependent  and  co-existent.  In  The 
 
Accursed Share, Bataille places emphasis on the element of usefulness and maintains 
 
that being useful means being useful to somebody or something. Seen this way, ‗‘life 
 
beyond utility‘‘ (1991, 198) is the realm of sovereignty. Being useful prevents us from 
 
experiencing sovereignty and leaves us in an economy of exchange based on utility. 
 
Laughter and tears for Bataille are two significant manifestations of such an encounter 
 
with sovereignty. As he puts it in la Souveraineté: 
 
Communication is never the object of discursive knowledge, but is 
communicated from subject to subject through a sensitive emotional 
contact (contact sensible de l‘emotion): It is communicated in laughter, 
tears and in the tumult of festivities (Oeuvres complètes.VIII: 287-88). 
 
 
Bataille has dealt with laughter in various works in particular, Inner 
Experience, but it is in his Unfinished System of Non-knowledge that Bataille closely 
deals with laughter as a source for thought in general. In Bataille‘s view, laughter is 
one singular possible response to death, yet ‗it is death itself that finds a voice when 
we laugh‘(Land. 1992, xvi). Either way, the key to understanding the significance of 
laughter in Bataille is his emphasis on the tacit link between laughter and death. 
Laughter is the moment when one becomes no-one; one is lost and has become a 
mouth, an organ for laughter to be uttered and heard. As Bataille puts it in his notes in 
the preface to Madame Edwarda, 
 
What the hearty laugh screens us from, what fetches up the bawdy jest, 
is the identity that exists between the utmost in pleasure and the utmost 
in pain: the identity between being and non-being, between the living 
and the death-stricken being, between the knowledge which brings one 
before this dazzling realization and definitive, concluding darkness . . .  
our laughter here is absolute, going far beyond scorning ridicule of 
something which may perhaps be repugnant, but disgust for which digs 
deep under our skin ... the sight of blood, the odour of vomit, which 
arouse in us the dread of death, sometimes introduce us into a nauseous 
state -which hurts more cruelly than pain (Boting and Wilson, 225) 
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 Still, what we seek is not so much the limits of epistemology and philosophy 
but rather the tacit link that joins laughter and death in Bataille‘s attitude. If the 
Bataillian notion of laughter implied in the French maxim ‗le rire tue‘ bears some 
credibility then it should equally be applied to assemblages. Unless assemblages 
embrace humour in their relation to other assemblages, they fall victim to inhuman 
laughter as a moment of halt and cessation. Laughter presses on the individual 
assemblages and turns them to an inertia; it connects assemblages to a becoming-zero, 
a halt. In comparison to Bataille, Bergson is obsessed with the mechanistic conception 
of laughter that brings about automatism; however, there is an implicit connection 
between the laughter which, ―puts the equilibrium of life in danger‖ (Bataille, 
2001,114) ) and the one that is connected to death in Bataille. 
 
 
In his Visions, Georges Bataille elaborates this point in relation to sovereign 
laughter which ‗characterizes all vacant lives as ridiculous. A kind of incandescent joy—
the explosive sudden revelation of presence of being—is liberated each time a striking 
appearance is contrasted with its absence, with the human void. Laughter casts a glance, 
charged with the mortal violence of being, into the void of life‘ (176). This is the point 
where laughter empties an assemblage from its expected function and transforms it into 
an object of ridicule. This view, according to which humour has its own inhuman 
rationality defined immanently and in relation between assemblages, questions primarily 
the cognitive aspect of humour which will be elaborated in the next chapter. Nevertheless, 
such a cognitive conception of humour and laughter as bound to human will is not a very 
new phenomenon. The human and intentional understanding of humour, as elaborated 
mainly in the contemporary understanding of wit in Incongruity Theory, is utterly 
discursive. Michael Billig, in his Laughter and Ridicule, makes a comprehensive study of 
the role of laughter in relation to what is called incongruity theory. Nevertheless, Billig‘s 
target is a critique of humour mainly in its modern conception and in regard to names 
such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Addison, Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain. 
Billig argues that the positivist conception of humour stems from the gentlemanly 
understanding of wit implied in works of John Locke (Billig, 57). In his analysis, Locke‘s 
attempt is nothing but an attempt to redefine laughter in order to make it less harmful and 
asocial. In order to do so and bring laughter away from derision to witticism, Locke starts 
with a definition of 
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judgement and argues that any true judgment depends on the ‗clear discerning faculty; 
 
of the mind where it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different‘(Billig, 62). 
 
Appearance of similitude can be misleading if there really are differences between two 
 
ideas. Thus, careful judgement consists 
 
In separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found 
at least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude..If 
judgment involves carefully distinguishing between things that appear 
to be similar but which are actually different, then wit is based on the 
reverse process. It brings together ideas that are different in order to 
treat them as if they were similar. Accordingly, wit operates through 
‗the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness 
and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, 
thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the 
fantasy (Billig, 62-63). 
 
In order to illuminate the realism inherent in the inhuman laughter, both in its 
 
positive embracing of molecular humour and its derisive side in the aftermath of 
 
rejecting humour, , we need to take into account the historical trajectory that has led to 
 
the incongruity theory of laughter and humour. The crucial point implied in Incongruity 
 
theory, as we will notice, is the conscious and voluntary production of humour which is 
 
rooted mainly in John Locke and other philosophers who dispensed in their theories 
 
with the superiority theory of laughter. It will be argued that such a conscious and 
 
intentional understanding of laughter not only results in a purely discursive conception 
 
but also it leaves no room for any ethical and ontological consequence of avoiding 
 
humour. Due to its reliance on language, laughter and humour in incongruity theory are 
 
not only emptied of this asubjective dimension; it also  ignored the practical and 
 
non-discursive that is realist mode of laughter. We will argue that inhuman laughter 
 
takes into account the  constant  denial of humour through a  (ir)rationality which 
 
gradually mocks the assemblages which reject humour in molecular sense. In chapter 
 
XI ‗‘Of Discerning and Other Operations of The Mind‘‘, John Locke makes the boldest 
 
attempt to elaborate his notion of wit and humour. It is easily noticeable that what 
 
Locke offers throughout this chapter in relation to wit is based on a sharp distinction 
 
between our ability to judge and our ability to be witty. 
 
 
The difference of wit and judgment. How much the imperfection of 
accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies, either in the 
dullness or faults of the organs of sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, 
or attention in the understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural 
to some tempers, I will not here examine: it suffices to take notice, that 
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this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe in 
itself. It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that so far as this 
faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing 
one thing from another,—so far our notions are confused, and our reason 
and judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our ideas the memory 
ready at hand consists quickness of parts; in this, of having them 
unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, 
where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the 
exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason, which is to be observed in 
one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given some reason of 
that common observation,—that men who have a great deal of wit, and 
prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment or deepest 
reason (1700, 117). 
 
 
In Locke‘s viewpoint, memory plays a prominent role and it canalizes almost all 
 
our consciousness. Locke‘s view on judgement seems to be rooted in the first parts of 
 
chapter XI that is called ‗‘No Knowledge Without Discernment‘‘. There Locke stresses 
 
the significance of distinguishing between ideas in our minds. But it is worth 
mentioning that this part is followed by another which is the gist of Locke‘s idea and 
is labelled ‗Clearness Done Hinders Confusion‘. This part reminds one of Locke‘s 
 
emphasis that there is nothing in us or our memories that does not come to our 
 
perception at some point and here highlights the role consciousness plays. But what 
 
does it all have to do with humour? The view that Locke defends has a simple 
 
formulation in relation to wit: 
 
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together 
with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or 
congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in 
the fantasy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in 
separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the 
least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by 
affinity to take one thing for another (1700, 11). 
 
Although the human ability to think and perceive is equally important to Leibniz, 
 
he does not agree with the way John Locke presents it in relation to judgement and the 
 
sheer discretion between faculties. As we are focusing on Leibniz, it is worthwhile 
 
noting what Leibniz finds missing in Locke‘s system of thought. Against Locke‘s 
 
emphasis on our constant conscious perception, Leibniz argues that at every single 
 
moment there are infinite petites perceptions in us which are beyond our normal 
 
perception. 
 
Leibniz tells us that we all know that we have perceptions, that for 
example, I see red, I hear the sea. These are perceptions; moreover, we 
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should reserve a special word for them because they are conscious. It‘s 
perception endowed with consciousness, that is, perception perceived 
as such by an "I" , we call it apperception, as a-perceiving. For, indeed, 
it‘s perception that I perceive. Leibniz tells us that consequently there 
really have to be unconscious perceptions that we don‘t perceive. 
These are called minute perceptions, that is, unconscious perception 
(Deleuze, 1980). 
 
Leibniz‘s conception of petites perceptions can be contrasted to Locke‘s idea in 
relation to humour. If for Locke humour can be defined as the reverse of judgement, one 
can use Leibniz‘s idea to think that assemblages utilize petite perceptions in a gradual 
manner to produce humour. Locke‘s conception of humour seems to be the beginning of 
the modern understanding of humour as linguistic wit which is based on cognition, 
whereas realism of humour is not based on cognition and subjective decision but is more 
rooted in the gradual preparation of assemblages to experience humour. 
 
Human understanding of humour renders it, as in Locke, a gentlemanly 
phenomenon and leaves no room for any moment of ridicule in a machinic manner, 
whereas inhuman laughter introduces us to an inhuman derision that occurs between 
assemblages or subjects. Viewing humour based on consciousness is unable to 
account for the social function of humour and laughter and instead renders humour a 
subjective decision. The inherent framework in Locke‘s understanding of humour and 
laughter that became dominant in cognitive theories of incongruity is undoubtedly 
based on a static conception of human subjects. Thus by doing away with a subjective 
understanding of humour, it seems that it is through such an inhuman gesture that 
assemblages in their encounter with each other keep their ethical existence, an 
inhuman laughter which takes becoming into account. If morality in whatever form is 
founded on the judgements that descend from a transcendent mode of existence, 
Inhuman humour is an attempt to substitute the judgement of God with a derision of 
assemblages in a materialistic and gradual sense. Assemblages which in their 
participation with other assemblages, avoid being affected accumulate residuals of 
petites perceptions which cannot be transformed into knowledge and this culminates 
in their ridicule. Such tiny perceptions are insensible parts that can be left out of the 
pretension of being ethical and culminate in a state of being ridiculed. According to 
Leibniz in his New Essays on Human Understanding: 
 
It is these tiny perceptions that often determine our behavior without our 
thinking of them, and that deceive unsophisticated people into thinking 
that there is nothing at work in us that tilts us one way or another—as if 
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it made no difference to us, for instance, whether we turned left or 
right (135). 
 
Such tiny perceptions can be ignored consciously, but they do exist, not only in an 
 
individual  realm  but  also  and  more  importantly in  the  case  of  humour  between 
 
assemblages. Such tiny perceptions are the between components for Leibniz and they 
 
make it impossible for any state to leap to another state. Although such perceptions are 
 
well beyond our senses, they render any change in various degrees possible. In fact, 
 
Leibniz makes an important distinction between perceiving and being aware of effects 
 
to show that they are more effective than we think. In the case of humour, such tiny 
 
perceptions make it possible for an assemblage to be ridiculed without even knowing 
 
how and why. They are not transcendental and yet they normally escape our attention. 
 
Such molecular effects in the disposition of assemblages make one specific encounter 
 
possible that result in one or two or more assemblages being ridiculed. While Locke as 
 
it were sticks to the significance of memory, which brings his conception of laughter 
 
closer to that of wit and determined laughter, Leibniz's conception can be utilized more 
 
efficiently in regard to the contingency of laughter and humour. 
 
Every impression has an effect, but the effects aren‘t always 
noticeable. When I turn one way rather than another it is often because 
of a series of tiny impressions that I am not aware of but which make 
one movement slightly harder than the other. All our casual unplanned 
actions result from a conjunction of tiny perceptions; and even our 
customs and passions, which have so much influence when we do plan 
and decide, come from the same source. For these behavioral 
tendencies come into being gradually, and so without our tiny 
perceptions we wouldn‘t have acquired these noticeable dispositions. I 
have already remarked that anyone who excluded these effects from 
moral philosophy would be copying the ill-informed people who 
exclude insensible corpuscles from natural science (38). 
 
Affects come out of an ephemeral encounter and they are not yet forms of thought 
 
or things; affects are prior to any form of thought or any assemblage whatsoever. They 
 
are immanent, and soon after their ephemeral emergence they disappear and most often 
 
become virtual and hidden. In order to keep their relation with the outside, affects are 
 
virtualised and appear through different forms from time to time. Not only assemblages 
 
are produced through such an encounter as for instance between partial objects, but 
 
more importantly, the relation between them is also an integral part of affect function. I 
 
place the emphasis on the latter because the former has been sufficiently explored and 
 
investigated in Deleuzian analyses and comments. 
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Assemblages are constantly in participation—they encounter each other and it is 
impossible to think of them in isolation. By definition, they are social and keep 
influencing and encountering each other. It is here and in this societal function of affects 
that inhuman humour can be more elaborated. If affects run assemblages, it does not 
mean that they are fully activated; they can be kept passive for a varying degree of time 
and be activated and appear in relation to other assemblages. The very meaning of 
humour therefore can be when assemblage A in its encounter with assemblage B is able 
to actualize the hidden and virtual affects or be affected or be activated by them. Here we 
need to stress the significance of the Bergsonian conception of laughter in a more 
inhuman and less subject-oriented manner. The Bergsonian frame of laughter, from the 
start, appears to contradict any Deleuzian attempt as it has been stressed that Bergson is 
more into analysing comedy, but he ends up analysing laughter as well. Look at the three 
main characteristics of laughter for Bergson. First, comedy is necessarily human: we 
laugh at people or the things they do. Second, laughter is purely cerebral: being able to 
laugh seems to require a detached attitude, an emotional distance to the object of laughter. 
And third, laughter has a social function. Through these three principles, Bergson strives 
to depict the production of laughter. However, it should be emphasized that the 
Bergsonian conception of laughter is not a clear-cut and homogeneous picture. The result 
of a Bergsonian understanding of laughter is that laughter is a momentary halt, a 
cessation, a pause. This transient moment of laughter entails a moment of encounter 
which has caused the machine an ephemeral cessation. Thus, it is not that a cessation 
causes laughter, rather an encounter with another assemblage or another image of an 
assemblage causes a cessation in the assemblage, and one consequence of such a 
cessation is laughter. In effect, through coexistence of assemblages, any assemblage 
might be exposed to any other and this exposure can be lubricated through inhuman 
humour. Inhuman humour intervenes in relation between assemblages in order to install a 
new balance, a new disposition between assemblages. Inhuman humour through its 
derision stops an assemblage from its common functioning in a screeching halt. This 
mechanical description of laughter implies the Deleuzoguattarian framework of 
intermezzo. If the rhizome affirms life and arise ‗‘from the middle, through the middle, 
coming and going rather than starting and finishing‘‘ (Deleuze and Guattari, 25), it can be 
said that inhuman laughter is the tool that is implicated in the rhizome. 
 
 
Assemblages conceal some affects to act better and more properly and inhuman 
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laughter actualizes them and ridicules them. In other words, if assemblages explicate 
multiplicity, humour is implicated in them and reveals itself in participation between 
various assemblages. Assemblages connect and plug into one another, but humour is 
implicated between them in a more gradual mode. Assemblages communicate very 
slowly and gradually following the very Leibnizian maxim in his New Essays on 
Human Understanding. Leibniz emphasizes in his debate against Locke that ''nature 
never makes leaps (Natura non facit saltus)'' (16). Implementing this maxim in our 
conception of humour helps see this inhuman humour that results out of the 
communication between assemblages in the most immanent form. Coming to an 
understanding of the inhuman rationale of this humour is of tremendous help in seeing 
rhizome and the ways it functions; the rhizome would need an index of this inhuman 
humour in order to dispense with an understanding of multiplicity and difference 
emergent solely out of elements of chance and randomness of assemblages. 
Nevertheless, it should be underlined that we are not looking to explore the logic 
behind this randomness, rather we aim to shed light on some conditions of how to 
treat the contingency of this randomness as humorously as possible. Humour as 
between assemblages in an immanent mode is able to ridicule the assemblages that 
hide their morality, actualizing this morality in a very gradual manner and laughing at 
the assemblages that should be ridiculed in one way or another. However a catalogue 
of the different forms of ridicule and humour that may befall assemblages are hardly 
feasible for this project, suffice it for now to depict the outlines of the trajectory that 
leads to this inhuman and realistic laughter. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Dealing with Wit in Watt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trying to define humour is one of the definitions of humour (Bevis, 1). 
 
Haw! You heard that one? A beauty. Haw! Hell! Haw! So. Haw! Haw! 
Haw! My laugh, M- ?I beg your pardon. Like Tyler? Haw! My laugh, 
Mr. Watt. Yes. Of all the laughs that strictly speaking are not laughs, 
but modes of ululation, only three need detain us, I mean the bitter, the 
hollow and the mirthless. These correspond to successive, how shall I 
say successive…suc…successive excoriations of the understanding… 
(Beckett, 54). 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Needless to say, humour in modern and contemporary texts plays a crucial role, but 
 
quite  often  this  role  is  so  interwoven  with  other  elements  that  it  renders  any 
 
independent analysis of humour hardly possible, a fact that seems to have led numerous 
 
scholars (Attardo 1994,  Chiaro 2006, Raskin  1985, Sherzer 1985, Sala 2012) to 
 
investigate and analyse humour in a context-free fashion, as in one-liners, jokes or 
 
cartoons. This chapter is an attempt to shed light on the production of humour in Watt, a 
 
novel that Samuel Beckett wrote while on run in the south of France to escape the 
 
German occupation of Paris, which has made some scholars think of Watt as Beckett‘s 
 
‗‘war  novel‘‘ (Murphy,  10).  Watt,  shaped  in  and  inspired  by  a  tragic  situation, 
 
nonetheless presents itself in a hilarious and humorous way, and moves towards 
 
tragicomedy; hilarity and misery placed in proximity makes the humour in Watt both 
 
amusing and irritating which will be explicated as this chapter strives to shed light on 
 
the construction of humour in Watt. This analysis leads us to the fact that neither hilarity 
 
nor misery can be underestimated in the construction of humour in Watt. Hilarity and 
 
misery are  presented  side  by side  and  there  is  no  linear  mode  of  tracing  them. 
 
Nonetheless, the relation between these two elements can be formulated in relation to a 
 
different kind of appreciation of humour in Watt. It will be argued that the interrelation 
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between misery and hilarity in Watt has a reciprocal effect in the development of the 
entire novel. In other words, not only does hilarity play a role in the presentation of 
misery, but also misery determines the way hilarity is constructed. This chapter 
focuses on the role misery plays in the production of hilarity or the tragic side of 
comedy, whereas the other side, namely the comic side of tragedy is elaborated and 
analysed in the next chapter in Life, End of (between anxiety and humour). 
 
But, what is meant by the tragic side of comedy? Watt presents us with a laughter 
that has been treated from a miserable point of view; a laughter intermingled inevitably 
with the tragic side of the novel. Nonetheless, we argue that such presence does not lead 
to a repression of humour in Watt; rather it renders another kind of laughter possible. And 
what is unique to this laughter is that it exists without excluding the miseries surrounding 
it. In his Watt, Beckett describes three kinds of laughter. There is an ethical laughter, The 
bitter laugh laughs at that which is not good, it is the ethical laugh 
 
(Beckett, 47) then comes an intellectual laugh, ‗The hollow laugh laughs at that 
which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not good! Not true! Well well.‘ and the 
third kind of laughter is the one that is of extreme significance to this project as the 
dianoetic laugh or the risus purus. A laughter at the dianoetic or the discursive and 
intellectual process. 
 
But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, down the snout--Haw!--
so. It is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh laughing at the 
laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest joke, in a word the 
laugh that laughs--silence please--at which is unhappy (Beckett, 48). 
 
 
Watt contains all three forms of laughter. However such diaonoetic laughter is 
where this analysis focuses on. Dianoetic laughter of Beckett provides us with an 
example of hilarity and misery paired and juxtaposed. We analyse this pairing in relation 
to the linguistic model offered by incongruity theory. Following previous arguments in 
chapter one, the aim is to analyse a subjective and linguistic will to laugh throughout 
Watt. A laughter that is willed and intended and as explained earlier is extremely 
dependent on human subjects and evident in modern linguistic and cognitive models of 
humour and humour analysis. Watt, we argue, by overusing wit, reveals such linguistic 
and cognitive mechanisms in its diaonoetic laughter. Watt is divided, for ease, into two 
different modes, the first of which is an attempt of showing how Watt unveils a wit and a 
laughter that is willed, programmed and determined and the second is the laughter at this 
kind of laughter. Such laughter is not limited to a shaped joyful moment 
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willed and intended to be inserted in the middle of the tragic to make it bearable, but is 
 
one that surfaces in the middle of the thought experiment. Therefore, as Robinson puts 
 
it, the target of such laughter is both the subject and object of laughter. 
 
This final laugh is the greatest, the highest, the finest, the most inner 
and the most formal of the three. Dianoetic means relating to the 
thought process, particularly that of logical thought. Arsene's dianoetic 
laugh is, ultimately, a laugh at the human condition (''the highest 
joke''), a condition involving him as well as Watt. It is beyond the 
laughter of a man detached from the utile pursuit of meaning. It is 
laughter which includes as its target both subject and object. It is the 
laughter of a man who realizes that his own thought is an inextricable 
part of the process he is laughing at, the laughter of the Cretan who has 
just observed that all Cretans are liars (152). 
 
By showing such mechanisms in wit production, Watt makes laughter at laughter 
 
possible. However, on the other hand, Watt also makes another attempt at producing an 
 
active humour which addresses affects, presenting an active conversion of reactive 
 
affects through humour. Arguably, separating these two modes in Watt is not as easy 
 
and available as our hypothesis claims; but, an attempt is made to show them through 
 
different examples from the text. The difference between these two modes of laughter 
 
is more comprehensible in an affective manner. In a simplified way, while the former 
 
kind of laughter depends on a will to be funny and witty, the latter stems from the 
 
interaction of affects. We argue that the will to wit is possible only through excluding 
 
other affects and reducing them to some linguistic and cognitive incongruities, whereas 
 
the latter laughter is one that emerges in the middle of affects and in an immanent mode. 
 
The will to wit is a transcendent and determined act of avoiding the tragic and aiming 
 
for the comic as an a priori. Dianoetic laughter as emerged in the middle of affects 
 
laughs at what normally makes us laugh. However it has another quality (as will be 
 
elaborated more in the next chapter and in Life, End of) that makes humour possible in 
 
the face of misery. 
 
To begin, one can speak of a representational humour or laughter which depicts 
 
and implements humour in a teleological manner as something morally good (Beckett‘s 
 
first laughter). According to Somers-Hall, the question of representation brings us to 
 
the realm of mimetics which will be discussed later, but it suffices to say that the realist 
 
project of humour deals primarily with the representational conception of humour 
 
which codifies humour in language and a subsequent linguistic or cognitive framework. 
 
Representation implies the validity of the subject-predicate form of judgement, which 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
is independent of the content that fills it, and thus "creates a sharp divide between the 
form of thought and its subject matter‘‘ (Somers-Hall, 56). And by applying this to 
the scope of humour empties the very production of humour from the contingent 
relation between its form and its content and instead prioritizes a subject who decides 
and determines the very construction of humour. Such laughter is bound to a 
determination to be funny; a determination that, at its core, is an ameliorating laughter 
which implies a gradual exclusion of the tragic. The representational mode of laughter 
is a willed and determined effort to be rid of the miseries and tragic issues and as 
Beckett puts it, such laughter is more a laughter based on moral values: it is good and 
healthy to laugh. In order to shed more light on such representational mode of 
laughter, the division between two sides of humour is emphasized. 
 
A realist project of humour takes two possibilities into account: humour 
construction in its interior relation and, second, such humour in relation to its 
exteriority and in the context in which it functions. While the former underscores the 
interior logic of humour production and following that focuses on linguistic, cognitive 
and affective manners of humour production, the latter accentuates the role such 
humour plays in broader social, cultural and inter-subjective modes. Needless to say, 
the interior/ exterior dichotomy is to a large extent an arbitrary division, but 
presenting the interior (linguistic, cognitive and affective) facets of humour 
production (mainly in this chapter and the next one) paves the way to illuminating its 
inter-subjective understanding in the last two chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Overcoming Nihilism: The Interiority of Humour 
 
 
 
To simplify, a representational humour offers two prominent features: its time and 
place can be expected. This is of extreme importance for a realist project on humour 
because its target is mainly affects. Watt to a large extent evades such spatio-temporal 
expectations which mimic expectations of humour in reality. This brings us to a 
comparison between the incongruous nature of jokes and what Beckett calls the 
dianoetic gestures of humour in Watt. While the former, based on will, inserts humour 
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into various parts of the text in the hope of infusing the comic, in the latter humour 
arrives so contingently that it can ridicule the willed humour. If the will to wit leaves 
some vacancy for humour to keep the tragic bearable and even entertaining, the latter 
reveals how hilarious this act can be: laughter at laughter. Yet, since the latter targets 
affects, more importantly, it is able to transfigure the tragic to comic by usurping and 
activating tragic affects. Watt’s attempt can be seen as laughter at the representational and 
willed laughter which is determined to discard the miseries by any means. In relation 
between the aforementioned hilarity and misery which are presented side by side in Watt, 
Beckett reveals a kind of laughter which laughs at laughter. His attempt seems to be one 
of ridiculing laughter. But what kind of laughter is being ridiculed and how? The rest of 
this chapter aims to elaborate making humour ridiculous, if not miserable whereas the 
third chapter commences with misery and sheds more light on the activation of humour 
inside misery. As explained in the first chapter, humour can be thought of as a mechanism 
that transforms the reactive forces to the active ones. In this part, we aim to analyse this 
function in more detail where humour addresses affects in 
 
Watt. The term nihilism is used in a Deleuzian way (which is already inspired by 
Nietzsche) to describe the situation in which the passive forces prevail. The interior 
analysis of humour in Watt draws our attention to the role humour plays in the 
entirety of the text and in relation to existent affects of text. 
 
As the co-existence of humour with tragedy in Watt makes the dominance of such 
passive forces likelier, we need to take the interconnection between such affects into 
account. In order to deal with this internal interconnection in the text that investigates 
humour in its interior relation with other affects, this study commences with the relation 
between humour and nihilism as the ultimate dominance of passive affects. In this 
section, after giving a quick background on the question of nihilism, we will argue that 
 
Watt is a novel that, by employing the constituent elements of meaninglessness 
appropriates humour in order to produce and create a new and innovative gesture. In 
effect, Watt is an example of betraying nihilism or even cynicism from the inside in 
order to render such inconsistencies humorous rather than lamenting on the loss of 
meaning on the one hand or representing a will to produce humour on the other hand. 
 
Watt does not simply utilize a playful linguistic and rhetorical will to be witty that, at 
best, postpones nihilism. Back to our question regarding incongruity theory, Watt’s 
attempt is not limited to a linguistic witticism and humour, but also reveals a significant 
affective dimension. It is here that Watt as a tragicomedy diverges from a linguistic or 
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rhetorical attempt which, by way of imagination, seeks to the meaninglessness 
inherent in tragedy; such an attempt hardly overcomes nihilism. Ironically speaking, 
the very attempt at the heart of cognitive and linguistic witticism, more than a 
response to nihilism, is a repetition of it. Although the linguistic role of humour in 
Watt in undeniable, Watt takes a further step and plays with affects. Watt, in its 
interiority, makes it equally possible to grapple with the affects and converts their 
constituent reactive forces to active ones. But first we need more elaboration on 
nihilism as a general term. 
 
In his book, Laughing at Nothing (2003) John Marmysz makes a brilliant move to 
find some commonalities between humour and nihilism. Marmysz comprehensively 
analyses Russian (revolutionary) and German (philosophical) forms of nihilism in a 
historical and epistemological fashion. In his analysis of politics, ethology and history that 
contains significant figures from Heidegger to Camus and Mishima, he traces different 
shapes of nihilism but avoids giving a solution to this overwhelming and modern 
phenomenon. Marmysz, following Nietzsche, introduces humour and laughter as a 
mechanism against this old human anxiety that motivates one towards liveliness and a 
celebration of life. Formally speaking, the book seems to make a significant point: the 
reason why nihilism can be remedied with humour is not that, as today´s psychologism or 
bio-politics claims humour must be added to our life agenda. The reason should be found 
somewhere else. Nihilism is inherently the result of inconsistencies in life in its various 
forms. It goes without saying that the same thing, namely inconsistency or incongruity, is 
the source and inspiration for humour. Humour can simply transform the inconsistencies 
that have resulted in anxiety to the celebration of life. Nevertheless it must be emphasized 
again that the practicality of humour means that it does not transform the inconsistencies 
of life only in a metaphorical and linguistic manner. Humour in such a gesture is the 
ability to deal with them in their existential mode to celebrate life and joy instead of 
reducing existential, social and political inconsistencies to some metaphoric and 
imaginary riddles. This way humour, instead of escaping the inconsistencies in life, 
acknowledges such inconsistencies and laughs with them. Epistemologically speaking, 
nihilism is based on the distance or the 
 
‗vantage point‘ from which one views the inconsistent world around oneself, something 
that is at the core of any humorous attempt in rendering such inconsistencies funny. That 
is why any definition of humour, at least according to such incongruities, entails the prior 
state of non-sense which is foregrounded by nihilism. In another interesting 
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attempt, Simon Critchely, in his book Infinitely Demanding, tries to illuminate the 
distinction between passive and active nihilism. Critchely attributes to passive nihilism a 
certain kind of distancing and therefore a kind of dismal quality in the human behavior to 
the extent that human can be called ‗‘homo rapiens, destructive species‘‘ 
 
(277). In contrast, an active nihilist takes the same distance but, instead of looking for 
a mystical stillness as is the case with the passive one, seeks to intervene and introduce 
another possibility in a creative way. Therefore humour as an act that is founded on 
such a vantage point and maintains a comic gesture out of it is essentially an active 
one. As Keiji Nishitani in his book Self-overcoming Nihilism suggests, nihilism is 
based on a separation between the subject and object, a rift that is the very result of a 
person‘s alienation from the world (25). In fact Nishitani´s attempt is evidently rooted 
in Nietzsche´s idea of overcoming nihilism by means of nihilism. Nishitani´s 
confrontation with nihilism is depicted in a series of lectures on the subject in 1949 
which is now translated into English under the title of The Self-Overcoming of 
Nihilism. According to Nishitani, science develops this rift through crediting the 
subject as a separate and independent entity of the world and this culminates, not only 
psychologically but collectively, in a state of nihilism(137). It is interesting to add that 
unlike Marmysz who seeks the source of nihilism in inconsistencies of the world in a 
very formal mode, Nishitani´s view of nihilism is not neutral. Marmysz introduces 
nihilism and deals with it as a normal phenomenon in human history, politics and 
philosophy, whereas for Nishitani nihilism is the very result of an alienation that is 
rooted in a modern epistemology of subject-object separation. Nishitani‘s solution to 
the existing and existential problem of nihilism is not one of eradicating it or ignoring 
it, but one that overcomes it in a way that is as efficient as possible. Nishitani, who is 
partly influenced by the ideas of Martin Heidegger and partly inspired by his Japanese 
 
Zen background, argues for ‗letting nihilism overcome itself‘ in an immanent act. 
 
(xxviii). Nishitani looks for a foundational integration of what he calls creative 
nihilism and finitude, something that he acknowledges as ´a horizon for important 
contacts with Buddhism´(125). According to Nishitani, Nietzsche is unique among 
western philosophers in opening the door to joy and play out of frustration of 
nihilism. It is, in fact quite common among western nihilists to be engaged with 
nihilism without being able to tackle or overcome it. Nishitani takes laughter as the 
prominent component in Nietzsche´s philosophy that ends in a humorous gesture. 
 
While Nishitani‘s ideas are evidently rooted in Nietzsche, there is also another 
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philosopher, Max Stirner, who plays an equally important role in the book. Max Stirner's 
work is basically made to highlight the significance of this axiom, 'Ich hab mein Sach auf 
Nichts gestelt' long before Nietzsche and Sartre. This axiom, according to Stirner unveils 
the characteristic of western ego as the autonomous ego that is grounded on nothing 
outside itself (33). Yet, this ''nothing but himself‘'(149) provides an ambiguous case, since 
it yields two possibilities. On the one hand, one can see only nihility and lack and, based 
on that, the beginnings of perpetual desire (something that leads us to Jacques Lacan), or 
one seeks this lack actively and creatively. In other words, nothingness is no more seen 
outside me, but it is something that in an active gesture, I try to merge with. Stirner 
chooses the latter in order to see activity and positive act out of nothingness in order to set 
the self free. Keiji Nishitani's in his book tries to show that Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Stirner, as the main thinkers of nihility, have one common concern, ‗‘the fundamental 
integration of creative nihilism and finitude.‘‘ (172) This requires the self to experience a 
depth of nihility and, after having touched this bottom or this void, then be able to realize 
creative nihilism. This active realization should be distinguished from what Nishitani 
attributes to Nietzsche‘s own attempt: the problem of sincerity. Nishitani believes that, 
according to another note in Nietzsche, the will to illusion (Wille zum Schein) takes 
‗‘what is not true and set it up as truth; and the realization of this will is the foundation 
from which sincerity arises‘‘(43). 
 
It should not be forgotten that the primary aim for Nishitani is to deal with the 
nihilism that had arisen in Japan, yet he is able to extend his approach to nihilism in its 
entirety. Nishitani, instead of dealing with nihilism in an objective manner, introduces the 
subjective modes where nihilism emerges and opens up to an individual. Nishitani argues 
that there are stages where nihilism uncovers: the first stage is where one is keeping a 
crack on his or her existence, something that might be evidently still constrained in a 
psychological frustration or extended to a more existential set of questions. In the second 
phase, the person, instead of asking himself about the Darkness that has overwhelmed 
him, and instead of looking at his injured self, goes on to ask, 
 
‗Who is this self?‘ ‗Who am I?‘ Broadly speaking, instead of looking for pathological 
answers and recovering from such problems through questions such as ―Why did this 
happen to me?‖ or ―What can I do?‖, one transforms these questions to what Nishitani 
calls ´the realization‘ of nihility (43) through questions such as who am I? or why do I 
exist? Something that is called Great Doubt in Zen Buddhism. Nevertheless this great 
doubt, instead of annihilating self, evacuates it from its ground and presents itself as a 
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reality. According to James Heisig, Nishitani´s emphasis on the word ‗realization‘ 
must be understood in its double sense in English where beside a subjective 
connotation, there exists a ‗‘non-subjective meaning too, an actualization of 
something non-subjective‘‘ (220). 
 
It is from this second stage onward that one realizes the rapport where nihilism is 
yielded to nothingness. Evidently, one needs to take one step through nihilism and the 
realization of nihilism to come across the nothingness that embraces everything. This is 
the third stage where the nihility is itself nullified. It must be stressed again that nihility is 
not ignored or avoided or cured through embracing reality. Nihility is not annihilated and 
fought; rather it is elevated from a relative nihilism that overwhelms the self to an 
absolute nothingness that surrounds everything. This stage uncovers šðnyat, the Buddhist 
stage where nihility is emptied out. According to Heisig, it must be borne in mind that 
such absolute nothingness does not spring out of the aggravation of nihility, but is rather 
the fruit of the negation of nihility. One can already hear the Nietzschean echoes which 
run through the whole project but this voice is doubled through the Buddhist affirmation 
of the absolute nothingness. ''The most remarkable feature of 
 
Nietzsche‘s ‗religion‘ may be the sound of laughter that echoes through it. He teaches 
that one can laugh from the ground of the soul, or rather that the soul‘s 'groundless 
ground‘ is laughter itself.‘‘ (Nishitani, 66) 
 
Although humour in Watt has a lot of linguistic and rhetorical facets, it is supported 
by an active affirmation of life. Such affirmation, we argue, is not laid in the cognitive 
construct of humour, but in the affective mechanism of the text. In other words, even if 
Watt resorts to language to produce humorous moments, it addresses the dominance of 
forces that Gilles Deleuze calls reactive forces. If according to Gilles Deleuze (1988, 41), 
and inspired by Spinoza, consciousness normally provokes sad affects replete with 
reactive forces, humour is a tool to transmute these affects to joyous active ones. Reactive 
forces in forms of bad conscience and ressentiment separate our body from acting on its 
own to affirm itself. The dominance of consciousness that belittles and degrades life 
hardly allows body to do what it can do. The Spinozist key phrase of Deleuze (and 
Guattari) that says nobody knows ‗what a body can do‘ (41) is in effect comprehensible 
based on such tension between knowledge and body and the very inability and 
inadequacy of consciousness that sets the limits of body. Setting humour beyond a 
cognitive will entails a function of releasing body from the demands of consciousness 
which is only made possible through converting affects to something 
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active. Humour can act in the midst of forces that compose a body and its abilities in the 
 
form of liberating body and its potentials that are normally repressed by morality and its 
 
knowledge  and  plays  a  prominent  role  in  the  relation  between  different  forces, 
 
especially  by  restoring  active  forces  that  have  been  reactive.  In  effect,  this  is 
 
worthwhile to add that from a Deleuzian perspective reactive forces can dominate a 
 
body, yet their triumph is nothing but making active forces in a body reactive, as 
 
Deleuze himself states: 
 
It must not be said that active force becomes reactive because reactive 
forces triumph; on the contrary, they triumph because, by separating 
active force from what it can do, they betray it to the will of 
nothingness, to a becoming-reactive themselves. This is why the 
figures of triumph of reactive forces (ressentiment, bad conscience, 
and the ascetic ideal) are primarily forms of nihilism (2006 59-60). 
 
 
 
 
2.3 The Incongruity Theory Once More! 
 
 
Now the question regarding the significance attributed to humour is whether a purely 
 
cognitive and linguistic delineation of humour in Watt, which neglects the significance 
 
of affects, is able to grapple with such nihilism? What is the humour in Watt supposed 
 
to do? In effect, by analyzing different pieces of Watt, one strive to see the rapports 
 
between the language of the text and its humour mainly because the majority of 
 
incongruity theories of humour start with language. Furthermore, we come closer to see 
 
what is the target of its humour? 
 
Until Watt began to invert, no longer the order of the words in the 
sentence together with that of the sentence in the period, but that of the 
letters in the word together with that of the sentences in the period. The 
following is an example of this manner:  
Lit yad mac, ot og. Ton taw, ton tonk. Ton dob, ton trips. Ton 
vila, ton veda. Ton kawa, ton pelsa. Ton das, ton yag. Os devil, rof mit 
(Beckett, 143). 
 
Is it possible to analyse the humour laid in this short passage of Watt in a purely 
 
linguistic  framework?  As  we  can  see  Watt  starts  with  language  and  even  very 
 
intentionally starts manipulating words to keep the reader entertained! But his attempt 
 
is so evident and intentional that spoils the whole idea of entertaining the reader with 
 
manipulated words, and rather with the very manipulating process. Reducing Watt’s 
 
humour to some linguistic and cognitive maneuver leaves the reactive affects as they 
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are. In effect and as we argue in this part, a linguistic conception of humour which 
 
neglects the significance of dealing with reactive forces is potentially nihilistic. Two 
 
reasons support this argument: first, one cannot convert affects‘ reactive and violent 
 
force  to  some  creative  and  active  forces  only  through  a  linguistic  and  rhetoric 
 
conception of humour. The second reason, which requires more attention, is more an 
 
ontological reason: the will to produce humour or to be witty at any cost and by any 
 
means eliminates the element of contingency in the production of humour and renders 
 
it a purely subjective decision. 
 
Then he took it into his head to invert, no longer the order of the words 
in the sentence, nor that of the letters in the word, nor that of the 
sentences in the period, nor simultaneously that of the words in the 
sentence and that of the letters in the word, nor simultaneously that of 
the words in the sentence and that of the letters in the word, nor 
simultaneously that of the words in the sentence and that of sentence in 
the period, nor simultaneously that of the letters in the word and that of 
the words in the sentence and that of the sentences in the period, ho no, 
but, in the brief course of the same period, now that of the words in the 
sentence , now that of the letters in the word, now that of the sentences 
in the period, now simultaneously that of the words in the sentence and 
that of the sentences in the period, now simultaneously that of the 
letters in the word and that of the sentences in the period, now 
simultaneously that of the letters in the word and that of the words in 
the sentence and that of the sentences in the period (Beckett, 144). 
 
Watt stretches the very production of witty language to its end and does as much 
 
as possible to unveil hilarity rather than something hilarious, the hilarity that wit strives 
 
and intends it. Watt, as we can see rather than offering a witty language presents us, in 
 
an excessive manner with the language of wit to the extent that unveiling the language 
 
of wit might disappoint the very process of entertainment. What Salisbury suggests 
 
generally about Becket‘s technique of rigorous blow when the reader is going to waffle 
 
with something can be applied to his usage of witty remarks too, 
 
Beckett suggests that if you are going to waffle on about a subject and 
refrain from making any significant observations, it is good manners to 
get it over with quickly. Although the tone is comically derisive, the 
language blow does not land altogether firmly, as humour gleaned 
from the effect of the rigorous putdown is subject to interference by 
the excess of critical rigour at work in this assertion (Salisbury, 55). 
 
Humour and laughter described in incongruity theory are formed based on a 
 
moment of inconsistency which makes it similar to the contradictions and 
 
inconsistencies at the heart of nihilism. Nonetheless, the former limits inconsistency to 
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a semantic, cognitive and linguistic concern, whereas contradictions and 
inconsistencies are more ontological. This transition from meaninglessness in its 
ontological perspective and meaninglessness as a semantic mode is what helps us see 
with a better scrutiny how cognitive models of humour function. Admittedly, one 
should immediately make a distinction between incongruity theory in its various 
forms. From Aristotle to Kant and Kierkegaard, incongruity has been thought of as 
the principal dimension in the formation of humour. While for some, like 
Kierkegaard, this incongruity is more existential, for others, such as new theories of 
cognition and neuroscience, this is more of a logical incongruity. That said, the major 
difference between semantic and ontological meaninglessness would be that the 
former as in one-liners, jokes and other linguistic manifestations makes a momentary 
attempt at providing us with a non-sense composition whereas the latter sees this 
incongruity in a practical and existential mode; the nonsensical in jokes is based on a 
subjective will that tries to mimic a real situation and translates it into an imaginary 
linguistic combination. Thus far, we have delineated some correlations between 
humour and nihilism that can be sought in the absurdist tradition too. However, we 
argue that Beckett‘s Watt is not simply one step toward releasing such inconsistencies 
implied in nihilism in a humorous gesture. Perhaps here we need to emphasize anew 
the difference between a wilful act of humour which tries to produce humour by any 
means to escape such inconsistencies and the one that is existentially open to humour 
in its contingent manner. 
 
Back to our discussion earlier on nihilism, we argue that although humour can 
function in order to neutralize nihilism, a linguistic humour is not more than a passive 
model which does not promote anything beyond a rhetoric of humour. In effect, the will 
to be humorous cannot oust the realism of humour opened to contingencies. In other 
words, the will to be humorous, when manifested and strengthened in incongruity theory 
in the form of wit and witticism, depends on human imagination rather than inhuman 
contingency; this difference is of extreme significance to any realist project of humour. 
The connection between contingency and imagination is a crucial one. A formal 
definition of contingency is that contingency is where something‘s existence and non-
existence are both possible. In other words, when something exists contingently, it can 
contingently not exist and this opens human affairs, even against his will to contingency. 
Any analysis of humour has to take imagination and contingency both into account, in 
order to see what motivates the will behind humour. Because if the 
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will behind humour and its reproduction is an attempt to freely connect and imagine 
semantic spheres, then as we discussed in the first chapter, and in the ideas of Allen 
Gillespie and the tight connection between imagination and nihilism, this humour not 
only evades nihilism, but aggravates it. Although this does not exclude human 
humour, it makes a sharp difference between humour that is fed by human 
imagination and a contingent humour. 
 
Although Watt is by definition an attempt conducted in language, yet the hilarious 
situations presented in Watt are not limited to such linguistic formulas as described in 
incongruity theory. Aside from having recourse to a linguistic formula of reproducing 
humour, Watt makes another attempt to uncover this formula. In other words, Watt itself 
unveils how the imagination steers the production of such linguistic witticism. Formulas 
of humour in the incongruity model are to a large extent algorithmic and can be translated 
in some different algorithms. In order to elaborate this point, we make use of some 
topological models in order to describe the mechanism of producing humour from a 
linguistic point of view. As a topological tool for this description, we utilise the knot 
theory in order to show the two succeeding moments of knotting and unknotting in 
humour which are analogous to moments of suspension and resolution in joke and wit. 
The following witty remarks in some one-liners might help see this, 
 
 
Q: Why was six scared of seven? 
 
A: Because seven ‗ate‘ nine. 
 
Rats are underrated, just check your dictionary. 
 
As one can notice, jokes and one-liners can be a result of producing a moment 
of suspension as in a non-sense linguistic combination which takes some time and 
patience to make sense and resolve the suspension in a moment of hilarity. This 
approximates the production of witty remarks and jokes very much similar to the 
production and resolution of riddles. Consider the following example: 
 
Q: What single word can be a long sentence? 
A: Prison 
 
 
Woman: without her, man is nothing. 
Woman: without her man, is nothing. 
 
‗What do you want?‘ 
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‗A cure for 
dyslexia.‘ ‗When?‘  
‗Own‘ 
 
Puns are bad, but poetry is verse. (Reddit.com
2
) 
 
Depending on the complication of jokes which start with one-liners‘ suspension 
to longer jokes, one can imagine diagrams from Knot Theory that corresponds to the 
suspension and resolution in jokes in a manner of knotting and unknotting in knot 
theory. Some basic diagrams of knotting are shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. A Basic Knotting Diagram. SPIE. Digital Library. 
(http://electronicimaging.spiedigitallibrary.org/article.aspx?articleid=1266263) 
 
 
 
 
Knots in this diagram differ in their varying complications and unknotting stages 
passed through before one is returned back to a moment of equilibrium or resolution. In 
this final moment, designated as ―Unknot‖, the circle is complete and the joke makes 
sense. The second illustration, which is called trefoil knot, is actually made up of one 
single knot. If we take Z for the number of knots in a knot, an unknot has 0+Z and a 
 
2
 https://www.reddit.com/r/Jokes/comments/28q3px/why_is_six_afraid_of_seven/ Date accessed on 
19.04.2015 
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trefoil which has only one knot is 1+Z. Accordingly, all knots can be described and 
catalogued in terms of their crossing number, which is the tiniest number of crossing 
of the knot. Without spending more time on Knot Theory, such diagrams are 
introduced as the algorithmic mechanisms and diagrams that any joke through its 
different suspensions (varying knots) and the following resolutions (the stages to 
arrive in an unknot). More complicated jokes in longer texts demand a higher degree 
of knots to be depicted while short jokes and one-liners require a simple trefoil knot to 
be unknotted in one single moment. Nevertheless, not all one-liners are equally easy 
to unknot; some one-liners require more attention and concentration and take more 
effort to be unknotted. 
 
 
I used to think that the brain is the most important organ. Then I 
thought, look what is telling me that. 
 
 
Q: What's the difference between your job and a dead prostitute? 
A: Your job still sucks! (Jokes4us.com
3
) 
 
Such a one-liner is not hard to resolve and the knot involved in its suspension 
does not take much energy and effort to be detected and unknotted. In effect, what 
brings the first part of the joke (suspension) to the second part (resolution) is rendered 
possible through, a metaphor which, without being necessarily explicit, can conjoin 
two different scopes of meaning. In this joke, the two chosen spheres are prostitution 
and one‘s job and the knot that has conjoined them is the element of suck; something 
that once again shows this how the link between these two spheres of meaning is 
made through a metaphor. Some more one-liners are listed below to see how the 
amount of time required to contemplate and resolve them (by laughing) varies. Here 
we take some examples for Jimmy Carr‘s comedies and one-liners. It is worthwhile 
taking another look at some other one-liners in a smarter level offered by the major 
British Comedian Jimmy Carr. Carr is known for his linguistic agility and the quick 
witty remarks he produces, his one-liners are more specific and innovative. 
 
I worry about my nan. If she is alone and falls, does she make a noise? 
I‘m joking, she‘s dead. 
 
 
 
3
  Jokes4us.com Dirty One Liners, Web. Date accessed: 
19.04.2015 http://www.jokes4us.com/dirtyjokes/dirtyonelinerjokes.html 
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When you eat a lot of spicy food, you can lose your taste. When I was 
in India last summer, I was listening to a lot of Michael Bolton. 
 
I am not worried about the Third World War. That is the Third 
World‘s problem. (Jokes4us.com
4
). 
 
As one can see, Carr is able enough to produce jokes using this riddle-like 
 
mechanism: by eliminating one semantic component one is supposed to fill the gap and 
 
once the gap is filled we are about to laugh. Humour in this regard is very much based 
 
on quickness of mind, and Carr is among the quickest. But what is the relevance of 
 
these jokes and one-liners to our project on realist humour? Clearly such one-liners and 
 
witty remarks cannot be excluded even from a broader understanding of humour. 
 
Humour is more inclusive and it can easily contain such linguistic manifestations in 
 
variety of different forms. 
 
 
I realized I was dyslexic when I went to a Toga party dressed as a goat. 
 
Swimming is good for you, especially if you are drowning. Not only 
do you get a cardiovascular workout but also you don‘t die. 
 
I like to go to a Body shop and shout out really loud: ‗I‘ve already got 
one.‘ 
 
No matter how much you give a homeless person for tea, you never get 
that tea. 
 
I was walking the streets of Glasgow the other week and I saw this sign, 
‗This door is alarmed.‘ I said to myself, ‗How do you think I feel‘. 
 
I have no problems with buying tampons. I am a fairly modern man. 
But apparently they are not a ‗proper‘ present. 
 
A big girl once came up to me after a show and said ‗ I think you‘re 
fatist‘. I said ‗No, you‘re fattest‘. 
 
I saw that show, 50 Things You Should Do Before You Die. I would 
have thought the obvious one was, ‗shout for help.‘ 
 
The American police have said they will never forget 9/11. Pretty hard 
too, I would think, considering it‘s your phone number.
5 
 
 
4 Jokes4us.com Jimmy Carr Jokes, Web. Date accessed: 21.04.2015 
http://www.jokes4us.com/peoplejokes/comedianjokes/jimmycarrjokes.html 
 
5 http://www.jokes4us.com/peoplejokes/comedianjokes/jimmycarrjokes.html Date 
accessed: 21.04.2015 
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Unknot is a loop without a knot, and knot theory shows the complications in 
numerous number of knots visible. In effect, unknot is the criterion through which one 
can count the number of knots involved, the knots which represent the semantic 
complication of jokes. Thus, what an incongruity theory of humour and laughter offers is 
more than anything based on a cognitive thermodynamics that takes place between a 
moment of suspension and one of resolution. Without focusing on more complicated 
knots bearing more knots, we will focus for a while on knots with one knot. While a knot 
by definition is a closed curve that does not intersect itself and is embedded in three 
dimensions, another characteristic of a knot is that it cannot be untangled to be a simple 
loop. If such one-liners bear simply one knot, the only difference between them is the 
sense. All jokes use one single knot and yet what makes them distinct is the shape of the 
knot which can be described in the extensity or the shape of the strings that are knotted. 
Otherwise and according to Knot Theory terminology, they bear the same value, which is 
one knot. The messier a knot is, the harder it is to unknot it and in the same manner and in 
a joke, the stranger the combination and the metaphor that makes the combination of two 
frames is, the harder is to resolve the suspension. 
 
Incongruity theory, in its contemporary cognitive interpretations like the theories 
of Victor Raskin and Attardo, constrains humour production to the result of a semantic 
tension. Such a tension or clash between scripts or frames of meaning is, according to 
these theorists, mainly resolved in the last stage of humour production. Whether the 
tension or inconsistency is fully resolved in the final stage is less significant than the fact 
that the tension between the two frames of meaning is at least partially resolved. What 
resolves the tension is the potential similarity that these two frames have had; a similarity 
that makes it possible, at least partially, to produce a far-fetched and unaccustomed 
connection. The element of surprise is the bottom line of incongruity theories that base 
themselves on the semantics of humour. This example shows how such a cognitive shift 
which entails an element of surprise enables the listener to connect two separate spheres 
of meaning. I said to the Gym instructor: ―Can you teach me to do the splits?‖ He said: 
―How flexible are you?‖ I said: ―I can't make Tuesdays.‖ This mechanism is one 
metaphoric manner where two potentially similar domains are likened without explicit 
signs. What is known as Conceptual Integration shows very well how these frames are 
juxtaposed and how they result in new jokes. In effect, the developments in Blending and 
Conceptual Integration (Coulson, 2001), as 
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the most recent findings in cognitive studies, backed up by experiments in neuroscience, 
 
are indebted to a large extent to Fauconnier and Turner (2008). Although Semantic 
 
Leaps is primarily, not unlike conceptual Blending Theory, an attempt to show how in 
 
the formation of new ideas humans combine their knowledge, applying frame-shifting 
 
or blending and semantic leaps to humour will ultimately render humour a semantic 
 
phenomenon that is based on a metaphoric pivot. Some studies done on wit and 
 
incongruity theory of humour approximate such humour to riddles and puzzles. In his 
 
book, Mathematics and Humour, John Allen Paulos explicates this fact and goes so far 
 
to claim similarities between ‗'the operations and structures common to humour and the 
 
formal sciences (logic, mathematics, and linguistics)‘‘ (8). Paulos' attempt is based on 
 
this intuition that ‗[b]oth mathematics and humour are forms of intellectual play, the 
 
emphasis in mathematics being more on the intellectual, in humour more on the play 
 
(10). To a great degree, combinations of ideas and forms are put together and taken 
 
apart just for the fun of it. Both activities are undertaken for their own sake (Paulos, 
 
10-11). What convinces Paulos to extend his analysis is the very existence of riddle at 
 
the core of any humorous act. It is this riddle-like feature which assimilates it to 
 
mathematics, ''Riddles, trick problems, paradoxes, and ‗brain teasers‘ seem to be a 
 
bridge between humour and mathematics- more intellectual than most jokes, lighter 
 
than mathematics''(10-11). In the second chapter of his book, Paulos launches an 
 
interesting project where he attempts to trace some axioms or some self-evident 
 
statements as in mathematics in the analysis of humour. In other words, logic plays a 
 
prominent role in the formation of humour and every humour is conceivable in relation 
 
to the axioms it takes for granted. 
 
The formal structure of such stories or jokes is as follows. Joke-teller: 
"In what model are axioms 1, 2, and 3 true?" Listener: "In model M." 
Joke-teller: "No, in model N." The following classic burlesque joke is 
an example: The dirty old man leers at the innocent young virgin and 
says, "What goes in hard and dry and comes out soft and wet?" The girl 
blushes and stammers, "Well, let's see, uh ... ," to which the dirty old 
man replies wickedly, "chewing gum." In other words, "model N" in 
our formal example and "chewing gum" (more accurately the whole 
scenario suggested by chewing gum) in our burlesque joke play the role 
of an unexpected and incongruous model of the given "axioms (24). 
 
 
Putting it differently, Paulos affirms that, like mathematics, in humour we keep 
 
some principles in the background; and incongruity arises in comparison to that 
 
background.  ''The  various  interpretations  and  their  incongruity  of  course  depend 
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critically on the context, the prior experience of the person (s) involved, their values, 
 
beliefs, and so on'' (27). Any inability to step out of what is offered to us on the surface 
 
and grasp what is implied makes it impossible to laugh. It is through a meta-level or 
 
stepping out of the encountered system or persistent self that one can experience 
 
humour through noticing an inconsistency with one‘s system or one‘s values. On the 
 
other hand, Paulos indicates that one cannot do away with a system in order to 
 
experience humour and laughter. A system/self is required to then be subverted through 
 
incongruity. 
 
At the other extreme from these would-be automatons we find people 
whose minds are mush (in the sense of being extremely loose and 
unstructured). Such people are not likely to have much sense of humor 
either. This is so because a modicum of mental orderliness, the 
awareness of various complexes of ideas and their links to one another, 
and the (at least partial) acceptance of certain values is necessary to an 
appreciation of humor. With no feeling for what is correct, congruous, 
or natural, there can be no perception of what is incorrect, 
incongruous, or unnatural (27). 
 
Through quoting Ralph Piddington, Paulos emphasises that in the absence of a 
 
system of (shared) values, one is not able to undergo an experience of inconsistency 
 
which might result in laughter. But what is then the role of this contradiction in relation 
 
to the shared values it subverts? Does this contradiction shatter the conditions put forth 
 
by the values on which it is grounded? The important thing in this regard is to depict a 
 
relation between this element of contradiction, this source of incongruity and what has 
 
been contradicted. It must be stressed here that contradiction and incongruity vary from 
 
one system of values to another. In other words, one incongruity can be 
 
ground-breaking and cause a reformation of the system, whereas some incongruities 
 
can give rise to more temporary cessations of meaning without any reformation of 
 
values in a more obtrusive manner. 
 
The production of jokes and one-liners based on such incongruity mechanisms 
 
should be seen as an attempt to produce a nearly impossible setting in which a 
 
suspension is created and immediately resolved. This means a lot to a realist project on 
 
humour,  since  the  context  and  the  values  presented  in  such  witty  settings  are 
 
representational, namely they are either non-existent or simulacra of practical situations. 
 
What occurs in a joke does not mean to be applied in reality. Wit, which is heavily 
 
dependent on imagination, assumes an incongruous situation in a riddle-like manner 
 
and resolves it in a way that entertains us. The element of surprise which arises 
 
 
 
65 
 
following suspension offered in witty remarks and jokes is their main component. The 
only point to make here is that humour made based on linguistic or cognitive incongruity 
is to a large extent context-free and the values presented in them are decontextualised. In 
other words, incongruity theory of humour, based on quick imaginative abilities rather 
than exploring humour creates suspension in an imaginative mode. By bringing 
suspension to a cognitive mode, incongruity theory underestimates the contingency of 
such suspension and yields it to a linguistic suspension. This suspension can be made and 
reproduced as one can notice in a variety of different kinds of similar jokes that are 
fabricated according to some algorithms. One cannot argue that humour is ever empty of 
such algorithms, rather we argue that the algorithms in the cognitive mode are easy to 
repeat and reproduce, whereas the realist humour bears the elements of contingency. 
Beckett‘s Watt is equally replete with such algorithms and the point is not that Beckett is 
able to present the reader with full contingencies in the very production of humour. On 
the contrary, Watt starts not unlike jokes and even one-liners with algorithms of humour 
that entertain and amuse the reader; the contingent humour emanates out of such 
algorithmic witticism. Therefore, a realist humour which is open to inhuman contingency 
does not start with it; it starts with algorithmic wit but stretches it to a point beyond 
linguistic and cognitive humour imbuing it with contingency and sheer awe. In such 
tension between the necessarily funny and the contingently humorous, or between human 
humour and inhuman humour, between the order of wit and randomness of humour, Watt 
commences with order and the chaotic inhuman humour emerges out of such human 
orderly humour. Such humour does not exclude the algorithmic and linguistic humour in 
wordplay, puns or other metaphoric compositions; rather it unveils the limits and 
conditions of the latter in surpassing it in an unexpected mode. This way, such inhuman 
and non-subjective humour emerges in the work whether or not the author or ‗the 
medium of humour‘ intends it. 
 
In chapter three and through analysing Life, End of we deal with such 
randomness in more detail and will argue that although randomness is an integral part 
of such inhuman humour, it is not a sufficient criteria for a realist humour. But for the 
time being, we analyse some parts of Watt to see how a calculated humour paves the 
way for an unexpected mechanism in the production of humour. 
 
To be together again, after so long, who love the sunny wind, the 
windy sun, in the sun, in the wind, that is perhaps something, perhaps 
something. For us moving so between the fences, before they diverged, 
there was just room. In Watt‘s garden, in my garden, we should have 
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been more at our ease. But it never occurred to me to go back into my 
garden with Watt, or with him to go forward into his. But it never 
occurred to Watt to go back with me into his garden, or with me to go 
forward into mine. For my garden was my garden, and Watt‘s garden 
was Watt‘s garden, we had no common garden any more. So we 
walked to and fro, neither in his garden, in the way described. So we 
began, after so long a time, to walk together again, and to talk, from 
time to time. As Watt walked, so now he talked, back to front (140). 
 
 
 
Despite the gesture (at least in the very beginning of this passage) towards the 
 
language of riddles and jokes, Watt’s humour is in sharp contrast to the representational 
 
mode of humour as in riddles which is founded on a semantics of humour that ends in a 
 
moment of resolution. Watt opens itself to a kind of indifference in the production of 
 
humour which is curious, especially in relation to the incongruity Theory of humour 
 
which describes the way to produce humour and is determined to make it. The humour 
 
in Watt is cruel and we argue that this cruelty of humour as tacit in Watt is rooted in 
 
dispensing with subjective and intended production of humour. Not only does Watt not 
 
produce subjective humour—it also makes subjective humour the very target of its 
 
humour. Watt is one good example of the exteriority of relations in the case of humour, 
 
as it makes thinking about humour and its interior logic possible Watt shows it once 
 
again to what extent humour is made up of exterior relations and this idea in this 
 
chapter is to be contrasted to the view that is determined to understand humour 
 
relation-free and based on a cognitive a priori. This brings humour from the 
 
representational mode of riddles to a more affective, physical and sub-representational 
 
gesture, a humour which actualizes and fulfils itself through the relation between 
 
molecular multiplicities, the relations that are offered by the dynamism of different 
 
points of view and their becomings. Folds participating in being give rise to a humour 
 
that is shaped by the unexpected encounter between relations and yet these relations are 
 
utterly asubjective which means that there is no subject in charge of the relations he 
 
undergoes and he comes across and consequently there is no subject conscious of the 
 
humour he will participate in. Subjects will not pass off, but they will take part in the 
 
formation of humour in  a larger context.  Yet, arguably, although this  humour is 
 
produced blind to subjects and its production does not take into account the will of the 
 
subjects, its affects befall different subjects differently. The Deleuzoguattarian 
 
conception of signs is helpful here as it places emphasis on the dynamic of signs and the 
 
‗'increasingly intimate‘' relations that in folding relations give rise to contingency. 
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Humour takes the similar route in its transpiration to subjects in a contingent manner, 
that is, at least for a while beyond interpretation of subjects participating in its 
production. By making such a process between relations of different subjects, humour 
produces subjects, not the other way round. Transversality, between positions of 
different subjects goes beyond a simple verbal communication that by reliance on 
cognitive abilities of subjects produces verbal humour. Even if subjects manage to 
produce the latter, this humour is bereft of realist elements of humour and is more an 
algorithmic mode of humour that pretends to act spontaneously. Watt, like any other 
text, is unable to depict such realization of humour in its participation between 
different subjects but what is argued here is that it surpasses such cognitive and 
subjective humour and even makes fun of this humorous gesture. This chapter takes 
some examples from Watt to analyse some various modes of humour and in the end; 
we argue that the cognitive conception of humour as embodied in incongruity theory 
is a subjective mode of humour that is far from a realist conception of humour. 
 
Watt produces laughter and humour in its bleak manner to the extent that one is 
tempted to call it a comic comedy or a comedy of comedy, humour inside humour. 
Viewing the elements of incongruity theory of humour, one can see the same 
elements in Watt; there is the same tension between suspension of meaning and its 
resolution, yet the time between this tension, the lapse of overcoming suspension 
through a semantic resolution, is not as quick. In effect, if one-liners and numerous 
comedians working with them have a tendency to quickly resolve the tension in an 
intelligent act which is the characteristic of wit, Watt does not resolve this tension as 
quickly and this way makes this process of production of wit visible, as even the 
suspensions are suspended in the novel. Take, for instance the suspension in the 
following extract from Watt, a suspension that, even on its own and without any need 
for an ultimate resolution is hilarious. 
 
The first is here, in his bed, or at least in his room. But the second, I 
mean Vincent, is not here any more, and the reason for that is this, that 
when I came in he went out. But the third, I mean Walter, is not here 
any more either, and the reason for that is this, that when Erskine came 
in he went out, just as Vincent went out when I came in (55). 
 
 
If normal definition of wit is based on a semantic or cognitive suspension of 
meaning, in order to spare it for a witty resolution, Watt presents another tendency; a 
formal suspension of such semantic suspensions. As we noticed in the example just 
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quoted, remaining in the suspension or suspension of what is usually taken as a semantic 
suspension has resulted in a banal and hilarious situation. Although wit at its core bears 
an element of unexpectedness, Watt unveils that this unexpectedness itself is expected. 
Watt shows that such subjective and willful incongruity can never replace the real 
contingency of humour. In the rest of this part, we focus on another facet of wit in Watt 
that is pertinent to incongruity theories but from the point of view of velocity. 
 
As explained in the first chapter, Michael Billig in his Laughter and Ridicule makes 
a comprehensive study of the role of laughter in relation to what is called incongruity 
theory. But Billig´s target is more a critique of humour mainly in its modern conception 
which raises names such as Thomas Hobbes, Aristotle, John Locke, Joseph Addison, 
Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain. Billig argues that the positivist conception of 
humour stems from the gentlemanly understanding of wit that was implied in the work of 
philosophers such as John Locke (Billig 66). According to Billig, Locke in his new 
Framework of wit is siding with an understanding of laughter that is more than anything 
gentlemanly. Locke´s view is an attempt to redefine laughter as less harmful and asocial 
than in Hobbes´ theory. Locke was arguing that any true judgement depends on the ''clear 
discerning faculty‗' (Billig, 62) of the mind where it perceives two ideas to be the same, or 
different. ‗‘Appearance of similitude can be misleading, if there really are differences 
between two ideas. Thus, careful judgement consists 'in separating carefully, one from 
another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
similitude‘(Locke, 123). If judgement involves carefully distinguishing between things 
that appear to be similar but which are actually different, then wit is based on the reverse 
process. It brings together ideas that are different in order to treat them as if they were 
similar. Accordingly, wit operates through ‗‘the assemblage of ideas, and putting those 
together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, 
thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fantasy‘‘ (Billig, 63). 
 
 
Billig launches his analysis based on the Chapter XI of Locke‘s book which is 
titled as Of Discerning and Other Operations of The Mind. Here Locke makes the 
boldest attempt to elaborate his notion of wit and consequently laughter. It is easily 
noticeable throughout this chapter that what Locke offers in relation to wit is based on 
a sharp distinction between our ability to Judge and think and our ability to be witty. 
 
The difference of wit and judgment. How much the imperfection of 
accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies, either in the 
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dullness or faults of the organs of sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, 
or attention in the understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural 
to some tempers, I will not here examine: it suffices to take notice, that 
this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe 
in itself It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that so far as 
this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, for the 
distinguishing one thing from another,- so far our notions are confused, 
and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our 
ideas in the memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts; in this, 
of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one 
thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in 
a great measure, the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason, 
which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence perhaps 
may be given some reason of that common observation, - that men 
who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always 
the clearest judgment or deepest reason (97). 
 
It seems that towards the end of his analysis and comparison of judgement and 
 
wit, Locke places emphasis on the fact that wit (in contrast to judgement) precipitates. 
 
In other words, if judgement stems from a meticulous precision of processing ideas, wit 
 
takes the opposite route which is not only semantically and cognitively ambiguous and 
 
unclear, but also quick and hasty. In Locke's view memory plays a prominent role and it 
 
canalizes almost all our consciousness. Locke's view on judgement seems to be rooted 
 
in the first part of Chapter XI that is called 'No Knowledge Without Discernment‘. 
 
There Locke stresses the significance of distinguishing between ideas in our minds. But 
 
it is worth mentioning that this part is followed by another part which is the kernel of 
 
Locke's idea and is called 'Clearness Done Hinders Confusion'. This part reminds one 
 
of Locke's emphasis that there is nothing in us or our memories that does not come to 
 
our perception at some point and here highlight the role consciousness plays. The view 
 
that Locke defends has a simple formula in relation to wit, 
 
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those 
together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any 
resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and 
agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on 
the other side, in separating carefully one from another, ideas wherein 
can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another (97). 
 
 
The emphasis is placed on two relevant components, quickness and suddenness. 
 
In contrast to judgement, wit quickly and suddenly brings together two otherwise 
 
irrelevant frames. In the rest of this chapter, we focus on the element of quickness and 
 
reserve a more elaborate analysis of suddenness for the next chapter and in relation to 
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Watt to investigate a more contemporary framework of it, and its role in relation to a 
realist project of humour. Watt is not based on such quickness of mind in producing a 
mechanism in contrast to judgement. Watt, by lingering in such suspension and not 
yielding it to resolution, evidently avoids being witty according the definitions 
mentioned, yet this drift opens vistas for new unexpected suspension and resolutions. 
Consequently the expected relief or resolution does not occur easily and one is somehow 
forced to loosen the dichotomy between suspension and resolution. In effect, such long 
suspensions make one not expect so much of a relief or resolution. In fact 
 
Watt seems to be quite aware of wit production and instead of entertaining us with the 
funny result, places mockery in the middle of wit production. Watt can be seen as an 
anti-cognitive book of humour which is aware of the cognitive tendency of humour. 
The following extract provides us with an example of a suspension that never ends. In 
this case, Watt tantalizes the reader who looks for a sharp line between suspension 
and resolution. 
 
It is useless not to seek, not to want, for when you cease to seek you 
start to find, and when you cease to want, then life begins to ram her 
fish and chips down your gullet until you puke, and then the puke 
down your gullet until you puke the puke, and then the puked puke 
until you begin to like it (44). 
 
Watt, does not resolve the suspension (common in riddle-like jokes) so quickly, 
instead it oscillates quickly between one suspension and another one. In effect, instead of 
having the suspension resolved semantically in the next sentence, it is left to another 
suspension. And it is precisely this way that Watt shows us the gist of hilarity and what is 
supposed to be hilarious without necessarily being funny. However, such banality is 
hilarious because it implicitly contains what normally makes us laugh. In effect, rather 
than an intentional jokes we encounter an ‗intentional failure‘ to be funny. As the extract 
below aims to show, repetition is a common technique for such intentional failure which 
replaces the expected and hilarious resolutions in Watt. But the question is what makes us 
laugh if not resolution? If a joke is funny it is through suspension and a consequent 
resolution of it, but where there seems to be no resolution, how can we claim humour? I 
argue that, by avoiding resolution, Watt shows another mechanism which is less cognitive 
and more affective in the production of humour and laughter, namely repetition. Watt 
repeats its suspension and laughs, a laughter that is not cognitively or semantically 
resolved but transforms the very incongruity, making the very inconsistency or 
suspension humorous by repeating it and producing a childlike 
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laughter, in the way that children repeat and laugh. There is no more suspension and 
 
resolution at work, but as Deleuze would say, there is ‗suspensions and falls‘(6). In 
 
effect, humour in Deleuze is more a somatic issue which in opposition to the ascension 
 
and higher view point inherent in irony that provides subjects with a vantage point, 
 
brings them constantly down to earth. The very descent in humour means that subjects 
 
fall to laugh, they fall to experience humour. This, as it will be discussed in the next part, 
 
makes humour less a cognitive laughter and more an affective gesture. 
 
 
Personally of course I regret everything. Not a word, not a deed, not a 
thought, not a need, not a grief, not a joy, not a girl, not a boy, not a 
doubt, not a trust, not a scorn, not a lust, not a hope, not a fear, not a 
smile, not a tear, not a name, not a face, no time, no place, that I do not 
regret, exceedingly. An ordure, from beginning to end. And yet, when I 
sat for Fellowship, but for the boil on my bottom . . . The rest, an ordure. 
The Tuesday scowls, the Wednesday growls, the Thursday curses, the 
Friday howls, the Saturday snores, the Sunday yawns, the Monday morns, 
the Monday morns. The whacks, the moans, the cracks, the groans, the 
welts, the squeaks, the belts, the shrieks, the pricks, the prayers, the kicks, 
the tears, the skelps, and the yelps. And the poor old lousy old earth, my 
earth and my father's and my mother's and my father's father's and my 
mother's mother's and my father's mother's and my mother's father's and 
my father's mother's father's and my mother's father's mother's and my 
father's mother's mother's and my mother's father's' father's and my 
father's father's mother's and my mother's mother's father's and my father's 
father's father's and my mother's mother's mother's and other people's 
fathers' and mothers' and fathers' fathers' and mothers' mothers' and 
fathers' mothers' and mothers' fathers' and fathers' mothers' fathers' and 
mothers' fathers' mothers' and fathers' mothers' mothers' and mothers' 
fathers' fathers' and fathers' fathers' mothers' and mothers' mothers' 
fathers' and fathers' fathers' fathers' and mothers' mothers' mothers'. An 
excrement (Beckett, 38). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Affects Converted 
 
 
He who laughs last, consequently, laughs best, but only because the 
last shall in his turn be first. That is to say shall be the other, he who 
communicates laughter to us, who communicates death to us. 
Laughter's state of grace is only a grace period, without end, without 
purpose. A roar of irreconciliation (Borch-Jacobsen, 740). 
 
Watt makes a journey to a house whose owner is Mr. Knott. There Watt lives like a 
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solitary servant. In the second section, Watt is much obsessed with comprehending life 
 
especially when following visiting the piano tuning Galls an anxiety overwhelms him. 
 
Section three of Watt offers a language which is hardly accessible. And the last section 
 
describes the journey Watt makes to the institute he had described before in the 
 
previous section. Needless to say, any humorous occurrence in such a context is already 
 
shocking and quite unexpected. Yet the novel, not unlike other works by Beckett, 
 
creates moments where in the midst of a dull and sombre mood, a moment of laughter is 
 
quite inevitable. 
 
Broad-shouldered, or big-bosomed and broad-basined, would on no 
account, if they were in their right senses, commit themselves to this 
treacherous channel, but turn about, and retrace their steps, unless they 
wished to be impaled, at various points at once, and perhaps bleed to 
death, or be eaten alive by the rats, or perish from exposure, long 
before their cries were heard, and still longer before the rescuers 
appeared, running, with the scissors, the brandy and the iodine. For 
were their cries not heard, then their chances of rescue were small, so 
vast were these gardens, and so deserted, in the ordinary way (134). 
 
 
Watt embraces the most trivial and banal elements on its way to humour. But it 
 
seems that all this paves the way for the key component of humour production in 
 
Beckett‘s work, namely repetition. In effect, Watt presents us with banality, but out of 
 
dealing seriously with such banality a repetition forms that forms a key component in 
 
Watt’s humour production. For instance as the relation of Watt to this fishwoman shows, 
 
 
The fishwoman pleased Watt greatly. Watt was not a woman's man but 
the fishwoman pleased him greatly. Other women would perhaps please 
him more, later. But of all the women who had ever pleased him up till 
then, not one could hold a candle to this fishwoman, in Watt's opinion. 
And Watt pleased the fishwoman. This was a merciful coincidence, that 
they pleased each other. For if the fishwoman had pleased Watt, without 
Watt's pleasing the fishwoman, or if Watt had pleased the fishwoman, 
without the fishwoman's pleasing Watt, then what would have become of 
Watt, or of the fishwoman? Not that the fishwoman was a man's woman, 
for she was not, being of an advanced age and by nature also denied those 
properties that attract men to women, unless it was perhaps the remains of 
a distinguished carriage, acquired from the habit if carrying her of fish on 
her hand, over long distances (119). 
 
 
Even if such elements might not yield a semantic incongruity that results in a 
 
humour as in one-liners, Beckett makes use of their banality and makes us laugh 
 
through a repetition of such banal elements. Such repetition which is a very pivotal 
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component in the construction of humour for Beckett, in particular in Watt, diverges 
 
from a witty and quick appropriation of meaning and makes the serious look ridiculous 
 
through repetition of the banal elements: a shift from the humorous signified to the 
 
humorous signifier, when the serious becomes not even the content but the form of 
 
laughter. 
 
Judge then of my astonishment when, upon approach, I found I was 
not mistaken. It was a hole, in the fence, a large irregular hole, caused 
by numberless winds, numberless rains, or by a boar, or by a bull, 
flying, pursuing, a wild boar, a wild bull, blind with fear, blind with 
rage, or who knows perhaps with carnal desire, crashing at this point, 
through the fence, weakened by numberless winds, numberless rains. 
Through this hole I passed, without hurt, or damage to my pretty 
uniform, and found myself looking about me, for I had not yet 
recovered my aplomb, in the couloir. My senses being now sharpened 
to ten or fifteen times their normal acuity, it was not long before I saw, 
in the other fence, another hole, in position opposite, and similar in 
shape, to that through which, some ten or fifteen minutes before, I had 
made my way (136-137). 
 
 
Repetition replaces the resolution in the process of humour production; repetition 
 
of such trivial elements increases an intensity which helps the expansion of humour to 
 
various parts of the text: 
 
Add to this that a bare yard separated the fences, at this point, so that 
the snout would be, of necessity, in contact with the second fence, 
before the hind-quarters were clear of the first, and consequently the 
space be lacking in which, after the bursting of the first hole, the fresh 
impetus might be developed necessary to the bursting of the second. 
Nor was it likely that the bull, or boar, after the bursting of the first 
hole, had withdrawn to a point from which, proceeding as before, he 
might acquire the impetus necessary to the bursting of the second hole, 
via the first hole. For either, after the bursting of the first hole, the 
animal was still blind with passion, or he was so no longer (137). 
 
 
There are cases (as in the following extract), where humour is given a more 
 
leading role. If, in the previous part, Watt offered repetitive moments when a serious 
 
issue falls from its height, there are cases in which the text commences its logic with 
 
humour and its permeation throughout the entire text is visible. In other words, while in 
 
the former humour is in charge of descending what is high and serious, in the latter, 
 
humour is no more an attachment to the serious, but is itself the very logic of the text. 
 
This way, humour does not provide the text with balancing mechanism or even a 
 
playful disposition that nullifies the serious, but something that the serious should grasp 
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and digest. Although as we will argue this is not yet realist humour, as it is largely 
 
bound to discursive humour, yet it provides us with a template for realist humour, 
 
 
Nor was it likely that the second hole, or better still Watt‘s hole (for there was nothing 
to show that the so-called second hole was not anterior to the so-called first hole, and 
the so-called first hole not posterior to the so-called second hole), had been burst, 
independently, at some quite different time, from Watt‘s side of the fence. For if the 
two holes had been independently burst, the one from Watt‘s side of Watt‘s fence, 
and the other from mine of mine, by two quite different infuriated boars, or bulls (for 
that the one had been burst by an infuriated boar, and the other by an infuriated bull, 
was unlikely), and at two quite different times, the one from Watt‘s side of Watt‘s 
fence, and the other from mine of mine, then their conjunction, at this point, was 
incomprehensible, to say the least. Nor was it likely that the two holes, the hole in 
Watt‘s fence and the hole in mine, had been burst, on the same occasion, by two 
infuriated bulls, or by two infuriated boars, or by one infuriated bull and one 
infuriated cow, or by one infuriated boar and one infuriated sow (for that they had 
been burst, simultaneously, the one by an infuriated bull and the other by an 
infuriated sow, or the one by an infuriated boar and the other by an infuriated cow, 
was hard to believe), charging, with hostile or libidinous intent, the one from  
Watt‘s side of Watt‘s fence, the other from mine of mine, and clashing, the holes 
once burst, at the spot where now I stood, trying to understand. For this implied 
the bursting of the holes, by the bulls, or by the boars, or by the bull and cow, or 
by the boar and sow, at exactly the same moment, and not first one, and then an 
instant later the other. For if first one, and then an instant later the other, then the 
bull, the cow, the boar, the sow, first through its fence, and thrusting with its head 
against the other, must have prevented, willy nilly, through this other, at this 
particular point, the passage of the bull, the cow, the bull, the boar, the sow, the 
boar, hastening to meet it, with all the fury of hate, the fury of love. Nor could I 
find, though I went down on my knees, and parted the wild grasses, any trace, 
whether of combat or of copulation. No bull then had burst these holes, nor any 
boar, nor any two bulls, nor any two boars, nor any two cows, nor any two sows, 
nor any bull and cow, nor any boar and sow, no, but the stress of weather, rains 
and winds without number, and suns, and snows, and frosts, and thaws, 
particularly severe just here (Beckett 138-139). 
 
 
Such an example does not imply that Watt is bereft of linguistic incongruity; to 
 
the contrary, Watt is replete with incongruity, but such incongruities are not linearly 
 
juxtaposed and as a result one cannot tell the moment of suspension from that of 
 
resolution. Putting it in Knot Theory terminology, one cannot say that humour is empty 
 
of or beyond knots, yet the knots or algorithms embodied in the text are so interwoven 
 
their beginning and end are not transparent. Humour is not something to be added to the 
 
text, it is something that produces the text and steers it; the text is open to humour and 
 
humour swallows it. This way, we not only discard a subjective charge in our approach 
 
to humour, but also and even more importantly, one paves the way for exploring similar 
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manifestations of this gesture in other works where humour is even irritating. Such an 
irritating and cruel intervention of humour leads to a coexistence of humour with the 
affects which are not supposed to yield humour. In other words and in an affective 
conception, such humour appears among the affects which are not normally supposed to 
result in humour. Back to our point on representational humour and laughter, one might 
explain the crucial point in representational humour as the insertion of the element of 
surprise and unexpectedness, an element that has made a pivotal point in the construction 
of what is known as incongruity theory. According to this theory, the element of 
inconsistency or incongruity makes us laugh: incongruity, as the kernel of humour, is 
founded on an element of surprise. Whenever there is something incoherent and 
surprising we are offered the main ingredient and component to produce humour. 
Although incongruity theory places emphasis on the element of unexpectedness, it is in 
effect an expected unexpectedness; humour simply unsettles our expectations 
semantically without substantially transforming affects so much. One can even claim that 
incongruity theory of humour starts with zero affects, since nothing occurs beyond the 
suspension of the former meaning that is described. In other words, no affect is suspended 
to be transformed to other new or active affects. Incongruity theory starts with the 
cognitive suspension rather than affective suspension; affective suspension, however, is at 
the centre of the project of realist humour. 
 
In effect, incongruity theory places emphasis on the howness of laughter and 
humour and one can see through these studies how humour can be made. 
Consequently, humour yields its core ingredient in order to be reproduced in a 
representational mode. The intervention of affects and in particular the affects that are 
not normally called for in a specific context requires more precise attention since 
these texts rely less on semantic and even lexical expectations and rather provide us 
with a momentary shift from what has drawn our attention. All this means that 
analysing such momentary and ephemeral emergence of laughter and humour should 
be seen against the background of affects running through the text. By taking the 
affects into account, one can see that a non-representational humour is able, above all, 
to break with the affects dominating a text or a situation; however, breaking with 
affective chains prevailing in a text does not mean that, as a consequence, the text 
does not equally break with the cognitive expectations. 
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The following is an example of Watt‘s manner, at this period: Day of 
most, night of part, Knott with now. Now till up, little seen so oh, little 
heard so oh. Night till morning from. Heard I this, saw I this then what. 
Thing quiet, dim. Ears, eyes, failing now also. Hush in, mist in, moved 
I so. From this it will perhaps be suspected: that the inversion affected, 
not the order of the sentences, but that of the words only; that the 
inversion was imperfect; that ellipse was frequent; that euphony was a 
preoccupation; that spontaneity was perhaps not absent; that there was 
perhaps more than a reversal of discourse; that the thought was perhaps 
inverted. So to every man, soon or late, comes envy of the fly, with all 
the long joys of summer before it (Beckett, 140). 
 
Throughout Watt, one notices that humour is, if not common, quite irresistible in 
 
its  place.  There  are  moments  in  the  novel, mainly in  Watt's  description  and  his 
 
monologue, when one encounters a gesture that is so excessively unexpected that 
 
laughter erupts even through some apparently ‗bad jokes‘. But more importantly when 
 
the laughter pushes through and comes out, one wonders how to deal with it, like excess 
 
and excrement. 
 
 
So it may be instructive to linger a little on these occasions of verbose 
intellectual strangulation and soiling in the criticism, rather than passing 
over them as nothing more than indications of artistic and critical 
immaturity. For although these 'bad' jokes may well be indicative of a 
risible stylistic weakness, there is also the beginning of something self-
conscious. of an awareness of what a rupturing of the 'lines of 
communication' might do to a text, and the growth of something 
intentional from this abjectedly fertile comic ground (Salisbury, 55). 
 
 
The shift from consciousness to affects is required in order to shed the light on the 
 
difference between representational or semantic and non-representational humour. But 
 
in order to start with affects we need to start with what Gilles Deleuze calls etiology 
 
(Stivale, 206). Deleuze's involvement with Ethics (inspired by Spinoza and Nietzsche) 
 
is to a large extent rooted in his problem with nihilism. The Spinozist attempt to attain 
 
happiness through a kind of wisdom is another name for an ethical life. Yet this wisdom 
 
and this ethics is an immanent movement that (unlike morality) does not escape from 
 
the material and social to the transcendent. While morality is in search of a beyond or a 
 
beyond being to mean its acts, ethics looks forward coming down from that beyond to 
 
the earth of bodies and see the way these bodies function. Spinoza criticizes morality's 
 
deficiencies as follows: 
 
For indeed, no one has yet determined what the body can do, that is, 
experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can do from the 
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laws of Nature alone, insofar as Nature is only considered to be 
corporeal, and what the body can do only if it is determined by the 
mind. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the body so 
accurately that he could explain all its functions – not to mention that 
many things are observed in the lower animals which far surpass 
human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their 
sleep which they would not dare to awake. This shows well enough 
that the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do 
many things which its mind wonders at (155- 156). 
 
This way, the very pivotal step for a Spinozist ethics is to take the body into 
 
consideration. And it is precisely here that Gilles Deleuze launches his project on 
 
ethics. In order to define his conception of the body, Gilles Deleuze has recourse to 
 
affects and defines affects in terms of the forces they bear. In effect, Deleuze's attempt, 
 
inspired with Nietzsche's to define body, draws him to the forces that irreducibly 
 
compose (and decompose) a body and this yields to defining the unity of body through 
 
the multiplicity of forces that shape it, where the dominant forces are called active ones 
 
and the inferior forces are reactive. All this for Deleuze, following Spinoza and 
 
Nietzsche, is a primary and crucial step to do away with the moral thought in favour of 
 
ethics where all singularities of body are being taken into consideration in a kinetic 
 
rather than a static mode of existence. This way, the very objective of an ethics is to 
 
take affect and affectivity into account by questioning what reduces one's ability to act 
 
or think and what increases this capacity. Through such cursory depiction of what 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus under ethics, one might be able to see how the 
 
interrelation of affects, as singularities in one body, can result in one‘s servitude or 
 
one‘s ability to increase one‘s capacity to act. It becomes even more important when, 
 
through Deleuze's understanding of Spinoza, we are enabled to see how to distinguish 
 
ideas from affects. It is in this regard that Gilles Deleuze places emphasis on the 
 
representational  character  of  ideas  and  contrasts  it  with  the  non-representational 
 
conception of affects. It must be emphasized and borne in mind that Deleuze is doing 
 
away with a psychologism of affects and instead tries to introduce us to an ethics; 
 
however he admits that Spinoza's conception of affect is an original one. 
 
Ideas are modes of thought defined by their representational character. This 
 
already gives us a first point of departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) 
 
because we call affect any mode of thought which doesn't represent anything. So what 
 
does that mean? Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling—a hope for 
 
example, a pain, a love— this is not representational. There is an idea of the loved 
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thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, but hope as such or love as 
such represents nothing, strictly nothing. As Deleuze states, ‗‘Every mode of thought 
insofar as it is non-representational will be termed affect. A volition, a will implies, 
in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what 
I will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it 
is a non-representational mode of thought‘‘ (1978, 1-2). The two interwoven facets of 
representation can be gathered under psychological and linguistic modes. If 
psychologism of affects yields to a subjective and personal or even biographical 
understanding of forces excluded from its outside or its umwelt, the semiotic 
conception of affects, in a similar manner pushes all affects to signify in its linguistic 
and discursive frames as if affects were statements that are to mean something. 
 
In order to elaborate such representational mode, and its contrast with the one 
in an affective mode, we make use of an understanding of signs in Lyotard which 
helps illuminate another facet in realist humour. In his Libidinal Economy and 
especially in his chapter on ‗The Tensor‘, Jean Francois Lyotard launches an 
ambitious attempt against the nihilism of representation. Lyotard develops his 
argument focally in relation to signs and semiotics and places emphasis on the 
exclusion of affects from common conception of signs. What makes his point more 
crucial is the concept of tensor (which is not unlike the molecular in Deleuze and 
Guattari) and is in charge of dissimulating affects rather than producing meaning 
through absence and lack. A representational conception of humour, more than 
anything, defines and delimits humour in terms of communication either in a 
psychological or a semiotic manner whereas a non-representational or molecular 
mode of humour maintains an affective and affirmative gesture against such semantic 
and communicative mechanism embedded in humour production. 
 
This way, representational humour depends to a large extent, whether in its 
production or its reception, on a cognitive framework of humour which has been 
greatly exploited by contemporary theories of incongruity or inconsistency. Such 
fields leave no room for an understanding of humour that escapes semantic norms. A 
non-representational approach takes humour as something that skips cognitive 
attention and does not yield fully to its semantic components. Instead, what a non-
representational analysis of humour offers is looking to the affective field that a work 
embodies. By comparison, for a majority of representational cases of humour, an 
affect maintains its dominance and this affect, more often than not, is shared between 
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what is expected and what is unexpected. In other words, if any kind of incongruity 
is introduced, be it through a one-liner, a cartoon or any other medium, the dominant 
affect remains the same before and after the incongruity and if there is a shift it is on 
semantic level. That's why we argue further that incongruity in semantic and 
metaphoric level yields suspension that in order to function asks for resolution in a 
way an algorithm or a puzzle works. On the contrary, for a non-representational 
humour, affective challenges and the interrelations that take place in the constellation 
of affects is given priority. Ironically, this makes humour in such texts depend less 
on a riddle strategy. 
 
The affective significance in this regard and in such works drives us to speculate on 
the existence of affects in literature and art. For this, we keep an eye on the Nietzschean 
understanding of philosophy which is more similar to ''physiologist and physician‘'. The 
reason Nietzsche admits such a title is his insistence on forces and even more importantly 
the typology of forces. Nietzsche attempts to delineate a whole, if not consistent, outline 
of different type of forces in order to provide a better understanding of the human psyche. 
Gilles Deleuze extends such a tacit typology in Nietzsche and explicates it in his different 
works. One major work which reveals the intersection and interrelation of forces is 
Nietzsche and Philosophy. Once again, it should be emphasized that the reason why such 
a work is being dealt and analysed here is its significance for any understanding of the 
role humour can play among the crowd of affects in the human psyche. Furthermore, 
humour can be freed from any psychological or anthropological reduction which 
embraces laughter from normalized body-politics. According to Deleuze, two crucial 
modes of existence which Nietzsche diagnoses are ressentiment and bad conscience. 
These two are the platforms which can transform active forces to reactive ones in 
different scales. Nevertheless, the pivotal point is not simply a speculation on the origin 
of ressentiment and bad conscience; rather it is the possibilities of discarding these two. 
A realist project of humour is an answer and an extension in this regard which reveals its 
various traces in different texts. While reactive forces inherent in these two 
aforementioned modes are more inclined towards nihilism, some possibilities can be 
introduced in order to not only nullify such affects but importantly transmute them. Such 
an existence of humour seems to be more of a gesture than a general model or a defined 
mechanism or determination throughout the text. In order to orientate better towards what 
is meant here by such a gesture, it is necessary to define in what context humour has 
come forth. If a work is able to lean on 
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a kind of humour whose elements have been planted earlier, the work provides a 
more intense humour. It might seem to be a more stylistic and rhetoric conception, 
but in terms of our distinction between different kinds of humour, it is of tremendous 
help. In its contingent exposure, a work prepares itself for the emergence of humour. 
Humour arrives and directs the dominating senses towards a new direction; its 
divestment from the prevailing affects. 
 
Such divestment is also reflected in Freud, however not in his Humour analysis. 
Freud, in his Mourning and Melancholia, defines in terms of detachment from the desired 
object, an incremental divestment of libido, a process which takes patience and is 
accompanied with pain. This process is a systematic movement to detach from one object 
and mourning is something the helps the psyche that has undergone such a pain restore its 
balance. Seeing humour in its affective constellation and in its contingency also involves 
a detachment from former dominant affects to new positive ones which construct the 
subject. Such a process of detachment gains its full significance in death, something that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Freud has already raised this point in relation to 
mourning due to the loss of somebody that results in withdrawal from the current 
cathectic investments. In the same vein, such preparation to be a medium for such 
inhuman humour in order for the current dominant affects to undergo a transformation 
into positive affects is possible when the subject divests from his or her investments. 
Mourning for Freud is a mechanism that paves the way to process and understand such 
transformation and one can argue that humour requires such process and preparation or 
otherwise it would be imposed on the subject in a sudden act where he or she is a part of 
the humour. In the next chapters we analyse how such detachment is at the core of an 
inhuman humour project. The ability in humour to transubstantiate the network of affects 
which has constituted and positioned the subject can be refused and ignored by the 
subject since it can jeopardize this constituted position. Subjects, in their evasion of 
humour and subsequent transpositions of affects maintain the negative affects towards a 
cruel end. In our analysis of sovereignty and humour in the next chapter such a relation in 
subject would be elaborated. 
 
In a nutshell and back to Watt, Beckett does more than a practice to entertain the 
reader. Watt is not a laughing novel, yet it appears quite interesting from humour and 
laughter point of view. In order to answer the question of why this is, we need to bear in 
mind that it is held mainly that laughter is a result of something unexpected, a surprise 
that then gets resolved. Watt discloses a logic, an algorithm of producing laughter. In 
 
 
81 
 
effect Watt shows us how to be happy or it provides us with a recipe of humour. The 
novel is replete with the moments where one is able to laugh against his will, even when 
he is filled with frustration, disappointment and anger. Even if, as some commentators do, 
we do not agree on Watt being a tragicomedy since the absurd is not quite correlated with 
tragicomedy, Watt is where laughter exists in its bleak nature. One is tempted to call it 
comedy-comedy. If not the whole novel but a majority of points made in the novel are 
comedy of comedy. There is something evidently important that Beckett is trying: if 
according to the incongruity theory, something must be suspended in order to be resolved 
and produce laughter, Beckett lingers this time between suspension and its resolution. 
Consequently the expected relief or resolution does not occur easily and one is somehow 
forced to loosen the dichotomy between suspension and resolution. In effect, such long 
suspensions make one not expect so much of a relief or resolution. In fact Beckett seems 
to be quite aware of what makes something entertaining and instead of entertaining us 
directly, entertains us with something that is supposed or expected to be entertaining. If it 
is still laughable or not is an open question. 
 
But Beckett can be seen as a anti-cognitive author, novelist or playwright who 
knows not only our political, social and orientations, but also our cognitive expectations 
in laughter. He knows what makes us laugh, then makes us laugh and keeps making us 
laugh with the same thing, which drains the laughter sooner or later. Instead of arguing 
what Beckett knows and does, perhaps it is better to use Beckett as a kind of comparative 
horizon in relation to cognitive incongruity which, almost in a similar vein, knows what 
makes us laugh. The tacit anti-cognitivism of Beckett is admittedly not on the surface of 
the text, nevertheless the text's usage of humour. Incongruity theory could suggest that 
absurdity is humorous because it subverts our expectations, but it doesn‘t resolve the 
tension like a simple joke does, rather going on and on ad absurdum. The laughter 
produced does not necessarily come at a preprogrammed point, but rather bubbles up now 
and then and disappears again and therefore the consequent absurdity in general is not 
explained very well by incongruity theory. Incongruity theory could suggest that 
absurdity is humorous because it subverts our expectations, but it doesn‘t resolve the 
tension like a simple joke does, rather going on and on ad absurdum. The laughter 
produced does not necessarily come at a preprogrammed point, but rather bubbles up now 
and then and disappears again. 
 
Thus any humour that is formed and embedded through varying degrees of 
suspension can be unknotted and return to its resolution or the unknot as the identity 
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element. Watt, as if aware of what makes us laugh, takes another direction. In fact if 
incongruity claims that there are at least two scenarios to produce humour where the first 
(background) does not fit the second (foreground) and it is through a (metaphoric) link 
that these two scopes are connected and hence the humour or laughter. Watt makes 
laughter or humour itself laughable and lodges it in a non-humorous (if not traumatic) 
body. Therefore Watt transcends the cognitive view on which humour is normally framed 
and still makes us laugh: in effect, it seems that this laughter requires an ability to laugh 
at oneself and one‘s own laughter, über sich selbst lichen. 
 
The cruel hilarity of Watt is therefore founded not only on its cognitive 
inappropriateness, but rather on an affective inappropriateness, which makes another 
humour or a double humour possible. Furthermore, if humour, according to incongruity 
theory, reveals the cognitive finitude, Watt makes the finitude of such cognitive humour 
itself visible and risible. The humour that Watt makes possible is a sovereign humour 
which based on its double nature laughs at things including insufficiency of calculated 
cognitive humour. A sovereign laughter is deeply connected to this insufficiency and 
exposes any finite being to an inhuman laughter, yet it eludes instantly as no cognitive 
mechanism can reproduce it. What makes such sovereign laughter is the anguish that 
supports it as a background. It is only through admitting one's limits that such an elusive 
and ephemeral moment of sovereignty can emerge. In his brilliant article Laughter of 
Being, Borch-Jacobson links such limits to the anguish and pain that we experience in 
facing the nothingness of our limits. Sovereign laughter takes a step further and without 
ignoring such anguish, undergoes a moment of escape where an ethical laughter based on 
an ‘‘ethics of summit‘' (739) takes place. Although admitting such anguish as a result of 
limits is a condition for such laughter, limiting oneself to this anguish nullifies such 
laughter too. The other side of the problem as Borch-Jacobson puts it is that Heidegger, 
like other similar philosophers, ''was destined to remain at the stage of the anguish of 
Nothingness...‘‘(743). Nevertheless such laughter of summit or as Borch-Jacobson puts it, 
'ethics of summit' should not be confused with what irony fulfils. In effect, irony is 
similarly ascension to a summit but it has a determined subject whereas such an ethics of 
laughter is asubjective and inhuman, more than a subject who laughs, the being that 
laughs through a subject. Watt produces laughter of laughter or laughter at laughter which 
gets rid of the common (un)expectations in order to be entertaining and instead makes 
what is not supposed to be entertaining, entertaining. 
 
What makes Watt special is comprehensible only in the level of affects, since 
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even if there is an incongruity applicable to various semantic spots in Watt, this 
incongruity is less a cognitive incongruity. Not that that humour in Watt is made up of 
incongruous moments but that the humour itself is incongruous in relation to the entirety 
of the text. Incongruity theory in its cognitive depiction misses the functionality of 
humour. Watt does not yield an easy answer to how humour functions, for the humour 
that leaps out of it in the majority of cases is an inappropriate unplanned humour. 
Therefore, if cognitive theories are in search of incongruity in semantic level, 
 
Watt looks for incongruity in cognitive incongruity: a double incongruity. Watt 
escapes incongruity and leaves incongruity itself incongruous in numerous spots of 
the text. In its attempt which can be called anti-cognitive laughter, Watt renders some 
voids visible, voids that are designed to be filled 'inevitably' with humour. Humour 
functions in numerous cases like this: cognitive equilibrium and congruity or 
consistency is punctured and as a result incongruity does not function; the text renders 
cognitive incongruity null and void and provokes humour. By neutralizing our 
expectations, Watt escapes the logic of surprise as commonly held in the production 
of humour. If humour is an attempt to grapple with finitude and cope with it, Watt 
makes even this attempt humorous; it laughs at what produces laughter. 
 
Realist humour does not add another affect such as happiness as in 
psychologism of laughter and humour; but directs forces involved in negative affects 
to a positive and constructive one. The fact that such humour transmutes dominant 
affects should be stressed, since a theory of humour that limits itself to a cognitive 
scope and disregards the significance of affects rather than a gesture to life is a 
temporary augmentation and extension of laughter which simply suppresses and 
cracks down on negative affects This suffices for the moment to enable us to 
emphasize the difference between intensity of realist humour as opposed to the 
extensity of cognitive and subjective laughter and humour. Back to the primary 
question concerning representational laughter, we can add an intensive/ extensive 
dichotomy which can be helpful to shield humour from a momentary manifestation. 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Towards the Exteriority of Humour 
 
 
 
As we discussed one main difference between one-liners and longer humorous text is 
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laid in their usage of memory. A one-liner is much more intense and abstract and this 
makes it different from a longer text like Watt which has to handle the same 
humorous gesture throughout the text. This distinction was raised in our analysis of 
self-referentiality, but in this part, we aim to elaborate the pertinence of the 
significance of these two forms of humour to a realist project of humour. A difference 
that has implications for the next chapter regarding Life, End of. By granting a 
memory for the text, one can say that one-liners utilize a short-term memory in the 
production of humour, whereas there seems to be a long-term memory in the 
production of humour in longer texts. In effect, if one-liners function according to a 
knowledge of the world through a short-circuit of juxtaposition which has been made 
possible through a metaphor, longer texts in order to maintain humour apply a 
constant self-referentiality in their production. Such self-referentiality demands a 
longer memory where an already described past is equally taken into account. 
 
Thinking of Watt, something has been said somewhere prior and now after a long 
journey of mind the novel foregrounds the earlier point and even resolve it at least to 
some extent. In effect, the past is not absent from the present but is implied there. Deleuze 
in his Proust and the Signs and his cinema books, makes a brilliant attempt of defining 
such past and its relation to the present through his virtual/ actual concepts. Based on a 
Bergsonian reading, the present includes both past and future and the only difference is 
that actual as the present moment is more real to us. When something is less real although 
it exists, its existence is limited to our memory and is not yet actualized. One such case 
can be seen in Watt where the character is dealing with his memories and makes an 
attempt to sort them out, keeps some and deletes others. Remembering memories and 
looking at them with some scrutiny is what makes parts of 
 
Watt quite humorous. It is through this access to such long memory that a realist project 
of humour can be defined in terms of historicity and beyond moments of ephemeral and 
metaphoric randomness of wit. Self-referentiality seen this way is far from the linguistic 
self-referentiality in post-modernism that is as a linguistic phenomenon targets itself in an 
attempt of loosening between words and things (Ray, 14). 
 
Self-referentiality, in a small scale is also implied the humour based in 
Incongruity Theory since every resolution takes place retrospectively and in reference 
to a previous suspension. In effect, one reason that makes a one-liner more difficult or 
intelligent to grasp is that it has recourse to a past memory rather than a present 
available situation. However not all one-liners utilize the past, longer texts are able to 
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refer to something suspended in more distant past. Nonetheless, it will be discussed at 
 
the end of next chapter that a realist humour does not think of such past only in a textual 
 
mode, where something mentioned and suspended in previous pages is being 
 
resurfaced  and  resolved  in  the  present.  Self-referentiality,  at  least  in  its  primary 
 
conception is the ability of a subject to refer back to itself. In a more formal manner and 
 
especially in logic, self-referentiality is the property that a statement refers to itself and 
 
makes statement about itself. Humour can utilize this characteristic in referring to itself 
 
through some encoding or through having recourse to some intermediary passages. 
 
Nevertheless, as the main characteristic of such humour is, its emergence in other spots 
 
are not predictable, Watt bears traces of self-referentiality where it refers and alludes to 
 
a point already made. Here we limit our understanding and definition of 
 
self-referentiality to a simple textual one where a text, in a sporadic and contingent 
 
manner refers to its own components. Self-referentilaity and its relation to humour can 
 
be explicated better against the background of incongruity theory of humour. 
 
Incongruity theory of humour, as it were, as the most dominant theory of humour, 
 
claims, with its long tradition in philosophy, that when our expectations are suspended 
 
or extinguished it can result in humour. This theory functions perfectly when we are 
 
dealing with a one-liner or when we encounter a moment when the author is referring 
 
us to something from the real world we share. But when it comes to larger texts, the 
 
relation between suspension and resolution is not as clear and in such cases humour, to 
 
a  large  extent  depends  on  the  ability  to  have  a  holistic  conception  of  the  text. 
 
Nevertheless having a partial understanding of a text does not exclude understanding of 
 
humour in its entirety, but keeps it in a specific level. In shorter texts the humour 
 
produced is the result of a simple coordination, a short collocation of two or more 
 
diverse zones and this collocation turns out to be new, unexpected and entertaining, 
 
whereas in longer texts, production and reception of humour is the result of two or more 
 
ideas or facts that are not simply and so closely and evidently juxtaposed. 
 
So all went well until Watt began to invert, no longer the order of the 
words in the sentence, but that of the letters in the word. This further 
modification Watt carried through with all his usual discretion and 
sense of what was acceptable to the ear, and aesthetic judgement. 
Nevertheless to one, such as me, desirous above all of information, the 
change was not a little disconcerting. The following is an example of 
Watt‘s manner, at this period: Ot bro, lap rulb, krad klub. Ot murd, wol 
fup, wol fup. Ot niks, sorg sam, sorg sam. Ot lems, lats lems, lats lems. 
Ot gnut, trat stews, trat stews (Beckett, 141). 
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It is in this framework, that a realist project of humour, with some reservations, 
defines what it means by the exteriority of humour. Granting a past for humour 
implies that the very process of humour production in such texts as Watt, depends 
heavily on a virtual or on a past. While the difference of such humour from the 
humour in one-liners is evident, there is another facet which is urgent for a realist 
humour. Realist humour distinguishes itself from a humour that is only a sudden and 
ephemeral act of laughter. For a realist humour, history is no less important that the 
present ephemeral moment. In effect, whatever is experienced in the past (rejection/ 
avoidance of humour) plays a role in the present production of humour. The crucial 
point for a realist project on humour is that although it places the emphasis on the 
contingency of humour and its momentary unexpected presence, it adds that such 
emergence should not be reduced to an ephemeral appearance bereft of any the 
historical or past responsiveness. Realist humour demands for preparatory acts to 
befall subjects and transmute their affects through making them a medium for 
humour. Subjects through their diachronic gestures open themselves to such 
contingency of realist humour, an act of summoning humour through the most tense 
and tragic moments paves the way for the emergence of humour in subjects. In the 
same vein, works by planting such traces of humour open themselves to a contingent 
and incalculable emergence of humour. This helps us take a crucial distance from 
such understanding of humour which limits it to a synchronic and sudden emergence. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Mentally Humorous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two believers cannot observe one another without laughing (Deleuze, 
1994, 119). 
 
Seeing laughter, hearing laughter, I participate from within in the 
emotion of the one who laughs. It is this emotion experienced from 
within which, communicating itself to me, laughs within me. What we 
know through participation (through communication) is what we know 
intimately: we immediately apprehend the laughter of the other by 
laughing ourselves, or his excitement by sharing the excitement 
(Bataille, 1986, 152-53). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made  to stress the significance of the 
 
affective role humour plays and we tried to make a distinction between a cognitive 
 
approach to humour and an affective one. A short attempt was made to highlight 
 
humour in its interiority, a mechanism that provides subjects with an ability to 
 
dispense with the passive forces and return these forces to active and constructive 
 
ones. The main part of this chapter is an attempt to expand this affective conception 
 
of humour. However, towards the end of this chapter, another side of humour, 
 
namely its exteriority, will be introduced. It suffices here to say that the interiority 
 
of  humour  as  we  explained  partly  in  the  previous  chapter  addresses  humour 
 
production in relation to the self and the production of the subject. In other words, 
 
such a facet of humour is more a gesture by which a subject rids himself or herself 
 
of reactive forces as normally embodied in the negative affects. Such microscopic 
 
humour  is,  as  we  discussed,  not  a  determined  and  intentional  act  that  targets 
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subjects‘ consciousness. We will argue that such humour by being microscopic and 
affective requires an abrupt and ephemeral characteristic. Christine Brooke-Rose‘s 
 
Novel, Life, The End of provides us with an opportunity to see such an ephemeral 
manifestation of humour in the middle of a consciousness which is not only bleak 
and frigid but also tragic. Such molecular manifestations of humour in its 
ephemeral mode will be linked to its molar mode in what we label the exteriority of 
humour. The distinction between molecular and molar, borrowed from Deleuze and 
Guattari, represents two equally important sides of the same phenomenon in its 
micro-property and macro-properties. 
 
Temperature, for example, is a molar property of a body of water or air 
composed of a large population of molecules. That is temperature is 
simply the average result of the molecules' kinetic energy, the energy 
they have by virtue of their movement. Thus the distinction between 
the molecular and molar is similar to that between micro-properties 
and macro-properties (Buchanan and Thoburn, 165). 
 
By making use of such a tentative distinction between the molecular and 
molar levels, a molecular significance is attributed to affects in the production of 
humour. This does not limit affects to some closed interiority, affects play a no less 
important role in the production of humour in its exterior mode. The first part of 
this chapter aims to delineate the affective side of humour in its ephemeral and 
abrupt mode in the language of Life, End of. Life, End of, like Beckett‘s Watt, is not 
a purely comic attempt and what makes it special to this study is the fact that its 
humour is located on the very microscopic level and in relation to a tragic 
experience. Life, End of, provides various flows of humour that are quite noticeable 
on the face of the tragedy it depicts. The main character-narrator of Life, End of, 
through her constant relation to an overwhelming experience of pain, anxiety, 
paralysis and death, offers epiphanies of humour, unexpected moments which at 
least lead one to a small laughter. Such experience of humour and laughter is shown 
to be based on a moment of suddenness in Life, End of and we argue that it should 
be analysed closely and in relation to consciousness. Although humour in Life, End 
of seems to have also been made up of the integration of different semantic scripts 
in an unexpected manner as in jokes and one-liners, a humour shaped on a more 
mental and cognitive level. We will see that such humour is not simply based on a 
linguistic playfulness. By going beyond the linguistic playfulness of wit, it will be 
shown that such humour is an act that defines itself less in relation to language than 
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in relation to the finitude of human knowledge. By hijacking humour from 
language and locating it beside knowledge, it can be a tool that constantly cautions 
one against the limits of one‘s knowledge. This already prepares one to deal with 
what we have been calling the interior significance of humour, which is definable in 
relation to the production of the subject. 
 
In effect, in order to provide such an affective side in humour with a larger 
context which directs us to its implications in a realist project of humour, in the rest 
of this chapter, we highlight the relation between the interiority of humour and its 
social and ontological mode in its exteriority. In other words, this chapter provides 
us with an opportunity to see how a realist project of humour, by dispensing with 
the dominance of linguistic humour (if not excluding it entirely), starts with an 
affective notion of humour and composes an interzone between such affects in a 
subjective and interior layer with one in an inter-subjective mode. It will be argued 
that what is at stake in this relation between the interior and affective side of 
humour and the exterior and social side is the question of knowledge. These two 
facets are interwoven and while the subjective mode of humour is founded on an 
ephemeral moment of emancipation offered by humour to move from the realm of 
knowledge to that of active affects, there is another facet which seeks to define 
humour in relation to social assemblages which bear various degrees of knowledge. 
A realist humour needs not only do away with an exclusively linguistic conception 
of humour but also aims for a dialectical understanding of humour between social 
assemblages. 
 
Tonny Aagaard Olesen, a scholar in humour and comedy in Kierkegaard, 
stresses the significance of two sides in Kierkegaard‘s conception of the comic (and 
especially humour) and defines them as passionate-dialectical sides (Olesen, 339). 
 
Olesen denies any similarity between Kierkegaard‘s theory of humour and the one 
offered by Hobbesian laughter that ‗‘laughs in order to assert itself‘‘, or a 
physiological-psychological model inherited from Spencer or Freud. Olesen claims 
that Kierkegaard‘s notion of laughter is as reflective as it is passionate. Such a 
theory dispenses with an understanding of laughter which is solely based on a 
‗‘free play‘‘ or an ‗‘immediate, arbitrary‘‘ or ‗‘carnivalistic‘‘ side that ‗‘lacks 
reflection‘‘ (342). Olesen‘s focus is mainly on Kierkegaard‘s major Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments which deals profoundly with 
humour, irony and the comic. 
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One may call Kierkegaard‘s theory of the comic in Postscript an 
existential comic of reflection. By this, it is meant that the comic is 
closely related to the existence relation itself, the essence which is 
passionate-dialectical. The passionate [pathetiske] element signifies an 
immediacy to which the individual is subject, such that it is set in a 
context of suffering...The dialectical element, on the other hand, 
signifies the mediated reflection in its never-ending task of juxtaposing 
categories and seeking out contradictions. Where the first instance 
concerns individual‘s earnestness [alvor] and interest, the second, the 
esthetic-metaphysical, involves disinterested deliberation, to which the 
comic belongs (Olesen, 343). 
 
 
Both these sides are equally significant to define and delimit what a realist 
 
project  of  humour  demands.  This  passionate-dialectical  conception  of  humour 
 
correlates  with  an  understanding  of  humour  which  on  the  one  hand  seeks  an 
 
emancipation  of  reactive  forces  in  the  minuscule  and  microscopic  relations  of 
 
subject and on the other hand aims for an interzone of social and even ontological 
 
roles attributed to humour where (instead of judgement of God) those subjects or 
 
assemblages which evade implementing humour inside will be dialectically 
 
derided. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Alinguistic Communication of laughter 
 
 
And thus it appears that the doctrine of eternal return is conceived yet 
again as a simulacrum of doctrine whose very parodic characteristic 
gives account of hilarity as an attribute of existence sufficient unto 
itself, when laughter rings out from the depth of truth itself, either 
because truth bursts forth in the laughter of the gods, or because the 
gods themselves die laughing uncontrollably. When a god wanted to be 
the holy God, all of the other gods were seized with uncontrollable 
laughter, until they laughed to death (Blanchot, 181). 
 
 
Life, End of as Christine Brooke-Rose‘s final novel, is replete with its narrator‘s 
 
contradictions and anxieties in her eighties. Anxieties that are at least partly, due to 
 
aging and approaching death. At the same time, its understanding of death is largely 
 
rooted in a quotidian mode that includes mental and physical decline. Therefore even 
 
the anxieties in Life, End of are not bereft of corporeal aspects. Friendship, 
 
independence, and all body organs are influenced heavily by such an experiment of 
 
aging  and  Christine  Brooke-Rose  who  is  already  known  for  her  experimentalist 
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works, depicts and traces every single and tiny component of such a decline. As an 
autobiographical work, Life, End of pictures such little manifestations which include 
the body, friends, loneliness, embarrassment, desolation and so on. Therefore the 
novel is filled with a variety of different affects that emerge out of any reflection and 
encounter with such aspects. And this already makes it hard to imagine that its 
humour is shaped outside of such a network of various affects. One can go that far as 
to say that Christine-Brooke-Rose seems to be more loyal to such affects than to the 
linear narration of an already formed plot in her novel. This is affirmed to some 
extent, where she, beyond writing, presents us with the affective side of writing. She 
describes the process of losing sight and this already damages her independence, yet 
writing remains there. Although this locates the novel in a tragic mode, there is an 
affective side in her writing that communicates something non-tragic. This makes the 
novel move between two forms of communication. On the one hand the linguistic 
communication of her pains and failures (from childhood, to marriage and then 
retirement) and on the other hand, the humour through which the latter is 
communicated. 
 
An old lady is staggering round her kitchen, keeps talking to herself on a variety 
of different topics, from ‗the looking glass‘ to the most abstract entities of her world. 
Different thoughts spring to her mind, like to stand requires the help of both arms. 
Pain has a notable presence in language that describes her intolerable physical 
difficulty. Walking is painful: ‗The legs now burn permanently, hot charcoal in the 
feet creeping up the shins.‘(2) The legs ‗flinch wince jerk shirk lapse collapse give 
way stagger like language when it can‘t present the exact word needed, the exact spot 
where to put the foot‘(2). And yet there are other people to deal with. A soothing 
doctor who acts reluctantly to explain things. The woman has another problem, 
another zone in her zones of problems is that of her old friends. More than anything 
she is worried about her stipulations. She wants others to ignore them. They must hire 
a car, consider her problems in the kitchen, and thus avoid bringing an end to a thirty-
year friendship? Although almost everything inside and outside is becoming 
increasingly inaccessible, she‘d rather be alone, in her house, her rooms, among her 
books. She observes a lot and meditates on various things, the condition of the world, 
population growth, the failure of medicine for the aged, the curse of advertising. Life, 
End of is a book filled with subjective contradictions and anxieties. The character 
constantly addresses a stance which is not only composed of linguistic or semantic 
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communication. It is argued here that Life, End of deals with the passionate side in the 
production of humour and the very construction of its subject who is suffering from 
passive affects. Therefore, what is stake is less what the novel communicates and 
rather the way the novel communicates such anxieties and pains. This communication 
which is not necessarily reducible to a linguistic or better to say an informative one, is 
largely fed by a humorous attitude in the novel. If the linguistic form is a mode of 
communicating information which conveys pains and obsessions, Life, End of offers a 
no less significant mode of communication which more than informative is 
contagious and deals with affects. 
 
Judy Little in her The Experimental Self argues that there is a poetic element 
in Brooke-Rose novels that results in a flexible and flowing state where even the 
characters ' do no take themselves seriously enough to despair' (125). As a result, as 
Little implies, the characters in Brooke-Rose novels are less obsessed with 
overcoming grand narratives than they are inclined to create. Little argues that there 
is self-subversive tendencies in her work. Georges Bataille is among the most 
notable writers who has stressed such communication of flows in his various works. 
Such communication according to Bataille not only is not reducible to the subjects 
who are involved in it but also it functions as a fluid, as ‘ a stream of 
electricity‘(Inner Experience 94). Therefore, the flow mentioned in Bataille is way 
beyond a linguistic phenomenon attributed fully to subjects, it 'destroys the concept 
of inner experience as internal because '' your life is not limited to that ungraspable 
inner streaming; it streams to the outside as well and opens itself incessantly to 
what flows out or surges forth towards it'' (2014, 94). The fact that communicating 
the inner experience is impossible should be added with the tacit emphasis in 
Georges Bataille that there is another form of communication possible to him; one 
shaped in affects, one that implies a heterogeneous community involved in it; 
laughter and tears bear an element of contagion that can be called an affective 
contagion. But before dealing with ideas foregrounded in Bataille‘s, it is worth 
mentioning a figure whose ideas help understand such affective communication, 
namely Alphonso Lingis. Lingis, who is well-known for his translations of a variety 
of different thinkers and writers, including Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Klossowski, is a figure through whom one can also see the phenomenological link 
to such realism. Although his major work, Imperative, is not limited to laughter, it 
provides us with a background against which one can see how phenomenology of 
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his kind can grasp and grapple with such random and corporeal phenomena. But 
more importantly and due to his phenomenological background, he is among the 
few philosophers who managed to synthesize such sensations as in laughter in his 
conceptualization of the subject. Lingis places emphasis on the fact that not only 
are such sensations significant in the present and actual state of subjects, they form 
and shape the subjects (119). In effect, one can go so far as to claim that such 
sensations are the forces that are prior to the formed subjects. As he puts it in the 
very beginning of his We Mortals, ‗‘One is born with forces that one did not 
contrive, One lives by giving form to those forces. Forms that one picks up from 
others‘‘ (Lingis, 119). One can notice to what extent his understanding of subject 
depend on the forces that come as a result of a subjects‘ interaction with others. 
Such plasticity in the formation of subjects is at the core of Lingis‘ innovative 
phenomenology and it sheds a new light on our understanding of separate affects 
through an interactive and holistic psychology which is notably influenced from 
Gestalt models. In his Imperative, Lingis introduces in a very sporadic manner, an 
understanding of laughter which goes beyond a communicative mode. In other 
words, once again we come across a writer who prioritizes an affective conception 
of humour and laughter over a linguistic one. 
 
Language is not the primary medium, then, for communication. It is 
not speaking to another that we cease to deal with him or her as an 
instrument or obstacle, and recognize his or her subjectively. It is in 
laughter and tears that we have the feeling of being there for others. 
We do not laugh alone and forever alone (Lingis, 127). 
 
 
As one can notice, at least two components are attributed to such laughter, 
namely its non-linguistic and communicative mode as well as its social and inter-
subjective dimension. But what makes Lingis significant to this study is not the direct 
links he makes with laughter and humour, but rather the plastic itinerary between 
different affects. What serves our purpose here, is to see how such framework can 
help us understand the humour in this novel. Life, End of, as we have already 
discussed is not a comic novel as its treatment with humour and laughter takes place 
in the middle of anxiety, crisis and the pain the character is undergoing. The 
handicapped, paralysed body of the narrator cannot move easily and is not even able 
to experience to laugh as smoothly. 
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And, the body, though it may cause laughter, has no sense of humour 
of its own, no small sparks of slow but planetary motion, no fleeting 
stars of word-play, only the mind has those (Brooke-Rose, 12). 
 
The  humour  in  Life,  End  of  can  not  be  analysed  independently  from  the 
 
overwhelming anxiety that the character presents; this makes the novel more 
 
interesting as the small, microscopic sources of humour are able to resist the anxiety 
 
that such an overwhelming physical state can cause. In a way, one can say that the 
 
humour present in the entire novel not only prevents submission to such anxiety but 
 
also evidently has the power to transfigure the affects inherent in anxiety. In We 
 
Mortals, Lingis foregrounds the fact that anxiety can be analysed and defined in his 
 
framework of thought. This is extremely important in relation to Life, End of, a novel 
 
which is an amalgam of anxiety, pain and such existential concerns and random 
 
humour that come up out of sudden in the middle of them and resist them affectively. 
 
Lingis does not celebrate or romanticize anxiety and instead links it in an affective 
 
framework  to  an  indifferent  mode  of  life.  Anxiety,  according  to  Lingis  and  in 
 
affective terms, surfaces through a distance. Lingis believes that there is an inherent 
 
distance which causes anxiety and leaves one to himself. Such distance and 
 
indifference is at the heart of an inability to express the forces of life. Putting it 
 
differently, when the forces are not actualized and they are imprisoned in themselves, 
 
they get isolated and this causes anxiety. This has, for Lingis, certainly traces of the 
 
active and passive modes of existence offered by Spinoza. For Spinoza too, when 
 
active life is led to the realization of one's powers it results in joy. In effect, one asks 
 
oneself ''what must we do in order to be affected by the maximum of joyful passions‘' 
 
(Deleuze, 1992, 274). It suffices here to remember that Spinoza‘s project in the same 
 
vein is an attempt to shift from passive affects to active ones that celebrate such joy. 
 
But what is interesting in Lingis‘ notion is the fact that he introduces anxiety as a 
 
result of such passivity and isolation. 
 
What feels anxiety is then a heat, a force of life that is potential, not 
actualized, that clings to itself, and wills to be. When the theater of 
practical and social world fades off into indifference and distance, 
when the firms my forces have contracted disconnect from the layouts 
and the functions and the roles, this force of life is backed up against 
itself, and clings to itself, and feels the cold darkness of nothingness 
closing in. Isolated, singled out, it feels its own singularity, a force of 
life assembled in this frail composition of matter, drifting into the 
abyss, never to be assembled again (1998, 121). 
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 Humour does not exclude or neglect anxiety, it reorients it through transmuting 
 
its inherent passive forces to active ones. In order to elaborate this, we take a look at a 
 
passage in Life, End of where the character is describing various issues and framing 
 
them in the context of death. 
 
For the first time since earlier enthusiasms followed by exams and all 
the rest, the mind now turns to the world, easing out of word-play and 
its neighbouring disciplines, philology, linguistics, linguistics, 
philosophy, psych-analysis. These are the ivory towers, more 
singularly cut off from the world than the wooden or stone towers of 
history politics economics sociology, however cut off these these still 
may be. But words we take for granted do get analysed. One book 
traces the complex history of democracy, that thing we ask people to 
die for, so that we needn‘t, and which we are trying to ram down the 
rest of the world‘s throat, how long it took, how recent, how false, 
flawed and incomplete it is. Another does the same with the word 
republic. I‘m a republican, says a girl ambulance-driver, clearly in the 
context meaning democrat, or even just that she‘s as good as any other. 
As if monarchies couldn‘t be democratic or republics dictatorial. Yet 
such studies are a good sign, some people are waking up. Traditionally 
philosophy and its kindred disciplines merely assert, science has to 
prove. And re-question. The strong but rustable metal towers of 
science are now unsharable, except in polularised versions of 
astronomy physics biology paleontology and such, the most 
inaccessible and yet the least cut off from the world, the planet, the 
universe. The globe. Except when some rush ahead with something 
new without first finding out if it can be stopped, like sorcerer‘s  
Apprentice.  
The glaucomous eyes grow squinilly weary of reading all day, 
the body grows heavier since unable to go out and walk. And despite 
the passion and ease of understanding, an ease resulting from long 
train of intake, it all gets nevertheless forgotten. Why not, since no 
seminars to give no conference papers to prepare, no books to write. 
On way to nearby death, what is intake for? Just pleasure. Still, the 
merely personal unmemorability of such books create tele-temptations. 
Documentaries, science programmes, earth reports, political 
discussions. These last however sooner or later are unhearable since 
speakers interrupt each other relentlessly until the less loud voice is 
quelled, though meanwhile listeners lose all. And since each country 
broadcasts as few learning programmes as possible at comfortable 
hours, two dishes bring them on a full platter of time-zone choices.  
For after all, even these learning programmes are fictions too, in 
a way. How? Well in the same way any presenter of anything tells a 
daily lie by his very presence when he says see you tomorrow. He 
won‘t but we‘ll see him. Or an author is shown typing, on his personal 
screen, the very novel that is published and being discussed on the 
screen that shows him. Such frequent staging sunders trust in the 
supposedly true programmes. 
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A windy-haired professor walks and and talks his way through a 
wood, down a street, up a rock, or barely-careless into a field, his voice 
saying, say, it‘s a battlefield. Or better, a battlefield called Waterloo, 
the camera careful not to include the modern pyramidal monument 
stair-climbed by tourists, yet cutting-room-switches to a crowd of 
office-workers locusting out of the tube-station called, on camera, 
Waterloo. Another follows the trail of a sixteenth-century conquistador 
gone native, from Rio Grande to Mexico by trenito or jeep, and stops 
to talk to locals who have just about heard, because it‘s legendary, of 
the mountain of gold he sought, but not of him. In the organised 
amnesia of modern schooling is such non-humorous fusion of temporal 
levels wise? (Brooke-Rose, 26-28). 
 
 
This already goes beyond a semantic or cognitive attempt, or what is at stake is 
 
not meaning but affects and their forces. By applying Deleuze‘s analysis of forces, 
 
especially in his Nietzsche and Philosophy, to one of humour one can say that such 
 
humour  is not  the  result of  differential  relations between signifiers, as  in  the 
 
structuralist view, but rather a differential relation between active and reactive forces. 
 
Therefore and as will be discussed in a minute, the relation between humour and 
 
value is at the heart of such conception of humour. In a vitalist framework, offered 
 
mainly by Deleuze and Guattari, 
 
The whole of life must be considered in terms of actions and passions, 
and so is essentially composed of social relations. While these forces 
are transcendental conditioning factors and hence unknowable, they 
can be distinguished genealogically according to a typology of sense 
and value (Goodchild, 30). 
 
 
What is at stake is how this passage shows the very transmutation of negative 
 
effects, especially those under inertia and the eminent death to those of humour. The 
 
humour for this passage presents us to at least two functions: one is more a vitalist 
 
attempt as mentioned, that brings us to the function of the new active forces  of 
 
humour while the other bears an ethical function. Although such ethical function of 
 
humour will be discussed in the next chapter, it suffices to note, through this passage 
 
how humour in a very minuscule and molecular sense addresses the truth itself or 
 
what has been represented as truth. Such function which in this research, is called 
 
humoureme  not  only  bears  the  former  vitalist  transmutation  of  forces,  but  also 
 
emerges out of any discourse which keeps professing. As we see towards the end of 
 
this passage, where the authors are represented in a way which is untrue but which 
 
pleases the spectators and Brooke-Roses‘ humour targets such pretension. 
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Back to the vitalist facet of such humour, it is interesting to see primarily how 
Brooke-Rose‘ passage provides us with a cluster of various affects, which are their 
own replete with negative forces. From the physical inertia to ‗the complex history of 
democracy‘ and ‗Documentaries, science programmes, earth reports, political 
discussions‘ (27) are common in one thing, they all transmit an ‗inaccessible‘ life. In 
different parts of the novel, this inaccessibility is presented, however Brooke-Rose 
divides such inaccessibility to physical and mental categories where one can be 
defined in terms of gradual and physical death, isolation and inertia and the other 
emblematic of anxiety. Nevertheless, humour surfaces in an unexpected phenomenon 
between these various sources of reactive forces. And it is such unexpectedness which 
makes it more suitable and more needed in this between. If anxiety surfaces when 
something is backed up against itself, and excluded from its assemblage and social 
relations, humour retains the connections and restores the assemblage by activating 
the passive forces. Nevertheless, for a realist humour such anxiety is very much 
reminiscent of a Bergsonian state of laughter when something organic goes toward 
being inorganic and becoming a thing. Bergson‘s Le Rire depicts the moment when 
an assemblage is collapsed and ridiculed. As mentioned in the first chapter and seen 
against his emphasis on duration, movement and time in his other works, Bergson‘s 
picture of laughter, to a large extent, arises as the result of the absence of such 
plasticity or when a rigidity befalls one organism. However, this rigidity is not simply 
a corporeal rigidity and as we will explain in a minute, laughter can target the inherent 
rigidity of ideas and knowledge and even affective rigidity too. By extending the 
degrading function of laughter to a phenomenological realm, one notices that the 
relation between such laughter and value is no less important; laughter degrades 
values (at least for a certain moment). Here we analyse some preliminary aspects of 
such relation between humour, laughter and values at work. 
 
In Life, End of, Even if laughter is one case among others where a non-linguistic 
and affective communication is formed and communicated, it unsettles a knowledge 
that is purely linguistic and discursive. Georges Bataille in his Inner Experience and 
his Unfinished System of Non-Knowledge shows that such experiences as laughter and 
weeping can be no less communicative than language. It should be noted that some 
psychological facets of these two phenomena were already present, as Bataille admits, 
in the writings of the American author Alfred Stern especially the one entitled The 
Philosophy of Laughter and Tears. In his analysis of laughter and tears, Stern places 
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emphasis on what these two experiences lead us to and the mechanism behind them. 
According to Stern, laughter and tears are two ‗polar manifestation of psychism', two 
irrational experiences which are similar in the fact that they are both excessive and do 
not fit the common economy of the psyche which seems to have interested Georges 
 
Bataille. Alfred Stern‘s emphasis is on the common element of value between laughter 
and weeping and both such experiences are formed in relation to value judgement. ‗‘We 
laugh at degraded values, or in order to degrade values, but we weep about threatened, 
lost, and unattainable values‘‘ (Stern, 17). However, to elaborate and differentiate them, 
Stern believes that tears are associated with a kind of positive value judgement as we 
weep where our values are threatened or they are no longer existent. On the other hand, 
we laugh as an expression of a negative value judgement as our values are degraded. 
Although Stern and Bataille‘s analysis of laughter and tears are helpful in order to discard 
a subjective and intentional conception of humour, it will be elaborated in the last chapter 
that, in order to develop a realist humour, one cannot remain in such a psychological 
explication of laughter and tears. However, by foregrounding the question of value in 
relation to laughing and weeping as moments when our values are threatened or 
degraded, we would be able to define and delineate an inhuman conception of humour 
that targets subjects by degrading them. By adding the element of value to a realist 
conceptualization of humour, we maintain a mechanism between an inhuman laughter 
and the very degradation of human values. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Laughing im Augenblick 
 
 
History topples irrationally at the 'mid-moment'. These instances, 
otherwise called 'initial', or 'Critical' Moments, have the characteristic 
of the epiphanic mode: suddenness, momentousness and intensity. The 
perfection of 'the irrational glory' is meant, of course to disown Hegel's 
self-realization or perfection of the spirit through the ages ( Tigges, 
181). 
 
As discussed earlier in the first and second chapters, the emphasis on the contingency 
laid at the heart of humour makes it different from a wilful act of producing laughter 
and wit. If a representational mode of humour makes an attempt to produce humour at 
any cost, this way depends on linguistic reformulations and algorithms, while a realist 
humour, without excluding language, places emphasis on a sudden and unexpectedly 
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new relation between forces that is understood better in terms of affects. However we 
 
need  to  elaborate  such  a  sudden  and  abrupt  moment  and  its  digressions  in  an 
 
understanding of a realist humour. 
 
Along the top of these crushed creatures, separated by a ridge of flatter 
stones for support, runs a tall line of vertical stones clinging together 
side by side, forerunners of defensive spikes and just as useless. One 
sticks out higher than others, horizontally sliced above a narrow 
downward ridge like a long nose, itself flanked by two hollows 
inclined outwards from nose to cheekbone, and below by a flowing 
beard. The hollows are darker at the top, eyes looking up blankly 
towards the brow cut off by sky like a pale Erasmus hat made of 
eternity, or a baseball cap worn back to front. Or maybe a Hamlet, or 
the sky as invisible crown of thrones. Did Christ wear a hat? (Brooke-
Rose, 24). 
 
To what extent can one think of humour in Life, End of as a humour beyond a 
 
simple linguistic mode? Life, End of seems to offer instances of humour that are 
 
defined in relation to the moment and time rather than language; an escape from the 
 
continuity of time in a discontinuous and ephemeral moment of humour. The novel 
 
produces cracks in linear time from which intense moments of humour erupt.One can 
 
see evidently how such movements from one cognitive zone to another is made 
 
possible through sudden humorous and ephemeral operations implemented in the text. 
 
Such humour may not look so hilarious and might not provoke a rush of laughter, but 
 
there is an element of mental playfulness that takes place in moving from one zone to 
 
another. This humour that is shaped in moving from one zone to another zone helps 
 
an ephemeral emergence and allows the reader to appreciate the very moment of 
 
suddenness. One can argue that while the element of surprise in one-liners is, to a 
 
large extent, a linguistic and rhetoric technique, such suddenness is more an affective 
 
communication that rises up in the midst of the linear narrative. Such suddenness or 
 
Plötzlichkeit has more to do with the element of time than with a linguistic 
 
unexpectedness of one-liners. To provide an example for such mechanism of humour, 
 
the following extract shows a linear description that towards the end reflects a playful 
 
comparison with unexpected entities. 
 
But the world. The contact seems less sure, the knuckle replacing the 
fingernail for the orthostatic position during the measuring of blood 
pressure. And soon no doubt the palm of the hand. The systole falls, 
the distole rises and vice versa. All this for the doctor, who glances at 
the month‘s figures and says nothing as usual. Yet the standing 
position is particularly hard, since the instrument always first shows E 
for Error or even EE, which means blowing up all over again, only to 
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reach E once more, like a reproach, still standing with exploding veins, 
then figures at last, which no one apparently needs to know, for clearly 
sudden death is easier than waiting nail or knuckle to wall for three 
minutes or more. Unless death is the same, first marking Error twice 
(Brooke-Rose, 24-25). 
 
 
In his Suddenness: on the Moment of Aesthetic Appearance, Karl Heinz Bohrer 
tries to bring the aesthetic vigour to this experience and elaborates suddenness based 
on a conception of time that penetrates the present moment and provokes a sense of 
discontinuity. The most proper word to describe what Bohrer describes in relation to 
this moment of Plötzlichkeit can be epiphany in its sudden appearance. This 
suddenness is not new in the history of philosophy—such a flash or Augenblick has 
already been discussed and put forth in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger. The main thing that Bohrer adds which is to some extent relevant to a 
realism of humour is again the problem of nihilism. Bohrer, however, approaches it in 
a different manner. Plötzlichkeit, due to its sudden nature, can destroy any continuity 
and make any positive paradigm its target. Bohrer‘s major project in Suddenness is to 
offer an understanding of suddenness which, by being indexed to history, stands safe 
from this nihilism of the moment that denies history and narration. The difference 
between the suspended moment as in the incongruity conceptualization of humour 
and that of aesthetic suddenness is of extreme significance to a realist project on 
humour. 
 
This momentary emergence (Augenblick) in Life, End of cannot be limited to a 
linguistic movement towards amusing the reader, since it foregrounds cognition as 
well and moves between cognitive territories in the same manner Beckett did. Bohrer 
discusses the case of Schlegel‘s Ueber die Unverstaendlichkeit, and Kleist‘s Ueber 
die allmaehliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden, and places emphasis on the 
cognitive acts and appreciates them as events which make something become 
suddenly aware of itself. In both ‗On Incomprehensibility‘ by Schlegel, and ‗On the 
Gradual Completion of Thoughts While Speaking‘ by Kleist, what is at stake is 
knowledge itself and how in a tension between thoughts and feelings, a spontaneous 
flow is expressed which was hidden from thought and knowledge. However 
knowledge normally suppresses this flow and interrupts it. As a result, such an event 
 
‗can not be measured, not even logically, by what is already in existence (Bohrer, 
1987, 10). 
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One way of analysing this difference that helps see these two mechanisms of 
suddenness and surprise in the cognitive and linguistic grasp of humour is through 
 
Bohrer‘s definition of suddenness against the background of fear. This fear is the fear 
of the unknown and the suddenness that it entails stands above a simple rhetoric 
intervention. In his discussion of Kleist, Bohrer reminds us of the fact that this 
awareness in Kleist is a direct result of a contingent consciousness or a 
 
Kontingenzbewusstheit, and more importantly, this Kontingenzbewusstheit takes 
place in the oscillation between Grund and Abgrund. It is once again such 
contingency that provides the possibility that counters nihilism of any sort. In his 
 
Suddenness, Bohrer maintains a more explicit argument that this moment of 
suddenness can not be defined simply based on an interruption of any kind and, in 
effect, reducing this moment of contingency to a simple interruption is itself nihilistic. 
To escape a negative aesthetic something else must be implied; otherwise contingency 
remains merely destructive. However, this moment and its obtrusive presence is more 
authentic than a simple appearance and combination as in a linguistic juxtaposition. 
 
According to Bohrer, this ‗sudden‘ or ‗dangerous moment‘ is a moment that is 
recurrent in numerous literary works and ‗‘has the ability of absolutizing of the now 
to an appearing moment, to a poetological structure, of the epiphany‘‘ (Bohrer, 59). 
 
This pure presence can be applied to the understanding of humour in Life, End of that 
is based on an incalculable and emphatic moment of humour production. It is 
significant to know that Life, end of is able to run such humour based on its cognitive 
or imaginative capabilities. The novel and the narration produce an agile humorous 
act that runs between different cognitive zones and shapes an interzonal imaginary. 
 
Good manners are timeless, spaceless, classless: simply the ability to 
imagine the other. As an intelligence officer learns to do, if efficiently 
backed and not corrupted, experiencing a whole war from the enemy 
view point (Brooke-Rose, 26). 
 
Life, End of is an attempt, not unlike those of Beckett, to write and unwrite, to 
loosen what has been already written. This puts forth a mental humour that takes 
place in mind, an attempt at the level of cognition and Weltschaung is made 
throughout the text. Admittedly, the humour in Life, End of is so scattered between 
lines and pages that it seems hardly possible to localize it. This makes its humour a 
flow running under other flows, flows which, on the face of it are quite serious and 
even tragic. Flows of pain are mostly accompanied by an underlying flow of relief. 
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But where does this relief come from? Back to our primary question, what are the 
 
conditions for such a humour? What makes such mechanism possible? Given the 
 
epiphany nature of this sort of humour, one can claim that this humour is more an 
 
imaginative  humour;  the  very  function  of  this  humour  is  often  questioning  the 
 
common sense by having resort to the imagination which is evidently more possible 
 
in a literary work. Such an imaginary humour is able to zigzag freely between all 
 
opinions, it challenges the opinions that are rooted in our most immediate knowledge 
 
of the world. There is a note on page 36 of the novel which implies this: 
 
Nevertheless there is a delicate balance to observe. Interruptions in 
imitation debates on radio and television produce not just animation 
but unhearing of two superimposed voices, which rapidly make the 
programme unlistenable unwatchable swtichoffable, the way the 
agressive interviewer who constantly overspeaks his guest as rapidly 
becomes unwatchable switchoffable (Brooke-Rose, 40). 
 
 
And how the novel shifts to another zone of knowledge which has similarities to 
 
what Koestler calls Bisociation mechanism. 
 
Animation and warmth can mean unhearing. Is that logical? Just as the 
long past of the Basques is not the same as the long past of the narrow 
strip of land, back to Abraham, Moses, Joshua, the Canaanites, the 
Philistines, the Palestinians, the Hebrews, the Romans,  
...(Brooke-Rose, 40). 
 
 
Zigzags like this between different zones of knowledge or common sense gives 
 
rise to a humour that is so ephemeral one can not be sure if the author has prepared it 
 
in advance or it has emerged simultaneous with the depicted pain.  Life, End of, 
 
following Beckett‘s style, is one prime example of tragicomic craft where anxiety, 
 
pain and its relief are presented in one same instance. And this makes it a better 
 
opportunity to see the interrelation, as we discussed, between anxiety as an 
 
accumulation of passive forces and its relief through humour. One can notice the 
 
humour of epiphany and Kontingenzbewusstheit in contrast to that of algorithmic 
 
humour of one-liners or wit production, embraces the ephemeral contingency that 
 
occurs  to  it.  This  is  not  only  a  generic  privilege  and  has  less  to  do  with  an 
 
epistemological mode than with an existential gesture. Life, End of, as an interesting 
 
example of a molecular humour, is able to present an underlying gesture together with 
 
the surface narration. Humour is not buried or hidden in the depth of the novel, but on 
 
its skin, its exact surface and the movements from here to there suffice to expose such 
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humorous mood. The novel zigzags and this unpredictable form, which unsettles 
 
opinions and common sense, is largely made possible through humour. Moving from 
 
one  form,  one  idea,  one  conduct,  one  belief  to  another  one  unexpectedly  is  an 
 
incongruous and inconsistent movement that can not be justified except through the 
 
humorous gesture. It is very important to see this trajectory of humour in Life, End of 
 
in  relation  to  the  tragic,  anxiety-ridden  face  of  the  book.  Although  this  face  is 
 
sporadically distributed in the entire novel, where there is this humorous movement it 
 
is meant to target a non-humorous one. In effect, this juxtaposition of serious and 
 
humorous in Life, End of is of extreme significance for a realist project of humour 
 
which tries to elaborate humour in its interiority. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Laughter and the Unknown 
 
 
The experience of laughter teaches Bataille an important lesson: 
sovereign is he who knows when to lose his head. At stake is Bataille's 
take on Kairos and the possibility of an eventual instant...What 
Bataille's sovereign laughter brings forth is a joyful, erotic, passionate 
relation to the unknown, of thought and history, which we perceive as 
the impossible (Parvulescu, 85). 
 
Die Komik setzt also Bewusstsein voraus, und sie entspringt genauer 
einem Widerspruch desselben zu einem eigenen Begriff oder Wesen, 
von dem her es sich versteht. Diesen Widerspruch bringt die 
Situationskomik von außen ins Spiel, während die Charakterkomik 
dem unangemessenen Überstieg eines Bewusstseins über sich selbst 
entspringt (Manfred Frank, Appendix, 15). 
 
 
In his Unfinished System of Non-knowledge, Georges Bataille makes a difference 
 
between  savoir  and  connaitre.  He  starts  his  discussion  with  what  he  calls  the 
 
unknown. The unknown for Bataille is ‗obviously always unforeseeable‘ (2004. 133) 
 
Laughter or what makes us laugh is one significant example of non-knowledge for 
 
Bataille. Bataille admits that studying laughter is not very hard while analysing what 
 
makes us laugh is extremely inaccessible, mainly because it is hardly possible to 
 
investigate the element of surprise or ‗intimate overturning, of suffocating surprise, 
 
that we call laughter‘(2004. 133). The real obstacle, as Bataille sees it is one of 
 
investigating what makes us laugh. What makes us laugh is not laughter, it is prior to 
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laughter and yet it can not be transformed to any other form such as knowledge, since 
 
if it could be transformed into knowledge, one could do that instead of laughing. 
 
Therefore,  the  focus  of  such  an  approach  is  once  again  ‗what  makes  laughter 
 
possible‘, especially when as in Life, End of we are analysing such minuscule and 
 
ephemeral moments that trigger a short laugh and then elude us. 
 
 
For professionally based friendship with women can become quite 
dodgy, since women have somehow not yet fully developed the art of 
unrivalling friendship on their own, with or without appendage (but 
have men?)...Whereas a professional friendship between a woman and 
a married man surges quite naturally like a surfer crouching under a 
wave, then balancing on the wave-length with his wife as beach-
witness and companion, wholly sharing and admiring, happy at the 
showery foam, and, if she has a profession, pleasurably listening and 
contributing her experience (Brooke-Rose, 33). 
 
Laughter in pieces such as the one given above is not much a loud laughter 
 
that one can hear, rather it is a mental laughter that touches unexpected zones and this 
 
unexpectedness triggers ephemeral laughter. This laughter has more to do with a 
 
knowledge of the world that can not be fully explicated and yet in its elusive 
 
emergence amuses us; it is a movement from what we know to something that we 
 
hardly know; this laughter emanates from something partially knowable and partially 
 
unknowable. In his discussion of non-knowledge, Georges Bataille insists that 
 
knowing something is extremely different from knowing how to do it; a difference 
 
that he attributes to the one between connaitre and savoir (ibid). Bataille argues that 
 
this distinction is of significance and relevant to laughter because ‗‘in every case 
 
when we laugh, we pass from the sphere of the known, from the anticipated sphere, to 
 
the sphere of the unknown and the unforeseeable‘‘ (2004. 135). Such an impossibility 
 
of analysing laughter as something which contains the unforeseeable at its heart 
 
convinces Bataille to call for a philosophy of non-knowledge. German Romanticism, 
 
as mentioned earlier, is a source through which one can see the role such 
 
non-knowledge plays in order to see how it helps an inhuman project of humour. 
 
Manfred Frank insists and warns us that German Romanticism varies from one 
 
philosopher to another and yet there are similarities that we focus on. According to 
 
Frank, Schelling is not determined and decisive about knowledge being able to take 
 
hold of the Absolute but similar to Hölderlin‘s view, Schelling in his 
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Identitätsphilosophie, makes it clear that ‗Being precedes consciousness so that no 
 
understanding can exhaust the content of what is meant by Being.‘ (Frank, 56). 
 
In a simplified way, it is here that a kind of absolute unknowing takes the 
 
place  of  absolute  knowing  among  some  German  Romantics.  According  to  such 
 
philosophers and especially evident in Hölderlin, of Being we have no concept but 
 
more a sense, a feeling. Theses philosophers, influenced by Jacobi, make a difference 
 
between Being as a predicative or relational Being and existential Being. According 
 
to this difference, ‗‘the relational (or predicative) sense of Being is a weakening - or 
 
disintegration of that sense of Being in existence. Put another way, predicative Being 
 
breaks up (or divides [ur-teilt]. Being which is originally undivided and unified; on 
 
the other hand, the predicative relation can only be understood from the relation-less 
 
existence‘‘ (Frank, 62). As explained earlier, such an experience of Being can be 
 
attained in relation to oneself, in the self-subversive mode that Brooke-Rose presents. 
 
If one‘s mind avoids and rejects such an experience, one‘s body is a more proper tool 
 
to experience the flows, the flows of pain and the flows of humour, 
 
 
For the biggest problem, as one study of the disabled says, is not the 
handicap- here the growing lameness and the pounding Vasco the 
Harmer, constant pain, the constant falls during the constant low-grade 
work of the pining Ceres in the hindbrain, pining for Proserpine. The 
biggest problem is Other People. And the body, though it may cause 
laughter, has no sense of humour of its own, no small sparks of slow 
but planetary motion, no fleeting stars of word-play, only the mind has 
those. But then, what is the mind but body, the corn goddess at war 
with the gleaning corebroom that sweeps up for a little peace and order 
and doubtful cleanliness. The mind without the body couldn‘t laugh 
nor murmur nor shriek nor have tears in the eyes. It couldn‘t play, nor 
run, nor stumble with words, it couldn‘t read (Brooke-Rose, 11-12). 
 
One can say with some confidence that Brooke-Rose, in Life, End of is more 
 
inclined to an experience of betweenness, between mind and body. One single way to 
 
dispense with the heaviness of mind and knowledge is through humour. It is by 
 
humour that she is able to oscillate between body and mind. Sarah Birch argues that 
 
Brooke-Rose‘s multilingualism is the very source of her success, 
 
the prismatic effect of viewing one field of knowledge, one language, 
one culture through the discursive lens of another, and the idea of 
crossing between cultural domains (Birch, 53). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
It seems that this multilingualism has provided her with a large amount of 
 
non-knowledge or intuition to produce humour. Her humour unveils the limits of 
 
knowledge and the role such knowledge plays in this regard. Humour and laughter 
 
can  be  seen  as  mechanisms  attached  to  this  absolute  knowledge  to  trigger  and 
 
appreciate surpassing the limits of knowledge by distancing from it. If according to 
 
such philosophers, ‗of our existence (Dasein) we have only a feeling, but no concept‘ 
 
(Frank, 64), then humour is a mechanism to oscillate between this knowledge and that 
 
feeling. If any knowledge is formed in a position or a disposition towards Being, then 
 
humour runs between these positions and attaches them to Being‘s feeling. However 
 
taking our knowledge of the world into account which is shaped, not only through a a 
 
personal point of view or a general Weltanschauung, but also through the molecular 
 
and momentary perceptions of the world, leads the realist project of humour to move 
 
from the interior facets of laughter to its exterior facets that, in a social mode, take 
 
place between subjects. The exterior side of humour and laughter not only aims to 
 
investigate the contagious facet of humour in its social scope, but also to analyse how 
 
humour takes place between different positions or assemblages. 
 
Much follows as a consequence of this: If ‗‘Being‘‘ (qua positing) can no 
longer be understood as something which (as something transcendental, 
as category or quasi-predicate) is a determination of thought or ‗logical 
form‘ then it must be understood as a ‗singular tantum‘- as ‗a blessed 
unity, [as] Being in the true sense of the word,‘‘, as Hölderlin affirms in 
the Prologue of the penultimate edition of Hyperion (KTA 163: 10). 
Being must be thought as something unique, something to which all else 
would stand in relation, and which, due to its power, would have a being 
(Seienden), next to others. Schelling will later speak of a ‗transitive‘ 
sense of Being ‗so that all being  
(Seiende) insofar as it is, has been of absolute Being in this unique 
sense, that is, it would be contained within Being (Frank, 66). 
 
Although the emphasis in Bataille is more on laughter, we need to pursue the 
 
question in relation between humour and subjects but also between different beings, 
 
subjects and assemblages. Laughter, one can argue, is stuck in a romantic 
 
understanding in Georges Bataille‘s analysis, defined as a sudden and eruptive act 
 
against systems or orders of thought and knowledge. Bataille has not shown how 
 
laughter can itself, through what he calls contagion, be incorporated between beings. 
 
Putting differently, Bataille‘s gesture against Hegelian dialectics results in avoiding 
 
any rational and gradual path defined by humour: humour is nothing but the corporeal 
 
and emphatic moment of laughter. In relation between beings (Seienden) that live 
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next to each other and the Being or the sovereign, humour can play a more materialist 
role that can not be simply reduced to the sudden eruption of laughter. Humour, we 
will argue, can provide a gradual mechanism between these beings and in a 
participatory mode. Such humour as is beyond possession of any subject is an 
inhuman humour. Yet Bataille has introduced a condition for the production of such 
laughter which is related to knowledge. In effect inhuman humour targets primarily 
any being (seiende) that professes absolute knowledge. Such realism adds two more 
characteristics to the inhuman humour which take place in the exteriority of 
assemblages and between beings: it occurs gradually, and it is immanent to the 
participation of such beings (seienden) with each other. Therefore, although the 
interior facet of humour production stresses the significance of sudden and passionate 
laughter, an inhuman laughter goes beyond a simply sudden source in its formation. 
Nevertheless it should be emphasized again that these two sides (interiority and 
exteriority) of humour are deeply connected and interrelated. The aforementioned 
relation between consciousness of a subject is utterly related and determining the 
exterior relation with other subjects and subjects. Back to the question of 
 
Identitätsphilosophie in Schelling, Fichte and other philosophers, consciousness and 
conscious subject is more a result than a generator. In effect, Schelling‘s philosophy, 
in the relation between the Absolute and all other subjects‘ relative knowledge and 
consciousness, does not terminate the role of difference between subjects but relates it 
to the Absolute knowledge ‗of which we have a feeling‘. For this relation, Schelling 
introduces a mechanism of transitivity between the absolute one (monism) and many 
subjects (pluralism). Transitivity functions as moving from the ground or earth to 
whatever exists on the earth, a ‗'moving from the ground to towards the finite being 
of which it is possibility, or from the finite being itself (understood as a moment of 
passage towards subsequent degrees of the same relative non-being) or finally from a 
subject or a thought that, as prius, is turned to the actualization of a being-possible, 
which is incapable of 'filling up', in its own finitude, the infinite of that which thinks 
it‘' (Corriero and Dezi, 125). 
 
In effect, we aim to recognize how humour plays a role in relation between the 
ground or the absolute and the partial consciousness every subject possesses. 
Schelling introduces transitivity in the relation between the universe and the 
multiplicity of subjects inhabiting it. Schelling‘s focus is more on the relative status 
that is inherent in knowledge and it is based on such incompleteness shared by all 
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beings bearing relative knowledge that realist humour moves beyond an interiority of 
 
laughter (as defined and emphasized by Bataille as an excessive moment in which 
 
subjective knowledge is unsettled and disrupted) towards an exteriority of humour 
 
between beings and multiplicities. In effect, inhuman humour is  nothing but  the 
 
laughter that is heard from the incompleteness of multiple beings encountering one 
 
another. 
 
you recognise its [the earth's] true essence only in the link by which it 
eternally posits its unity as the multiplicity of its things and again 
posits this multiplicity as its unity. You also do not imagine that, apart 
from this infinity of things which are in it, there is another earth which 
is the unity of these things, rather the same which is the multiplicity is 
also unity, and what the unity is, is also the multiplicity, and this 
necessary and indissoluble One of unity and multiplicity in it is what 
you call its existence (…) Existence is the link of a being (Wesen) as  
One, with itself as a multiplicity (Schelling SW I/7, 56). 
 
By replacing being with a more materialist and less essentialist concept of 
 
assemblage that takes constant evolution and becoming of beings into account, one 
 
would be able to say that the transitive quality of Being, in a Schellingian term, can 
 
make Being diffuse in different assemblages and by means of this transitivity of 
 
Being, different assemblages are arranged in such a way to interact and participate 
 
with one another. But rather than negating one another, assemblages, in their ultimate 
 
relation to the absolute, bear various abilities of humour or obtain different degrees of 
 
hilarity.  Since  it  is  this  absolute  Being  as  the  source  of  inhuman  humour,  any 
 
assemblage is safer from ridicule by acknowledging humour in its knowledge of the 
 
absolute Being. As soon as any assemblage becomes autonomous and sticks to itself 
 
and its own difference or instead of maintaining humour in its exterior participation 
 
with other assemblages sticks to its own knowledge of the other assemblages, it is 
 
prey to inhuman humour. However as mentioned earlier this is a gradual procedure 
 
that does not need to occur quite suddenly. As Being, according to Hölderlin, is not 
 
based  on  knowledge,  any  assemblage  that  sticks  to  its  knowledge  would  be  a 
 
candidate of inhuman humour which occurs through the very transitivity of Being. 
 
Any assemblage can be a medium, a lip, a mouth, a tooth, a cheek for this laughter 
 
that instead of hearing it and enjoying laughter as a subject will be an object or an 
 
organ to shape it. Thus, we do not need to understand inhuman humour as analogous 
 
to human laughter since in inhuman humour an assemblage can be  an organ to 
 
produce laughter. 
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Nullification of knowledge of any singular assemblage can take place in relation 
 
and in encounter with other assemblages and this paves the way to go beyond laughter 
 
to a materialist understanding of inhuman humour. The unconditioned in the absolute 
 
‗is the incomprehensible itself (das Unbegriefliche selbst) for I can never grasp it in 
 
conceptual thought. But it is not unknown, quite the contrary, it reveals itself as ‗‘ an 
 
unmediated certainty which not only is in  no need of any foundations, but also 
 
excludes all foundations‘‘ (Schelling, 79). Furthermore, since no assemblage 
 
functions independently and are all defined and diffused on one same ground, they are 
 
not  comparable  to  the  status  of  the  ground  that  is  independent  and  needless  of 
 
assemblages which exist on it. Consequently, any assemblage that seeks autonomy 
 
collapses and instead of being able to act on the ground, would be a part of ground: 
 
state of derision and humiliation, buried into earth: humilis. Yet this humiliation does 
 
not take place ex nihilo, it emanates within the gradual relation one assemblage has 
 
with other assemblages. 
 
This ultimate (or highest) knowledge can not seek its regular ground in 
something else. Not only is it in itself independent of something 
higher, but, since our knowledge proceeds from consequence to 
antecedents and vice versa, that which is the highest and for us the 
principle, that is to say that the principle of all knowledge (Erkennes), 
must not be knowable (erkennbar) through another principle of its 
being and the principle of its being-known have to coincide, be one 
and the same, given that it can not be known but precisely because it is 
itself not something different (Schelling, 80). 
 
Any attempt in positing the absolute as well as any attempt at unconditioning 
 
what is conditioned will be met with the inhuman laughter and returned to earth, a 
 
hilarity which occurs in a materialist mode, without any transcendent hand and from 
 
within the participation of assemblages. Inhuman humour functions in an objective 
 
manner since  it  is  linked to  absolute indifference. Such an  absolute indifference 
 
makes no difference safe from its inhuman humour. All differences should bear a 
 
degree of humour or they will be an object of humour itself for another upcoming 
 
difference. In other words, either an assemblage embraces humour or it would freeze 
 
and function as an organ for inhuman humour. This absolute indifference (the way 
 
Schelling defines it) acts objectively in relation to assemblages and yet its humour is 
 
incommensurate to human humour since it acts and produces humour inconsiderate of 
 
subjective demands and intentions although, there are conditions to it. 
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Once assemblages fall into objectifying other assemblages or subjectifying their 
own difference through their knowledge of themselves, once difference becomes 
known or conscious and expected from other assemblages rather than oneself, such an 
assemblage is likely to be ridiculed by inhuman laughter. Since ‗‘The emergence of 
difference out of Absolute Indifference is neither a mechanistic, objective process nor 
a voluntaristic, subjective one‘‘ (Groves, 30), the absolute indifference acts 
asubjectively
6
 and produces inhuman humour. 
 
 
 
3.5 Towards the Humour of the Outside 
 
 
Territory and Earth are two components with two zones of 
indiscernibilities- deterritorialisation (from territory to Earth) and 
reterritorialisation (from earth to territory) (Deleuze and Guattari, 86). 
 
[...] there exists neither a subject as subject nor an object as object, but 
that what knows and what is known are one and the same, and 
consequently no more subjective than objective (Schelling, 1804, 141). 
 
The minuscule cases of mental laughter in Christine Brooke-Rose‘s novel in the face 
of something serious can be read a gesture towards the distribution of humour in 
reality. If one is able to experience such humour only in imaginative form, one reason 
is that we can not easily bypass the segregation of humorous/ serious in reality. Yet 
such molecular humour throughout this novel is an attempt to see that the humorous 
and the serious can co-exist without reducing one to the other. Molecular humour 
takes place in everyday life without being specified to a particular time or place. It 
does not emerge by surpassing the serious, quite the opposite it occurs in relation to 
the serious or even the tragic. The connection between Hegel and Bataille makes a lot 
of sense if one considers that, for Hegel, consciousness is the key point in relation 
between slave and master. For Hegel, autonomy of the slave after being enslaved can 
not be attained unless through consciousness. This leads him to a state where 
 
 
6 Also Frank mentions Scheling: ' Die Ironie, resümiert Schlegel, enthält und erregt ein Gefühl von 
dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und 
Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mitteilung. Sie ist die freieste aller Lizenzen, denn durch sie 
setzt man sich über sich selbst weg; und doch auch die gesetzlichste, denn sie ist unbedingt 
notwendig.
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Absolute Knowledge becomes uniquely significant. Bataille, as mentioned earlier, 
sticks to his idea of sovereignty instead of following the Hegelian path shaped 
through consciousness. Bataille seeks a state of unknowing or non-knowing in 
experiencing sovereignty. For Hegel, Absolute Knowledge implies a state where there 
is not anything in the reality or the world that is not already a part of mind; something 
that closes the gap between the world and the mind in its Absolute Knowledge. 
Bataille seems to consider some special slot for this subject here since he insists on 
the contingency of the knower in its relation to knowledge. There is a knowledge 
always in the process of attaining knowledge and this can not be eradicated from our 
presuppositions. In his book, French Hegel, Bruce Baugh quotes a view from another 
thinker close to Bataille in the same camp, Benjamin Fondane, where laughter, even 
tragic laughter is: 
 
The sign and the key to a new universe, which follows on all sides of 
the mechanical universe of necessity. It is the sign of a deeper inner 
life, a plethora of vitality, of a strange lack of application to the real, a 
maladaptation to the social. This less, which from the point of view of 
the social...is deficiency, appears to us on the contrary, as a more, a 
superabundance, a presence (Fondane, 211). 
 
 
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, in his seminal article Laughter of Being, sheds some 
light on an ontological notion of laughter mainly influenced by what he attributes to 
 
Bataille as ethics of laughter or ‗ethics of summit‘. There Borch-Jacobsen approaches 
as Bataille did, the experience of laughter in relation to finitude and stresses the 
significance of plausibility of laughter in face of finitude, death and anxiety. Using a 
sentence from Bataille, Borch-Jacobsen defines what he means by the approximation 
of laughter and death. According to Georges Bataille, ‗‘Laughter hangs in suspense, 
affirms nothing, alleviates nothing‘‘ (Borch-Jacobsen, 743). While philosophers avoid 
such an ephemeral existence of laughter, according to Borch-Jacobsen, Bataille is 
among the rare philosophers who have elaborated this point; even in Heidegger, as 
Borch-Jacobsen argues, the relation between laughter and finitude is ‗destined to 
remain at the stage of anguish of Nothingness.‘ (Borch-Jacobsen, 743). According to 
Borch-Jacobsen, sovereignty is the answer to the very enigma of laughter; it is at 
work in the way we deal with any experience of finitude, be it death, pain, anxiety or 
any other tragic state. This sovereignty in Bataille is not so far from Hegelian 
 
Herrschaft. 
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Sovereignty is thus essentially defined as unconditionality (whence 
moreover its frequent assimilation to autonomy) and especially as "end 
in itself." What is sovereign, for Bataille, is that which does not serve 
anything-and no purpose other than itself, that which is not a means 
(useful, instrumental, servile) in view of an end (Borch-Jacobsen, 745). 
 
Borch-Jacobsen goes further and claims that the concept of sovereignty fits 
 
literally with what Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics offers: 
 
Is it not that for the sake of which the rest [is] done? ... Since the ends 
appear to be many, and since we choose some of them ... for the sake 
of others, it is clear that not all ends are complete; but the highest [= 
sovereign] good appears to be something which is complete.... That 
which is complete without any qualifications is that which is chosen 
always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. Now 
happiness is thought to be such an end most of all, for it is this that we 
choose always for its own sake and never for the sake of something 
else (Borch-Jacobsen, 74). 
 
In effect, for Bataille laughter has an unsettling function in relation to 
 
knowledge and is a tool that emerges to question the totality of knowledge. We have 
 
to emphasize that Bataille did not develop any material relation between such laughter 
 
and knowledge, or rather, he kept the two economies utterly segregated and did not 
 
manage to see how they might interrelate. The same can be applied to laughter as he 
 
did not develop a theory where laughter in its sovereign sense permeates what denies 
 
it. Borch-Jacobsen‘s attempt also illuminates such laughter as an embodiment of 
 
sovereignty without any attempt to see the interrelation and participation between the 
 
relative and the absolute or, in Schelling‘s word, the transitivity of infinite and finite 
 
in an elaborate sense. Consequently, such laughter is left as an interior experience that 
 
transgresses the limits of the individual. Nidesh Lawtoo in an article tries to bring 
 
such Bataillian framework of laughter into a constructive mode of subject production. 
 
Lawtoo‘s  attempt  is  to  extend  an  intrinsic  characteristic  of  laughter,  namely  its 
 
contagion to a new mode of communication which already implies the presence of the 
 
other. Following the psychologist Pierre Janet and his psychology of Socius, Lawtoo 
 
aims to come to a ―mimetic, inter-subjective psychology which transgresses precisely 
 
this metaphysics insofar as it considers the ‗other‘ with whom I communicate as 
 
already interior to myself, already constitutive of what I am, so intertwined with 
 
myself that metaphysical distinctions between ‗self‘ and ‗other‘, ‗interior‘ and 
 
‗exterior‘, no longer hold- in short, already a socius‖ (1987. 74). 
 
Seen this way, Bataille‘s theory of communication and especially that of 
 
 
 
114 
 
laughter is less to do ‗the death of subject‘ and more with the ‗birth of a new subject‘ 
that is able to communicate with an already implied other inside self. Nevertheless, it 
should be stressed that Lawtoo‘s attempt is more focused towards emitting an 
‗affective‘ subject in such sovereign communication of laughter, a communication 
that gives rise to the birth of a subject in its affective mode. Lawtoo stresses the 
significance of a ‗‘model of mimetic, automatic reflexes in order to account for the 
general experience of contagious forms of communication‘' (2011. 75). Given that, 
such an attempt is admittedly a major turn in our understanding of Bataille‘s 
conceptualization of laughter and how it can help in the production of a new model of 
(inter)subjective communication. Lawtoo‘s attempt stays in an affective domain and 
hardly gives rise to a materialist conception of humour in its exteriority; however, it 
places an unprecedented emphasis on the element of contagion in laughter. Lawtoo, 
following Bataille, is not able to illuminate the significance of this contagion, 
especially because both constrain their projects to that of laughter. Therefore the 
attempt here is to analyse the importance of such participatory model of socius for a 
realist framework of humour. Such attempts are admittedly a major turn in our 
understanding of Bataille's conception of laughter and they help in the production of a 
new model of (inter)subjective communication, but they remain in an affective 
domain and are hardly able to target a (ir)rational model of humour in its exterior 
mode. Such models, besides all their novel and innovative facets, are still shaping 
themselves in reaction to the linguistic and discursive communication and hold 
laughter as a mode of (affective) communication that is able to undo the normalized 
subjectivity and presents a new mode of individuation. However it seems that these 
precious attempts in the mimetic and affective sides of laughter can offers a more 
co(s)mic model of humour to think of laughter in a more inhuman mode. 
 
Can we not claim that this kind of laughter or this conception of laughter is, 
to a large extent, a reaction to the failure in the distribution of laughter or humour in 
its daily and quotidian manner? In effect, remaining in an affective understanding of 
such laughter that opens itself in a momentary relief from everyday life—something 
that is to be discussed in the chapter on stand-up comedy in more detail—does not 
necessarily mean any question concerning the significance of rethinking the 
distribution of humour in our life. One needs to take this affective side into account in 
order to be able to see laughter or humour in its vast and day-to-day mode. 
Nevertheless, the question is how such a thing is feasible in the face of an increasing 
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need to segregate between serious and humorous levels of life. By stressing the 
significance of such a dichotomy, we might be able to once again place emphasis on 
the co(s)mic aspects of such a laughter. Affective conception might be able to 
introduce an outline of such elusive and contagious communication in laughter, but 
still maintains it in an aesthetics that has nothing to do with the way laughter and 
humour can partake rationality. 
 
In effect, the Bataillian attempt to provide a mimetic account of subject based 
on a non-discursive model of communication foregrounds the need to look for a 
participatory model of humour and laughter which entails the interconnection 
between subject and object of laughter. Although, as Lawtoo highlights rightly there 
are implications of this need in Janet and Bataille's usage of Socius, the relational 
dimension of laughter has been left under-exploited. Janet stresses the significance of 
imitation and mimesis in his psychology, whereas what is required in terms of 
laughter is not only a mimetic and contagious composite but more a realism of 
laughter that justifies not only the way its spreads between subjects but also the 
criteria for its possible derision. If Janet raises the issue of relationality, it is solely in 
the domain of relational subject based on the very act of mimesis, while relationality 
can take another face where laughter itself takes place in relation between subjects. 
 
The act of mimesis, for Janet, is fundamentally a relational process that 
transgresses reassuring distinctions between subject and object, 
imitator and imitated, in favor of a back-looping effect that short-
circuits a linear, causal logic. The subject‘s imitation of the other 
generates a retroactive effect whereby the other starts imitating the 
subject imitating the other, and so on, ad infinitum (Lawtoo, 2011, 78). 
 
According to a reading, which is to a large extent inspired by Derrida's reading 
of Bataille, laughter like death and play ' is not something we do but something that 
happens so much against our will that we are always looking for ways to control it 
(Westphal, 211). According to Westphal, this brings us to an understanding of 
laughter in relation to Hegelian Absolute where laughter manages to awaken the soul 
from its slumber from dialectics to speculation or ''the slumber of reason‘‘(Westphal, 
208). And he makes a gesture to approximate it to 'belly laughter‘ in Zen Buddhism. 
Communication of affects as the pillar of laughter, is analogous to a communication 
in humour that takes place between different Weltanschauungen. In other words, 
laughter and humour are not fully incommensurate especially when a contagious 
communication is highlighted. If laughter in a human affective frame is defined based 
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on contagion, humour can also be settled between assemblages in an inhuman and 
asubjective communication. In order to explicate this inhuman role of humour 
between assemblages, it is inevitable to illuminate how communication takes place. 
The next two chapters are extensions of the exterior side of such realism. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
The Fool inside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The ridiculing laughter of Beckett and the mental laughter of Christine Brooke-Rose 
oscillate between affects, and are able to transmute the passive affects to the active 
ones. Nonetheless, the practical side of such laughter which was introduced as the 
exteriority of humour is to be elaborated. In order to tackle the role humour plays 
beyond a psychological mode and to address its ethical as well as political 
significance, one primarily should think of the plausibility of an asubjective humour 
which although does not exclude the subjects involved, brings with itself an event 
which goes beyond such subjects and their will. In other words, although humour 
befalls subjects, it functions beyond and prior to them. In order to investigate the 
significance of humour in social and exterior relations between subjects, one should 
reconcile two poles: the indifference of such humour to subjects as well as its 
materialization in relation to and between these subjects. This, it is argued here, can 
be fulfilled through a conceptual persona, a persona that not only unveils the way the 
realism of humour functions and shows its characteristics in an actual and material 
social mode, but also a persona for the linguistic and rhetoric modes of laughter-
production. A conceptual persona, as Deleuze and Guattari define it, is an 
intermediary way to think. 
 
In philosophical enunciations, we do not do something by saying it but 
produce movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a 
conceptual persona (1994, 65). 
 
With some due reservations and evident similarities, the fool and the buffoon 
have been chosen in this chapter as the typical persona that unveil two apparently 
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similar but ontologically different procedures in the production of laughter. In What is 
Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari, through the ideas of Descartes and Nicholas of 
Cusa, introduce the persona of idiot as the private thinker who stands against the 
school man. To them, idiot is able to think for himself and he is a conceptual persona 
for thought or even pre-thought or what makes the thought possible. 
 
Where does the persona of the idiot come from, and how does it 
appear? Is it in a Christian atmosphere, but in reaction against the 
"scholastic" organization of Christianity and the authoritarian 
organization of the church? Can traces of this persona already be found 
in Saint Augustine? Is Nicholas of Cusa the one who accords the idiot 
full status as conceptual persona? (1996, 62). 
 
 
What Deleuze and Guattari point up immediately is that this Christian figure 
gains a new persona (and function and singularity) in Russia and transforms from the old 
idiot to the new idiot who doubts more and more. The new idiot becomes a reservoir for 
non-sense or the incomprehensible, or even for what makes thought possible. However, it 
seems that the attempt made by Deleuze and Guattari to define idiot in its new mode and 
as a persona should be seen against the background of the old idiot which will be pursued 
in this study under the holy foolery. Nonetheless, a point is here worthy of attention, 
Deleuze has already in his Logic of Sense made a difference between nonsense and 
humour. In his Logic of Sense, and despite the similarities between the two, Deleuze 
devotes the eleventh series to nonsense and the nineteenth series to humour. To him, 
sense is the surface effect whereas nonsense is behind it as a blind spot that not only 
generates sense but also can be conceived in the interpretation as well as evaluation of 
surface effects or senses. (1990, 70-71). On the other hand and in the nineteenth series, 
Deleuze introduces humour that ‗‘hurls us into the ground of the bodies and the 
groundlessness of their mixtures.‘‘ (135). Humour can do this through different 
mechanisms varying from analogy, example and substitution. However one major 
technique in humour production is that of repetition that Deleuze analyses sufficiently 
and convincingly in relation to different literary and cinematic works. Yet, it seems that 
humour is so dependent on the element of nonsense that one is tempted to claim that 
humour is but a manifestation of the nonsense. Deleuze‘s analysis of humour does not go 
beyond an interrelation between humour, nonsense and the absurd and more importantly 
humour does not find any embodiment except in its linguistic manifestation. That is why 
it should not come as a surprise to see that for Deleuze and Guattari, in their late 
collaboration in What is 
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Philosophy, the new idiot is defined in the realm of the non-sense free from any truth 
 
challenge. 
 
 
The old idiot wanted truth, but the new idiot wants to turn the absurd 
into the highest power of thought-in other words, to create. The old 
idiot wanted to be accountable only to reason, but the new idiot, closer 
to Job than to Socrates, wants account to be taken of "(every victim of 
History"-these are not the same concepts. The new idiot will never 
accept the truths of History. The old idiot wanted, by himself, to 
account for what was or was not comprehensible, what was or was not 
rational, what was lost or saved; but the new idiot wants the lost, the 
incomprehensible, and the absurd to be restored to him. This is most 
certainly not the same persona; a mutation has taken place. And yet a 
slender thread links the two idiots, as if the first had to lose reason so 
that the second rediscovers what the other, in winning it, had lost in 
advance: Descartes goes mad in Russia? (1996, 62-63). 
 
Admittedly, for Deleuze and Guattari idiot is more equipped with non-sense and 
 
this has underestimated humour of the idiot in their approach and instead highlighted 
 
his nonsense. Realism of humour by making use of foolery define this persona as a 
 
fluctuating figure between sense and the non-sense and as will be discussed in the 
 
fifth chapter that repetition as a technique in humour production will not be restricted 
 
to a linguistic one. Fools‘ humour is not only an evasion from the fixated codes of 
 
morality to the realm of nonsense, but also a means to unveil and challenge the 
 
hypocrisy  of such codes. Although the claimed realism in humour borrows a 
 
pragmatic manifestation from the fool, some comparisons with the buffoon help us 
 
proceed more effectively especially in differentiating between the realism in humour 
 
and the cognitive-linguistic wit. In the first part of this chapter holy foolery will be 
 
investigated in the way it utilizes humour and in the second part of this chapter, such a 
 
distinction  is  traced  in  the  works  of  two  comedians,  Andy Kaufman  and  David 
 
Letterman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Holy Fool’s Humour 
 
 
Andrew  Thomas,  in  his  book  The  Holy  Fools:  a  Theological  Inquiry,  analyses 
 
different facets of holy foolery in Christianity. According to him, and in the relation 
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between holy fools and the monastic life, the first Byzantine holy fools were 
themselves among critics of monastic orders and this attempt was later imported from 
the church to the city. As he shows, they transformed theology and holiness from the 
church to a more practical and actual scope, through a negative theology, takes a civil 
side to be applied in the urban life. Thomas argues that this was neither secular, nor 
religious, in particular in comparison to desert fathers and mothers who had 
transformed the production of norms through their master-less obedience, defeat of 
vain glory, and foreignness to self. Thomas maintains that the transformation of the 
production of ethical knowledge among early Christian ascetics- through control of 
passions, representations, and silence- was followed by the holy fools‘ apophatic 
babble and rejection of religious loci of knowledge production in liturgy, confession, 
religious community and ecclesiastical authority. As a continuation of ascetic 
methods of reforming the self‘s relation to society by brutal truth-telling, the holy 
fools used self-ostracising insult to follow divine truth into the periphery without 
legislating universal modesty and submission to group truths. One technique among 
them was humour and laughter, which they believed to play a prominent role in 
relation to knowledge and truth. As such, the holy fools exemplify the practices most 
idealized in early Christian asceticism- humility, suspicion of fixed orders and truths, 
apophatic critique of doctrine and legislation- with renewed innovation and 
commitment to city life. These people applied the principles and strategies of negative 
theology to the Christian theology and practices of holiness through aspiring to desert 
freedom, the practice of ignorance, and the ‗no-serious self‘. Therefore, laughter and 
humour was a corporeal tool for fools in order to target the pseudo-consistent 
discourse and morality that almost always conceals its cracks through hypocritical 
acts. 
 
Sergey Ivanov, in his comprehensive book Holy Fools in Byzantium and 
Beyond (2006), stresses the significance of holy foolery in eastern Christianity and 
other religions. More specifically, he discusses the saints in orthodox Christianity who 
strove to overturn the conventional manners defined as sainthood and lived in 
Byzantium for over a millinium. Ivanov places emphasis on the disappearance of this 
cultural phenomenon from modern Greek culture while he argues that such a 
phenomenon is still alive in Russia. Holy fools, according to Ivanov, act 
spontaneously and instinctively against the secular ones who no longer believe in the 
unity of mundane and celestial. This way, holy foolery is a mechanism used to 
 
 
122 
 
intervene in the familiar realm and turn it into something humorous, ridiculous and 
unfamiliar. According to him, Islam has also trends similar to the acts of holy fools in 
Christianity, especially framed in Sufism. Those who are called Malamiyah are 
among the leading figures of foolery whose acts are not acceptable from a normal 
moral point of view or Ulama (Learned men). The key point in Islamic manifestation 
of holy foolery is its play with moral codes, yet this play has a victim and this is the 
person who through his own self-humiliation makes such questioning of moral codes 
possible. Similar manifestations of the holy foolery in Christianity and Islam can be 
seen in such examples provided by Ivanov, 
 
The thirteenth century ‗fool for God‘ (muwallah) Ali al-Kurdi threw 
apples at the mosques in Damascus, just as Symeon had thrown nuts at 
the churches in Emesa (10). 
 
Such acts are undoubtedly not so acceptable according to Islamic law and 
morality. But the striking similarity as Ivanov shows is very helpful to trace some key 
points in relation to various religions. Ivanov suggests that the major work on holy 
foolery in Islam is Kashf al-Mahju‘b, by Ali Uthman al-Hujwiri. Overall, there is a lot 
to analyse and investigate in different manifestations of holy foolery, but what is 
important to this study is the way the holy fools make use of humour, suspending 
religious codes in order to overturn fixated and hypocritical religious norms. However 
as the main interest in holy foolery in this chapter is focused on the way they make 
use of humour and laughter, we need to elaborate such playfulness embodied in 
laughter and humour among the holy fools to be able to follow its digressions and 
consequences for a realist project on humour. 
 
There are numerous theological approaches that have been adopting humour 
and comedy in their understanding of religion. Such approaches underestimate the 
tragic side of religion and instead shed more light on the hidden and implied comic-
humorous side in religion. However any attempt to stress the significance of laughter 
and humour among the religious figures misses the point that rather than presenting a 
humorous and funny figure, such figures can be read as victims of humour in a self-
humiliating mode that trigger humour in others. Among such studies are those of John 
Morreall, Conrad Hyers and Harvey Cox. For instance Hyers in different works such 
as The Spirituality of Comedy (2008) and The Comic Vision and the Christian Faith 
(1981) makes an interesting attempt to reconcile humour with faith and religion. But 
to do this he is determined to depict a humorous picture of 
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Christ or even other religious figures such as Buddha. However, for a realist project 
on humour, what is at stake rather than an insistence to project such religious and 
ascetic figures as humorous is to think of them as volunteer victims of humour. 
 
James P. Carse in his Finite and Infinite Games (2011) introduces two kinds of 
games. He makes a distinction between finite and infinite games where finite games 
are played based on boundaries and infinite games founded on horizons. Boundaries 
are rules that make one conform in order to keep playing a finite game, whereas in 
infinite games there are horizons that change and move as the player moves or 
changes. Finite games are played in order to win, whereas infinite games are played in 
order to continue the play. In order to win, finite games have a definite start and 
ending. Carse introduces sports and debates or engaging in a war as examples of finite 
games. On the other hand, infinite games are fuzzy in that their beginning and the end 
is not as definite. As soon as the game is approaching its end or a resolution, new 
rules are introduced to keep the game going. However, as Carse emphasizes, it should 
be stressed that as ‗‘The infinite player does not expect only to be amused by 
surprise, but to be transformed by it‘‘(18), the fool‘s vulnerability makes him the first 
person to be affected by the humour. In effect, one reason why hypocrisy is normally 
the first target of such humour is that it demands one‘s transformation to what he or 
she claims. In other words, the target of this humour is the morality that sustains its 
code through its serious and non-humorous gesture. One main characteristics of this 
humour is its ability to unveil what has been seriously presented and display the rift 
between what that morality claims and what it does. Moral codes are suspended 
through interventions that take place mainly in daily life. Thus rather than fulfilling 
what he or she is supposed to do, the holy fool does something shocking to spectators. 
Acts of excess, more than anything, are shocking to the audience and the best 
manifestation of holy foolery that still has traces is the literary figure iurodivye. 
 
Iurodivye which is in effect the Christian version of the Greek Salos which is a holy 
fool is a product of the Early Christian era which has been playing a prominent role in 
the Russian literature (Franklin, 50) . But what should be borne in mind is that one 
need not always understand the holy fool through his asceticism. What is more 
important to this study is the pragmatic suspension in foolery that causes humour. The 
suspension that like incongruity theory‘s description causes humour, but unlike 
linguistic humour which makes a semantic suspension possible, holy fool‘s humour is 
practical, a feature that makes it a very suitable model for a realist project of humour. 
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In effect, holy fools and iurodivye are ascetic in their appearance, nevertheless 
transgressive in numerous cases in their humour, foolery and joy. In order to subvert 
the norms which appear to be general, holy fools stick to a particular instance, a 
singular moment and this way empty the norm from what it professes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Cecil Collins‘ A Fool Dancing. 1941. Tate. London. 
 
 
It should be underlined that both the buffoon and the fool make use of 
humour in a practical and real sense and they overlap in countless ways, nonetheless 
the major difference between the two stems from their attitude to humour. In a 
simplified way, the buffoon‘s aim is evidently more comic and they employ humour 
more generously, whereas the humour of the fool is more tacit and implied, 
especially, given the fact that fools have usually been associated with a sort of 
asceticism that renders them holy (Efthymiadis, 348). Aside from the historical and 
religious connotations attributed to the fools in the broad sense of holy foolery, the 
way the fools make use of humour is a practical gesture in the middle of reality. 
 
Moreover, they are not easily definable and predictable as buffoons are, they are ‗‗as 
inexplicable as the essence of life itself‘‘ (73). Nonetheless, it is such ubiquitous 
invisibility among fools that allow them to commit an ethical task in making the 
invisible that is hidden by subjects visible. The buffoon and the fool share numerous 
qualities and characteristics, but their acts are not based on some random and 
haphazard attitude; rather, the goals they pursue are consistent and, as Esaulov 
believes, they are both sufficiently‗systematic‘(74). According to Ivan Esaulov, 
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‗comedic culture‘ whether understood in its broad sense or in its narrow Bakhtinian 
 
sense of carnival is the one that presents the buffoon as its cultural figure. Although 
 
buffoon can appropriate a subversive gesture and makes use of humour in a functional 
 
way to mock this or that institution, he is dependent on the normally unjust social 
 
power and social relations that he mocks. Esaulov maintains that, as one can see in 
 
Bakhtin, the buffoon‘s role is deeply connected to the totalitarian ideas he is mocking. 
 
Nevertheless,  the  buffoon  starts  with  comedy and  his  acts  are  determined  to  be 
 
ultimately funny and amusing. Putting it in a formal way, Esaulov places emphasis on 
 
the fact that buffoon‘s act is both internally and externally comic, whereas the fool‘s 
 
is not necessarily externally amusing and humorous. 
 
Comedic culture is the element for buffoonery, whether it is 
understood broadly in the Baktinian sense or narrowly as with Moser. 
Holy foolishness is similarly part of comedic culture, although it is 
only 'comedic' from the external point of view (74). 
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Adding Bakhtin‘s view on foolery can help us understand that the difference 
between buffoonery and foolery is not as easy to discern. The same Bakhtin did not 
ignore the role fools play in Dostoevsky's work. In his analysis of Dostoevsky's 
Poetics, Bakhtin attributes a crucial role to foolery in Dostoevsky's works, particularly 
in Notes from Underground. According to Bakhtin, ‗the introduction of parodic and 
polemic element into the narration‘ in Notes from the Underground is already a fool 
act which makes it ‗‘more multi-voiced‘‘ and ‗‘more interruption-prone‘‘. In effect, 
Bakhtin in his analysis of Dostoevsky introduces us to a persona in the novel, a 
persona that is confessing but his confession is not comprehended in the personal 
sense. According to Bakhtin the source of dialogisation in the novels of Dostoevsky is 
rooted in such movement from one attitude to another where any idea is neutralized 
when we are introduced to another point of view which all aims to ‗‘necessity to 
retain for oneself the final word.‘‘ (229). This goes to the extent that one‘s attitude 
towards oneself can also be influenced by others‘ attitudes. Bakhtin links this to the 
very tendency towards holy foolery in Notes from Underground where the character 
targets his own consciousness. Admittedly, for Bakhtin this means a cynical tone 
because ‗‘Finalizing moments, since they are perceived by the person himself, are 
included in the chain of his consciousness, become transient self-definitions and lose 
their finalizing force‘‘ (296) But as Murav puts it, the reason for this is that Bakhtin 
reduces foolery in Dostoevsky‘s work to a formal edifice and avoids grappling with 
its ethical and even theological facets. Murav argues that Bakhtin‘s analysis ‗‘is to 
put theology at the service of form‘‘. Murav prefers to surpass this aesthetic view and 
instead of reducing them to some literary tropes, calls them ‗theologeme‘ (13). 
 
In a major and classic study, The Fool, His Social and Literary History, Enid 
Welsford (1935) strives to distinguish fool, clown, jester and buffoon. The buffoon is 
the figure of entertainment and represents taking life as easily as possible. The 
buffoon normally avoids the serious side of life in order to entertain. It does not mean 
that he does not make use of serious issues to produce laughter and humour, rather it 
means that his attitude is not serious. According to Welsford, the ‗‘company [of 
buffoons] is welcome, good stories about them accumulate, and if they have little 
conscience and no shame they often manage to make a handsome profit out of their 
supposed irresponsibility‘‘ (3). Welsford, does not simply reduce the function of 
buffoons to one of entertainment and admits their occasional political engagement. 
Welsford adds that they are extremely cherished and appreciated for their quick wits. 
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Buffoons are ‗‘a quick-witted sociable race, who expressed themselves easily not only 
 
with the pen, but with their tongue‘‘(14). Welsford, does not make any difference 
 
between buffoon and fool more than a short remark that although both buffoon and 
 
fool belong to the margins of society, the fools are either pretended or real madmen 
 
and the buffoon is ‗‘an absurd ne'er-do-well' figure‘‘(3). The fool, on the other hand, 
 
‗'falls below the average human standard, but whose defects have been transformed 
 
into a source of delight, a mainspring of comedy, which has always been one of the 
 
great recreations of mankind and particularly of civilized mankind‘‘ (Welsford, xi). 
 
Harriet  Murav  also  opposes  the  Bakhtinian  understanding  of  foolery  as  a  mere 
 
carnavalesque phenomenon.  Murav in  her  outstanding  book, Holy  Foolishness: 
 
Dostoevsky's Novels and the Poetics of Cultural Critique, relates Dostoevsky's four 
 
novels to the Bakhtinian conception of polyphony and dialogic mind but maintains 
 
that : 
 
The holy fool is not just a special case of the buffoon or clown, 
although he imitates their behaviour. Patterns of inversion and reversal 
are typical of the narrative structure of the lives of the holy fools, but 
these episodes do not bespeak the 'joyful relativity' of Bakhtin's 
carnival world. In the world of the holy fool we see reversal not for its 
own sake but in order to lead to a new finalized condition, that of 
conversion or salvation (10). 
 
 
The personal derision and ridicule, deficiency or the ‗fall‘ of the fool provides a 
 
‗delight. The fool forms a persona for humour, whereas wit is best represented in the 
 
will in the buffoon to have others amused. The scope of the buffoon is limited to 
 
language and rhetoric, whereas the fool enters equally  the non-discursive and 
 
pragmatic  side.  In  effect,  the  buffoon  utilizes  wit  and  provokes  laughter  quite 
 
frivolously and the significant fact in his act, as Esaulov describes, is the sadistic side 
 
of his acts. According to Esaulov, ‗the buffoon can be understood through the prism 
 
of sadism‘. Although Esaulov‘s analysis, as he admits, is merely psychological, the 
 
attribution  of  sadism  to  the  buffoon  should  be  analysed  beyond  a  medical  and 
 
pathological conception. Ivanov closes his book with a view that takes sainthood and 
 
foolery as almost synonymous. As he argues: 
 
Holy foolery makes manifest an integral feature of sanctity in general, 
as a cultural phenomenon. As Thomas Mann noted in one of his letters:  
‗You and your catholic Christianity are too often shocked by the word 
‗idiot; when applied to a saint. Yet this is the title of one saint‘s vita  
(Heiligengeschichte), perhaps the most profound novel of a certain 
Byzantine psychologist (eines byzantinisches Psychologen)..If we take 
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‗saint‘ not just to mean a pious person, but to imply something more 
sinister (etwas unheimlicher), then there was a fair amount, an 
arresting amount (eingreifend viel), of the saint in Nietzsche...[In him] 
all became grotesque, drunken, full of the pain of the Cross, criminal 
(grotesk, trunken, kreuzleidvoll, verbrecherisch)... Mann‘s ‗Byzantine 
psychologist‘ is not Leontios of Neapolis or Symeon the New 
Theologian, but Fedor Dostoevskii, and his ‗idiot‘ is not Symeon of  
Emesa or Andrew the Fool, but Prince Myshkin (414). 
 
We do not aim to investigate holy foolery in detail, rather this study limits 
itself to the way holy fools obtain and make use of humour as a template of a non-
discursive humour in everyday life. As Ivanov cautions, holy fools vary from 
culture to culture and even in one same Christian culture. However, what is 
common to holy fools who feign foolery as in its examples throughout literature 
and cinema, from Pushkin to Dostoevsky to Bresson and Tarkovsky and idiocy as a 
technique in the Dogma 95 Movement in cinema (Birzache, 215) and so on and so 
forth, is their gesture towards morality. Holy fools‘ world is not a moral-free 
context, as their function is to juxtapose coherent forms of morality to practical 
paradoxes in life. Such function becomes increasingly significant especially in 
relation to moral finitude. Holy fools, by living on the boundary of the sacred and 
the profane, produce elements which question totality in either secular or religious 
moralities. What makes fools different from ascetics with their strictly religious 
attitudes is the fact fools, by humiliating themselves and applying humour to 
themselves, decreases the rift between what they say and what they do. The 
implication is that the main target of foolery and its humour is hypocrisy which 
constantly hides the gap between saying something and doing something. This way 
holy fools, through their lives and actual existence between subjects, are able to 
reach and unveil the hidden inconsistencies; I call this function humoureme. 
Humoureme is the microscopic element that unsettles and tickles a subject or an 
assemblage that professes totality or acts utterly seriously as if there is nothing 
funny about it; humoureme is the very tickling of an assemblage in a microscopic 
level. However, it should be stressed that such ticking causes twitching movements 
to a subject, whereas wit in its sheer linguistic sense hardly goes beyond amusing 
the subjects. That is the reason why fools‘ humour targets any ascending or 
transcending moral code that avoids being ridiculed. The fool, in this regard, 
emerges when the schism between serious and humorous is strict or where the 
serious denies any instant of humoureme. In order to elaborate such function of 
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humoureme, it is worthwhile remembering how repetition is the very core of 
humour production. 
 
Among contemporary (non)artists who use this technique in their art 
which leave the audience in awe and amazement mainly because one does not 
know if what they present is serious or funny. Christoph Schlingensief is one artist 
who managed to utilise such blurred line in some of his works. For instance in his 
 
‘Passion Impossible: 7 Day Emergency Call for Germany‘ (1997), a fake police 
force is invented that has not only order and laws under its surveillance but also the 
happiness and joy of the citizens, among them are in particular the homeless and 
ostracised people. Such work which is known for its participatory attitude inserts 
humour where is not appropriate, and furthermore it does not avoid the everyday 
and banal situations in order to be comfortably defined in an isolated museum 
stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Schlingensief‘s Passion Impossible: 7 Days of Emergency Call for Germany. 1997 
 
 
Gilles Deleuze, particularly in his Coldness and Cruelty (1989), has 
attributed masochism to humour as the art of descending, of consequences and falls. 
In Difference and Repetition (1994), from the very start, Deleuze seems to be 
distinguishing two modes of repetition, namely irony and humour. For Deleuze, both 
irony and humour function based on repetition; while the former repeats to ascend, 
the latter repeats in order to fall. Nonetheless, Deleuze‘s analysis is insufficient when 
it comes to another form of laughter which this study claims to be inherent in 
derision. By surpassing the romanticized conception of masochism present in 
 
Deleuze‘s analysis, the social side of such a persona can be highlighted. If there is a 
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repetition as the cylinder for the production of humour as the subject of laughter, the 
same is arguably true for a repetition that initiates derision as the object of laughter. 
 
Any attempt to reduce the act of the fool to one of masochism does not do 
justice to their humour. When the fool‘s humour is a less determined and intended act 
than the determined act of the buffoon, the realist humour gives the fool a role which 
is neither a holy and transcendental one, nor an intended act of amusement. The fool 
in this framework emerges when the schism between serious and humorous is strict or 
when the serious keeps excluding the humorous. By adding the discursive scope of 
buffoon to this, the buffoon is content with the verbal or physical side of amusement 
and that is why while the fool starts applying humour primarily to himself in an act of 
self-derision, the buffoon does not start with himself for it might spoil and endanger 
the very determined process of amusement. For a fool the subjective side of humour, 
which applies to himself, and the exterior social facets of humour, which address 
others, are deeply connected, to the extent that one can claim that the very subjective 
openness to humour functions as a pre-condition for his social and inter-subjective 
humorous acts. The fool starts with himself since he knows better the schism between 
his ideas and his body; he knows his body, what his body is able to do and what his 
body hides. Although the fool‘s humour is not one to provoke laughter as an a priori 
decision, he is determined to insert laughter where and when it is avoided. In effect, 
the fool is the persona for the contingency of humour that acts upon the pretentious 
serious deeds. Therefore, the masochism of the fool should be seen in such a social 
and political domain rather than from a psychological perspective. This renders less 
significant the celebrated and romanticized conception of madness and foolery for a 
realist humour than the very act of foolery which makes the serious the very target of 
humour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Fools’ Auto-derision 
 
 
Auto-derision as a facet of the comic occurs when the comedian is able to detach from 
himself and mock himself. Nevertheless, it is no surprise that there are only a 
minority of comedians who practice auto-derision in their comedies. One reason 
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might be ascribed to the inability of shifting the perspective from mocking others to 
that of mocking oneself. Auto-derision seems to bear an ethical facet that goes beyond 
a simple aesthetic or rhetoric act of self-mockery. This part focuses on such ethics of 
auto-derision where the subject of humour can become the very object of comedy. 
The significance of this analysis exists in two different layers: first, auto-derision in 
its ethical sense sheds light on individuation and creation of new subjectivities by 
means of which a subject is able to transform to a new perspective, not through 
annihilating its perspective but through making himself an object of humour. And 
second, any such act stands in opposition to humiliation of others; in other words 
humour and especially self-mockery is the ability to dispense, to some extent, with 
humiliating and degrading others and instead shifts the focus of mockery to the self. 
 
In order to elaborate the concept and function of auto-derision, it is 
worthwhile considering some historical figures in this regard. For instance, Till 
l'Espiègle or Till Eulenspiegel is among stories that has introduced auto-derision in 
literature where the character is able to mock what he says and does. This concept is 
still used by various contemporary figures in comedy, such as Philippe Geluck, David 
Letterman, Woody Allen and Louis C K. Auto-derision, which has been translated as 
self-depreciation into English, is defined by The Free Dictionary as ―undervaluing 
and belittling oneself‖ and has much affinity with humility and excessive modesty. 
 
Self-deprecation is normally and in particular a feature in psychology but here we are 
dealing with self-deprecating humour rather than self-depreciation as a psychological 
or even sociological trait. The aesthetic of auto-derision is one that makes sense in the 
very distance one makes from oneself, and it is a sense that can be produced only in 
relation to one‘s self. In order to shed light on the very function of auto-derision, we 
make a short and tentative attempt to see it in relation to Brecht‘s Verfremdungseffekt. 
 
If Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt, especially in his analysis of Chinese theater, is 
designed to cause a hindrance to identification with the epic/ tragic character at work 
(Brecht, 24), auto-derision in a similar vein creates an estrangement from the comic 
subject towards being the object of comedy. In effect and in a more detailed manner, 
if Verfremdungseffekt is designed to hinder emotions which are involved in the 
construction of tragedy, one can experience such a comic Verfremdungseffekt in auto-
derision. One becomes one‘s own source of humour and instead of attributing humour 
to something outside or finding an object of humour in others; one is transformed to 
the very object of humour where the linkage between the aesthetic and 
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ethics of auto-derision reveals itself. Auto-derision can be regarded as a movement 
from other to self, from mockery of others to ridicule of one‘s own self. It unsettles 
the subject as a formed and rigid entity in relation to the world and others. In the work 
of comedians such as Louis CK, and prior to him Andy Kaufman, one can say with 
some confidence that in addressing oneself as the very object of humour, two steps 
are discernible: 
 
 
1. Finding incongruity in one‘s life through examining different 
heterogeneous facets. 
 
2. Coping humorously with such difference with humour and laughing with 
such paradoxes. 
 
Although there is not a clear-cut epistemological line between these two 
phases, auto-derision in its existential sense entails such two phases: highlighting 
difference and individual identity and the ability to laugh with such difference. In 
other words, such laughter does not eclipse one‘s difference or identity simply 
because laughter bereft of difference will result in a state of humiliation in the most 
cynical sense of the word. But humoureme occurs where subjects take a serious 
gesture towards their individual difference. In other words when subjects see nothing 
beyond their difference; they might tolerate another subject‘s difference without being 
affected by it or rather when they stick to their own individuality, identity and 
differences and close themselves to others‘ differences. It will be argued that 
maintaining such a serious gesture and such constant denial of humoureme culminates 
in an inhuman humour which can be materialized in an inter-subjective or asubjective 
humour. When Kierkegaard, in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1992), prefers 
humour to irony, it is because humour in an existential gesture enables one who has 
experienced inconsistency to cope with inconsistency and re-experience joy. For 
Kierkegaard, irony forms the boundary (confinium) between the aesthetic and ethical, 
while the boundary between the ethical and religious is attributed to humour. As John 
Lippitt in his Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard’s Thought (2000) argues, the reason 
why Kierkegaard resorts to humour and irony (to form the comic) is to launch an 
attack which is indirect against a thought that professes purity and elevates itself 
beyond human existence through its abstract and uncritical concepts. It is through 
laughter that this gesture comes to existence but more importantly, it is through 
laughing at one‘s thought (and difference) that one is legitimated to laugh at others‘ 
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thoughts (and differences). Nonetheless, according to Lippitt it is quite an effort to 
question a subject that is actually framed so much, both professionally and 
bureaucratically. It should be added (and this is neglected in Lippitt‘s analysis) that 
the role humour should play is not to be an ultimate index of a thought that has 
formed and framed a subject; rather humour should, in its microscopic interventions, 
participate throughout the very formation of the subject. The later a subject decides to 
laugh at him/herself, the more inhuman this humour is Not only it is strenuous for a 
subject that has been avoiding humour for a long time to embrace it, his attempt to be 
open to humour might remain in a morality of humour and sense of humour which 
barely experiences humour beyond language. 
 
What is extremely significant in such a conception of humour is that it can not 
be reduced from its ethical and existential mode to a linguistic or a cognitive domain. 
The incongruities inherent in life and in morality which are constantly explored by the 
production of difference are beyond a simple linguistic and discursive sphere and 
humoureme is the element which reveals them comically. Humoureme does not aim 
to resolve and reconcile differences in a dialectical synthesis, rather it functions by 
acknowledging paradoxes which a serious gesture strives to conceal. The paradoxes 
are inherent to life but as one can see in figures such as Kierkegaard and later in W. 
 
H. Auden (1965) humour is the command, beyond an ‗optional extra‘ (Pyper, 9). 
Although linguistic and cognitive incongruity is a way of representing such existential 
inconsistencies, their reliance on the linguistic imagination can be an escape from 
bearing with real inconsistencies to unreal inconsistencies that are easy to resolve. 
Realist humour relies on an automatism similar to the one utilized by Robert Bresson, 
where instead of trained actors, he uses (what he calls) models. But if such 
automatism is not to be found in a rhetoric or linguistic mode of incongruity, where 
can one look for it? Where can one utilize such existential gestures? The main 
characteristic of such humour is not in the ability to represent incongruity 
linguistically as in a buffoon, but rather the very unsettling of the expectations in a 
pragmatic mode as a fool does. This is most evidently visible in the figure of fools, 
those who ‗‘undermine the practices and knowledge that configure gender, market, 
and religion through playing with and making contingent divisions that seemed 
necessary‘‘ (Thomas, 18). 
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Figure 10. Greg Tricker’s The Hidden Fool. 1993. Nailsworth, United Kingdom. 
 
 
Holy fools do not make a determined attempt to be fools, yet 
what occurs to them and what they present is, in various ways, an 
opposition to common sense. Such involuntary foolery, as Birzche puts 
it, that represents humour is not an already rehearsed mechanism, its 
very involuntary mode puts forth a clash with commonly accepted 
codes of society. The holy fool as a persona for a realist project of 
humour acts out a humour that embraces and even jeopardizes his own 
existence, ‗‘They challenge involuntarily, as a result of their very 
existence, and in spite of their apparent weakness‘‘ (Birzache, 155). 
 
The holy fools submit themselves as voluntary victims of inhuman 
humour and rather than humiliating others to give rise to humour, are 
open to be self-humiliated. The reason is, as we said, that they know 
that avoiding humoureme makes humour increasingly inhuman and 
cruel to bear. Wherever holy foolery is depreciated and excluded, and 
humour is transformed to a semantic and linguistic mode, it is likelier 
that inhuman humour humiliates subjects more and more. The holy 
fool is the one that constantly applies humoureme in pragmatic, day to 
day and real functions. Humour in the holy fool is deeply connected to 
an ethical agenda that instead of relying on language, applies 
humoureme as a medium for rendering hypocrisy and concealed 
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inconsistencies of  serious discourses  visible. Nevertheless  and  as it 
 
will be analysed in the next chapter, inhuman humour does not go 
 
extinct in the absence of holy fools, it only becomes harsher and more 
 
cruel. When holy fools exist, one can more easily practice humoureme. 
 
In his brilliant book, Holy Fools in Byzantium and Beyond, Sergey 
 
Ivanov makes a sharp distinction between a jester and the holy fool. 
 
This distinction bears significance in that the jester is doggedly 
 
determined to produce humour. Such determination is not very much 
 
the case in holy fools who openly apply contingent humoureme in the 
 
most microscopic and banal facets of life. 
 
 
The jester, by contrast, bears only a superficial resemblance to the holy 
fool. Although both inhabit a topsy-turvy world and neither can 
survive without spectators, nevertheless the jester is part of the crowd 
whereas the holy fool is entirely alone even in the midst of the urban 
bustle; the jester thrives on dialogue, while the holy fool is monologic; 
the jester is immersed in ‗festival time‘, or ‗carnival time‘ whereas the 
holy fool is outside time; the behaviour of the jester is akin to an art 
form, whereas art is quite alien to the holy fool (Ivanov, 5). 
 
The  theme  which  is  recurrent  in  the  history  of  holy  foolery is  one  of 
 
self-mistrust. This mistrust towards self is the source of inspiration for the holy fools 
 
to target themselves in different forms of self-humiliating acts. Symeon as one main 
 
pioneer in Christian history of holy foolery is  known for  humbling himself and 
 
humility. According to Krueger, such humility is a technique among holy fools to be 
 
excluded and be taken as outcasts. And this way, not only they violate social norms 
 
but equally they transgress the monastic rules and regulations.  Symeon‘s gesture 
 
against monastic norms of asceticism through food consumption is such an example. 
 
 
This suggests that economic humiliation is a key component of 
sainthood. Both Symeon the Fool and his companion John the hermit 
are from wealthy Syrian families. When Symeon goes to Emesa under 
the guise of a madman he humbles himself not merely through a shift 
in economic status, but especially because in behaving shamelessly he 
places himself decisively among the outcasts (Krueger, 70). 
 
 
Such  a  model  of  auto-derision  can  be  traced  back  to  the  middle  ages, 
 
Byzantium and early Christianity and the character of fol-en-Chris. Holy fools with 
 
their long tradition demonstrate the ways something comic transgresses itself. For the 
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holy fools,, uncovering the unexpected is framed in a comic mode where people are 
being entertained. This way a holy fool was able to simultaneously uncover what is 
entertaining and what is shocking. In general, holy fools provoke these shocking 
effects through the way they dress, talk or behave; their appearance is so unexpected 
that they are called fools. Therefore and as such humour targets oneself first and 
foremost, the pivotal point for holy foolery is humility. According to Birzche, the 
holy fool is someone that has personified humility and madness which is set along 
meekness. This humility and meekness is rooted in various models in different 
religions, yet for Christianity, holy fools seem to be located mainly in words of 
Apostle Paul, in 1 Corinthians 4:10, where a minimal description of fol-en-Chris is 
given: 
 
Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?...For the Jews 
require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ 
crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block (chosen the foolish things 
of the world to confound the wise..if any man among you seemeth to 
be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. For 
the wisdom of the world is foolish with God (1 Corinthians 1:20). 
 
 
In order to extend and elaborate the ethical and ontological sphere of a realist 
project of humour, foolery provides us with a model to see how the very function of 
the humoureme is to render visible what a serious discourse hides. In effect, if the 
persona of the fool in a variety of different cases is able to unveil the hypocrisy of 
ascetics and religious men by acting foolishly, his humoureme in its ethical 
dimensions and in the contemporary sense of it can also target hypocrites. 
Nevertheless, humoureme addresses both sacred and secular moralities in its 
actualization; it goes beyond a linguistic framework and becomes a tool to tickle 
and unsettle morality in its most concrete and quotidian sense. A fool, in contrast to 
fixed subjects who stick to their current subjectivity and do not want to fall prey to 
humoureme, commences with himself. 
 
Yet it is not always clear whether a holy fool or its contemporary embodiment 
in a stand-up comedian is inclined more towards irony by bringing things back to 
their origin, or more towards humour by descending to particular instances. But 
what is clear is that she or he subverts norms and normal expectations. Such a 
distinction between irony and humour means a lot to Deleuze, and any such 
philosophy that is dealing primarily with the problem of good and evil, in terms of 
ethics. According to Deleuze (1994), although irony and humour 
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share  a  lot,  they  have  inherent  differences  when  it  comes  to  individuality  or 
 
individuation. 
 
 
Irony, as the art of differential ideas, is by no means unaware of 
singularity. On the contrary, it plays upon the entire distribution of 
ordinary and distinctive points. However, it is always a question of 
pre-individual singularities distributed within the idea. It is unaware of 
the individual. Humour, the art of intensive quantities, plays upon the 
individual and individuating factors. Humour bears witness to the play 
of individuals as cases of solution, in relation to the differentiations it 
determines, whereas irony, for its part, proceeds to the differentiations 
necessary within the calculation of problems or the determination of 
their conditions. The individual is neither a quality nor an extension. 
The individual is neither a qualification nor a partition, neither an 
organization nor a determination of species. The individual is no more 
an infima species than it is composed of parts. Qualitative or extensive 
interpretations of individual remain incapable of providing reasons 
why a quality ceases to be general, or why a synthesis of extensity 
begins here and finishes there. The determination of qualities and 
species presupposes individuals to be qualified, while extensive parts 
are relative to an individual rather than the reverse. It is not sufficient, 
however, to mark a difference in kind between individuation and 
differenciation in general. This difference in kind remains 
unintelligible as long as we do not accept the necessary consequences: 
that individuation proceeds differentiation in principle, that every 
differentiation presupposes a prior intense field of individuation. It is 
because of the action of the field of individuation that such and such 
differential relations and such and such distinctive points (pre-
individual fields) are actualized- in other words, organized within 
intuition along lines differentiated in relation to other lines. As a result, 
they then form the quality, number, species and parts of an individual 
in short, its generality. Because there are individuals of different 
species and individuals of same species, there is a tendency to believe 
that individuation is a continuation of the determination of species, 
albeit of a different kind and proceeding by different means. In fact 
any confusion between two processes, any reduction of individuation 
to a limit or complication of differentiation, compromises the whole of 
the philosophy of difference. This would be to commit an error, this 
time in the actual, analogous to that made in confusing the virtual with 
the possible. Individuation does not presuppose any differenciation; it 
gives rise to it. Qualities and extensions, forms and matters, species 
and parts are not primary, they are imprisoned in individuals as though 
in a crystal. Moreover, the entire world may be read, as though in a 
crystal ball, in the moving depth of individuating differences or 
differences in intensity (246-247). 
 
 
In Difference and Repetition irony is introduced as the art of ascending Or 
 
the art of heights. Although Deleuze claims that both irony and humour (be it in 
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Kierkegaard‘s  Abraham  and  Nietzsche‘s  Zarathustra)  are  based  on  repetition,  he 
 
emphasizes that humour take another path as it is the art of descending to particular 
 
things. 
 
If repetition is possible, it is as much opposed to moral laws as it is to 
natural laws. There are two known ways to overturn moral law. One is 
by ascending towards principle: challenging the law as secondary, 
derived, borrowed or ‗general‘; denouncing it as involving a second-
hand principle which diverts an original force or usurps an original 
power. The other way, is to overturn the law by descending towards 
the consequences, to which one submits with a too-perfect attention to 
detail (1994, 5). 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Andy Kaufman’s Foolery 
 
 
Stand-up comedy is a comedy that is held and performed while the comedian in 
 
standing. It is a comedy in movement, usually devoid of any specific narration to be 
 
followed in the entire show, although it might contain short narrations that turn out to 
 
be independently entertaining. But there is a special point to analyse: the distance or 
 
time slots between the moments that one is not laughing and the ones when one is 
 
laughing is  relatively  accelerated  in  comparison  to  the  classical  conception  of 
 
comedy. Stand-up comedy, as it were, is based almost wholly on verbal humour and 
 
its constant production and this has been attracting millions of audiences around the 
 
globe. There are factors that this comedy offers: First, the main reliance of stand-up 
 
comedy on  verbal  language  which,  to  a  large  extent  does  away with  any other 
 
gestural, facial and even corporeal dimensions. And second, the comparison one can 
 
make between comedy in its traditional sense and stand-up comedy, as stand-up 
 
comedy relies less and less on a specific plot that flows through the whole work and 
 
depends more and more on one-liners or monologues. 
 
 
What is famously  named ‗fast-paced‘ grouping  of stories in stand-up 
 
comedy along with bits and one-liners are all what a stand-up makes use of. Stand-up 
 
comedy is more minimalist than a normal comedy and the speed on which a stand-up 
 
comedy functions varies from show to show. Yet one prominent feature in stand-up 
 
comedies is this very speed in poking fun and creating funny scripts which can 
 
encompass personal, social and political issues. This way, stand-up comedy relies on 
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the background knowledge it shares with the audience and creates humorous 
situations out of them. Linguistically speaking, any stand-up depends a lot on the 
topic or theme which is the common-sense and conjoins it to a new knowledge which 
is normally called rheme or comment. Although we do not aim to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of stand-up comedy, and reduce it to some specific viewpoint or 
component, yet the element of speed recurs in our analysis; an element which was 
already introduced in the introduction on wit and especially in John Locke. In effect, 
speed and quickness, as Limon emphasizes in stand-up comedy, has always been 
defined as a crucial characteristic of wit and witticism. In comparison to comedy, 
stand-up is where a crowd of comic situations are being described, imagined and 
represented whereas comedy, rather than relying fully on imagination, is an attempt to 
depict the setting on stage or in literature, which even invites some non-discursive 
elements. A search for word ―wit‘ in a dictionary convinces one that this word is 
mainly associated with quickness, sharpness, cleverness and agility. In effect, wit 
seems to be a feature stand-up comedy relies heavily on. Wit and witticism can be 
seen in a variety of different ways but the best way to analyse it is through 
incongruity theory. Something is suspended and then fully or partly resolved. This is a 
process which can be maintained to infinity, infinity of creating, imagining and 
representing inconsistencies and juxtaposing them to be yielded to some full or partial 
resolution. Such subversion of expectations is a determined act in stand-up comedy 
from the very beginning; it functions as an a priori to provoke a non-sense 
combination. Such production of humour can be traced back to surrealism and is 
mainly founded on creating an unlikely and delirious situation. Here one can see how 
wit should be taken seriously as a mental and existential gesture which is determined 
to enjoy incongruities. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the humour in a realist project can attach itself to an 
ethical question which oscillates between what is visible and what is hidden by a 
moral framework. Holy fools as the persona in charge of such a task are able to utilise 
humour in its most banal and everyday deeds. Holy fools in relation to religious 
fathers are able to introduce elements of humour unexpectedly in their very banal acts 
of everyday life as we called humoureme which targets a serious gestures replete with 
hypocrisy. The role of such humour is to render visible what is hidden under this 
serious gesture. In this part, we pursue such an ethical dimension of humour in a more 
contemporary sense. In comedy and especially stand-up comedy such moments where 
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one is able to mock oneself are not uncommon. But what is our criterion for 
distinguishing a rhetorical gesture from an existential one, especially when the result 
in both is the same humour? We argue that one can have resort to the element of time 
in order to make such a distinction. By extracting humour from one‘s memories and 
past experiences one might be able to undergo the experience of a cognitive humour 
where he or she can mock his or her old gesture, but this still keeps the present subject 
is less vulnerable and in a safe and protected position. Arguably, it is harder to 
experience humour in the present. A large part of this difficulty is due to the fact that 
being open to humour and its contingency does not allow one to prepare for an 
cognitive or linguistic humour. Although the humour that is produced and provoked 
by memories plays a prominent role in opening cognitive vistas to subjects, it is still 
not a real contingent humour in its actuality. It is scarce that the present moment is 
taken into account in constructing humour. The very existence of present actual 
humour requires a more intense immersion in the Verfremdungseffekt; a technique 
that entails taking distance from oneself and submitting oneself to the present moment 
as the moment of subjectivation. Kaufman is one comedian who is able to define 
humour in its actual moment of emergence when there is not much time lapsed 
between what happens to him on the stage and his comic response to that. As a result 
in such comedy, the comedian starts mainly with himself or herself and this leads to 
real auto-derision. 
 
If the Brecht‘s Verfremdungseffekt is suited to take place in relation to 
Aristotelian catharsis, Kaufman‘s attempt is to implement verfremdungseffekt in 
relation to his present comic moment. Brecht‘s attempt to apply verfremdungseffekt 
in his theatre was meant to distract the audience from being involved in the play
7
; 
instead of producing an Aristotelian feeling of catharsis and emotional involvement, 
he inserted a critical and objective awareness. This way, once epic theater is mingled 
with verfremdungseffekt, one is able to be extracted from his or her social order 
which is the result of an unconscious political domination and that is symbolized in 
different forms. In a broad sense, one can say that verfremdungseffekt as used by 
Brecht in epic theater is a device to transcend the social and symbolic order that has 
overwhelmed us. Comedy seems to activate this potential through auto-derision and if 
in epic theater verfremdungseffekt is defined through disrupting illusion or eschewing 
 
7
 In Eisenstein's words this mob can be called 'the proletarian audience. Stanley Mitchell, introduction 
to Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso,1998) 
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clichés formed by emotions, one can define verfremdungseffekt in comedy produced 
through auto-derision as a moment where one disrupts the fact that he ‗is supposed 
to‘ entertain us. Therefore, verfremdungseffekt in epic takes place in opposition to the 
social order and the symbolic, while in comedy verfremdungseffekt occurs also as 
opposed to the comic imagination That amuses the audience. 
 
Humour in Kaufman is filled with such tensions, tensions which occur in the 
middle of his performances. Such instances which occur beyond entertaining the 
audience, gives rise to an untimely laughter. Humoureme is embodied in such 
minuscule manifestations of laughter which are not planned and are mainly the 
result of the present interaction between subjects. Although one result of 
humoureme is questioning hypocrisy, humoureme mainly targets what professes to 
be serious while suppressing laughter inside. More importantly, humoureme plays a 
prominent role in relation to oneself, as discussed earlier in case of fools, 
humoureme cannot function just in an external mode and in relation to others: it 
obliges one to be able to laugh at oneself in the first place, or even making one the 
very object of humour. Kaufman‘s comedy include and address his own identity in 
its actual, present moment and it primarily addresses himself in his performance. In 
his appearance on Letterman
8
, on June 24
th
 1980, Andy Kaufman enters the stage 
and starts his first act as a self-humiliating one in which his nose is running; 
Letterman seems to ignore this fact but finally, when his nose keeps running, offers 
Kaufman a tissue. On surface, one can say that such act that provokes the audience 
to laughter is quite empty of shame and embarrassment for Letterman and the 
audience. However there is an amalgamation of humour and shame that is the result 
of Kaufman‘s act to target himself as the very object of the comedy. The way 
Kaufman makes fun of himself is inseparable from the way he makes fun of the 
others or he is simultaneously an objects as well as the subject of his comedies. 
This is somehow evident in his denial of the label comedian and preferred to be 
called a ‗song and dance man‘. 
 
I am I not I a comic, I have never told a joke....The comedian's promise 
is that he will go out there and make you laugh I with I him....My only 
promise is that I will try to entertain you as best I can. I I can I 
manipulate people's reactions. There are different kinds of laughter. 
Gut laughter is where you don't have a choice, you've got to laugh. Gut 
laughter doesn't come from the intellect. And it's much harder for me 
 
8
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=6p0sr2BejUk 
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to evoke now, because I'm known. They say, 'Oh wow, Andy Kaufman 
he's a really funny guy.' But I'm not trying to be funny. I just want to 
play with their heads (New York Times, ‗Kaufman Biography). 
 
 
Back to our example of Kaufman, we should add that his humble act of 
 
self-deprecating humour has nothing to do with a moral code. Quite the opposite, 
 
one can argue that by juxtaposing humour to moral codes, Kaufman highlights a 
 
(however  tiny)  moment  of  abjection  and  emboldens  a  shame  that  is  normally 
 
invisible (from his running nose to the way he coughs, especially knowing that he 
 
died from lung  cancer!). This way, humour takes an irritating  shape which 
 
questions  something  moral  in  a  joyous  mode.  That  is  the  reason  why  Andy 
 
Kaufman‘s humour is not as easy to grasp and his comedies can be categorized as 
 
anti-humour. However by addressing himself, he might irritate the audience and 
 
although it is easier for the audience to laugh at an absent- even imaginary other, he 
 
uses any appropriate moment to target his own acts. 
 
I like to talk about my marriage. I met my wife several years ago when 
I was in New York performing every night improvisation, night club, I 
perform every night for free, I would get jobs elsewhere for maybe 
fifty dollars. ...and I met her up driving to from southern New Jersey 
one time she was a cocktail waitress. And we went out a few times and 
fell in love and got married. She kind of, she worked as a waitress 
while I was working for free in night clubs, (audience laugh). And we 
lived together, outside New York city, we had two children, their 
names are Mark and Lisa. And I (silence, audience laugh)..(coughing, 
audience laughs)...I am not, I‘d rather if you don‘t laugh because, I am 
not trying to be funny right now.and shortly after that I went to 
California, things there started happening.
9 
 
The same person, Andy Kaufman, after mentioning that he is being serious, 
 
starts coughing again in a minute but this time hardly anybody in the audience starts 
 
laughing. This provides us with a humour which is more than anything an irritating 
 
laughter. The audience is not able to laugh smoothly as Kaufman breaks the boundary 
 
between the serious and funny with small pieces of humoureme. Such humoureme 
 
appears when it is not expected or rather when the audience is expected to laugh 
 
smoothly, but it is imbued in an element of shame, and the audience gets involved in 
 
it. 
 
 
 
 
 
9
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=6p0sr2BejUk 
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Such humour does not remain in an imaginary domain, and is fulfilled in a 
 
practical sphere which overwhelms first its subject and then the others—the humour 
 
is indifferent here to its subject and object. It suspends the moral and expected 
boundary between the serious and the funny and redistributes it anew, at least 
temporarily. A better example of such small manifestation of humoureme can be 
 
traced in another work by Kaufman called ‗ Man on the Moon‘, a 1999 production in 
 
a biographical form which represents different stages in Kaufman‘s life from his 
 
infancy and his experience in comedy clubs and television series towards his fame 
 
and popularity in Saturday Night Live (1980), Fridays (1980- 1982) and Late Night 
 
With David Letterman (1982- 1993). In Man on the Moon, Kaufman presents an idiot 
 
character that sits beside his comedian character, where his humour noticeably 
addresses himself In a more intense mode, humoureme can be traced in various parts 
of this show. The beginning of this show starts with minuscule parts on his 
background, but places humoureme in the middle of such serious and informative 
parts. 
 
 
Hello I am Andy  
And I would like to thank 
you for coming to my movie.  
I wish it was better, you know...  
but it is so stupid. 
It's terrible. 
I do not even like it.  
All of the most important 
things in my life  
are changed around and mixed up...  
for dramatic purposes. 
So  
I decided to cut out 
all of the bologna.  
Now the movie is much shorter. 
In fact, this is  
the end of the movie. 
Thank you very much.  
I am not fooling. Goodbye. 
Go  
You're still here. 
Okay!  
I hope you're not upset.  
I did that to get rid of those folks 
who wouldn't understand me... 
and don't even want to try! 
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Actually, the movie is really 
great. It's filled with colorful 
characters, like the one I just did...  
and the one I'm doing now. 
Our story begins...  
back in Great Neck, Long Island. 
This is our house.  
And that's my father's old car. 
That's my father.  
That's my little brother, 
Michael. That's my little sister, 
Carol. And that's my mom  
Janice?  
Andy's up in his 
room? Yeah.
10 
 
The  fact  that  Kaufman  throughout  this  monologue  keeps  talking  about 
 
himself and his actual situation makes the boundary between the humorous and the 
 
serious blurred. In fact, this is what the holy fools do in the way they make use of 
 
humoureme. The holy fools‘ use of humour is not as evident as the one used by the 
 
buffoon simply because the buffoon has already segregated between the humorous 
 
and the serious and has designated his or her acts in the former. One can claim that 
 
this can even be a reason why the fool can not be well represented because he is not 
 
as visible a figure as a buffoon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/m/man-on-the-moon-script.html 
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Figure 11. Cecil Collins. The joy of the Fool. 1944. Tate. London. 
 
 
In Holy Madness, the German Indologist Georg Feuerstein makes a rare 
attempt to analyse this relation between the serious and the playful. In order to 
explicate the role humour plays in its real and practical sense, Feuerstein introduces 
three levels of play among human beings. On the first level there is ‗‘the unself-
conscious play of the child who is completely absorbed in his or her make-believe 
world of toys and games‘‘(Feuerstein, 220). According to Feuerstein, this is for a 
child an attempt to escape to his or her imaginary world but it can equally play the 
role of a safety valve for the immature adult who ‗‘because of her incomplete 
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psychic adaption to life, is never quite at ease with the world‘‘ (ibid). However, the 
second case is the adult who ‗tacitly or knowingly appreciates that ‗real‘ life itself is 
pliable and therefore playable‘ (220) Such person is able to observe play in the middle 
of human affair and participates in its illusions (221). 
 
One can notice that Kaufman‘s comic acts cannot be thought completely as 
the first escapist humour nor the second category of humour that Feuerstein 
introduces to see something palpable in the midst of reality applies to him fully. The 
second category is no more applicable because Kaufman does not introduce a playful 
attitude through which we are supposed to observe life as illusion. Kaufman‘s humour 
is more dependent on the very present act of its production and participation with its 
audience. Feuerstein introduces a third kind of humour and playfulness which 
although is quite aware of the playfulness of life, and succumbs to the same illusion, 
inherent to life as others, he does not add to such an illusion. In other words, and this 
makes it interesting for a realist project of humour, such a subject, instead of adding 
up and creating illusions inside life, is vulnerable and open to (illusions of) life itself. 
That is why his humorous acts are quite open to the contingencies of the reality as it 
comes. He avoids creating ‗an imaginary world as does the child or adult fleeing from 
reality (Feuerstein, 221). One helpful distinction between an imaginary and a real 
condition of playfulness is described in James Carse‘s book, Finite and Infinite 
Games (2011). In his elaboration between finite and infinite games Carse highlights 
the significance of surprise in finite games. According to him, in finite games which 
are based on boundaries, one wins by surprising others in his or her unexpected 
moves. 
 
It is therefore by surprising our opponent that we are most likely to 
win. Surprise in finite play is the triumph of the past over the future. 
The Master Player who already knows what moves are to be made has 
a decisive advantage over the unprepared player who does not yet 
know what moves will be made (Carse, 17-18). 
 
Therefore, surprise is almost threatening and deadening for different 
opponents and the one who is surprised is more likely to lose. This way, as Carse puts 
it, the players are supposed to prevent such surprise in their game. If finite games are 
based on the triumph of the past over the future, the realist project of humour thinks 
of humour as inclined towards the triumph of the future over the past. 
 
Infinite players, on the other hand, continue their play in the 
expectation of being surprised. If surprise is no longer possible, all 
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play ceases. Surprise causes finite play to end; it is the reason for 
infinite play to continue. Surprise in infinite play is the triumph of the 
future over the past. Since infinite players do not regard the past as 
having an outcome, they have no way of knowing what has been begun 
there. With each surprise, the past reveals a new beginning in itself. 
Inasmuch as the future is always surprising, the past is always 
changing. Because finite players are trained to prevent the future from 
altering the past, they must hide their future moves. The unprepared 
opponent must be kept unprepared. Finite players must appear to be 
something other than what they are. Everything about their appearance 
must be concealing. To appear is not to appear. All the moves of a 
finite player must be deceptive: feints, distractions, falsifications, 
misdirections, mystifications. Because infinite players prepare 
themselves to be surprised by the future, they play in complete 
openness. It is not an openness as in candor, but an openness as in 
vulnerability. It is not a matter of exposing one's unchanging identity, 
the true self that has always been, but a way of exposing one's 
ceaseless growth, the dynamic self that has yet to be. The infinite 
player does not expect only to be amused by surprise, but to be 
transformed by it, for surprise does not alter some abstract past, but 
one's own personal past (Carse, 18). 
 
 
What is worthy of attention is what makes one able and ready to undergo such 
 
infinite games instead of taking refuge in finite games. As Feuerstein also suggests, 
 
we argue that the openness inherent to and demanded by infinite games require a high 
 
degree of self-effacement. In effect, self-effacement enables one to embrace (humour 
 
in) reality. In Kaufman on the one hand, the subject of humour, namely Kaufman 
 
himself, is rendered its object which bears an element of self-mistrust and self-
degradation and on the other hand the expected humour are disappointed, at least 
temporarily. This is attributed to humoureme which is able to emerge quite 
 
contingently  in  the  middle  of  a  banal  acts  of  a  serious  subject. According  to 
 
Feuerstein the condition for true humour is accepting fully one's physical mortality. 
 
Feuerstein quotes from James p. Carse that: 
 
 
Infinite play resounds throughout with a kind of laughter. It is not a 
laughter at others who have come to an unexpected end, having 
thought they were going somewhere else. It is laughter with others 
with whom we have discovered that the end we thought we were 
coming to has unexpectedly opened. We laugh not at what has 
surprisingly come to be impossible for others, but over what has 
surprisingly come to be possible with others (Feuerstein, 32). 
 
Feuerstein maintains that the plausibility of such humour and laughter is due 
 
to outwitting the self and its finite games. This is the way to come to a ‗‘continuous 
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humorous recreation, or re-orientation' from ' the humourless, serious repetition of 
oneself' as in ordinary life‘‘ (Feurestein, 227). In effect, Kaufman breaks the always 
blurred boundary between the comic and the serious (where the audience in a comedy 
always thinks he or she is not dealing with the serious). But it does not mean a 
synthesis where the serious and the comic co-exist, rather it means the unexpected 
emergence of the comic in the midst of the serious and the other way round. The 
contingent humour of Kaufman even among his rehearsed comic acts, at least in some 
cases, is not a decided and determined plot to entertain the audience. In his book 
 
Stand-up Comedy in Theory, John Limon devotes a chapter to David Letterman and 
tries a philosophical reading of his show as a comedian. Letterman as an intelligent 
figure hosting quite a variety of different intellectuals and celebrities in his show 
convinces Limon on a very significant point that Letterman‘s ability is built in his 
agility and sharpness as the key to his success. Limon sees Letterman‘s ability to 
produce jokes over jokes or meta-jokes as a result of ‗‘formal intelligence with only 
dreck for instance‘‘ (Limon, 69). But one interesting remark Limon makes is the fact 
that Letterman‘s comedy is deeply connected to the element of speed. However John 
Limon connects it all with American Millerianism and juxtaposes this speed, to some 
extent, with ‗the attempt to put two worlds in gear‘ as in drugs and alcohol. But the 
gist of his argument is the lack of physical act in production such as Letterman where 
language and more importantly mind plays the prominent role. It is through Kristeva 
and her concept of abjection that Limon tries to attribute a kind of ‗comic abjection‘ 
to Letterman: ‗‘the presence of significance without meaning seems comic in general, 
and like David Letterman‘s comedy in particular. Its symptom is verbal speed'' (73). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 From the Ethics of Humour to the Ontology of derision 
 
 
The holy fool engages in antics not to demonstrate a joyful relativity of 
hierarchies, but to achieve his own and others' salvation within the 
established cultural hierarchy (Pratt, 115). 
 
 
When fools humiliate themselves, they undergo a process of subjectification. In this 
process, they utilize humour to target themselves primarily and by becoming an object 
of laughter for other subjects, they also help them (through their similarities) to be 
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able to apply humour to themselves. When fools mock themselves through self-
humiliation, it already means that others are avoiding it or have been unable to do it. 
This might be emblematic of egoism where subjects are deeply engaged with their 
established subjectivities, differences and moralities. In the same vein, when an 
assemblage is humiliated and mocked as an object of humour for other assemblages, 
it produces a sign for them to apply to their own assemblages. When an assemblage 
just uses other assemblages as an object of humour without implementing the emitted 
humoureme to its own assemblage, it would be used sooner or later by inhuman 
humour as an object of humour. There is a correlation here between solidity of an 
assemblage in avoiding self-humiliation and the unexpectedness of the humiliation 
that befalls it. 
 
Like the closed monads of Leibniz, humility, humoureme can be applied to an 
assemblage from inside. This monadic characteristic of humoureme means that no 
monad participates in the application of humoureme and humility in one assemblage. 
Assemblages are closed when it comes to humoureme and they implement it 
themselves and on their own. However, the rationale of inhuman humour makes it 
possible to think of humiliation as the other side of humour, which, unlike the 
humoureme, takes place in participation between assemblages. The next chapter is an 
analysis of such humiliation according to inhuman humour in various assemblages. 
But here and in auto-derision, we are simply thinking of humoureme in a monadic 
mode. 
 
Either an assemblage keeps its relation with other assemblages and earth or it 
avoids keeping its relation to earth, in which case it is doomed to descend. The latter 
is the very function of humoureme in its microscopic mode to keep the assemblage‘s 
ambitions in touch with earth, while the former is the very function of humiliation 
when an assemblage is losing its connection to earth and will have to fall down to 
touch the earth in order to survive further; an event that humiliates such an 
assemblage, it gets humiliated as it does not apply humoureme inside itself. By 
avoiding humoureme inside, and where an assemblage never descends (as the joy of 
vanity) to earth, it will be humiliated in a process where other assemblages willingly 
or unwillingly take part. Those assemblages that participate willingly in humiliating 
such an assemblage are also apt to be humiliated in upcoming stages of encounter 
between assemblages. An assemblage, by cutting its connection to earth (humus), will 
collapse to earth and becomes humiliated. But what practical role does such 
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self-humiliation play? There is a link between ethical and ontological facets of such 
humour that needs to be explicated. Limiting such auto-derision to a psychological or 
a masochistic attitude ignores the ethical and social role such humour plays. 
 
If the interior side of humour was defined as an active force that does away with 
the negative affects, transforming and orienting them toward creative ones, the 
exterior side provided us with the role humour plays between subjects in their 
communication. These two facets and the schism between them has resulted in 
understanding humour as a purely psychological training or an unending hedonistic 
attitude in social and ethical domains. However it is high time we approach towards 
the cosmos which evacuates humoureme from its most banal life sides and gives 
humour no chance to co-exist with the serious. Such dogma which can not tolerate 
any humour in truth can be seen in an excessive mode in contemporary discourse of 
terror which evades any humour as its fundamental agenda. Although it will be 
discussed in relation to the dystopian wit introduced in chapter five, we commence a 
mythological depiction of such state of terror and destruction which shapes an 
approach in rejecting humour. Angra Mainyu, as the destructive spirit in 
Zarathurstrianism is depicted as the malignant spirit that is surrounded by destructive 
forces from within and yet deceives from the outside. 
 
These two principles now mark off their respective territories of action 
against one another. The Holiest Spirit, who keeps to truth (asha), 
orders for himself life and good actions; Angra Mainyu, who keeps to 
untruth (drug: 'deceit'), the non-life and bad actions. All beings have to 
'choose' between these two basic principles (Sweeney, 80). 
 
This malevolent and destructive element which plays the role of God or 
Spənta Mainyu‘s adversary and whose name (according to the Encyclopædia Iranica) 
out of disgust, is usually written upside down in Pahlavi texts, can be seen as the 
amalgamation of utter avoidance of humoureme. In effect even being written upside 
down is emblematic of such state of humiliation for such malignant spirit in 
Zarathurstrianism demonology, which is the result of rejecting or deceiving ṛtá 
 
(which is against both chaos and lie). Angra Mainyu which already in its etymology 
suggests an immanent relation with narrowness and suffocation has traces in words 
such as anger, and anxiety (Webster, 1913, 56) acts based on such an avoidance of 
joy in inherent in ṛtá and is determined to empty humans of this joy. Instead of 
undergoing such joy, however, Angra Mainyu sticks to fabricate it in a constant state 
of deception. Any speculation towards its name makes it clear that the reason that 
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Angra Mainyu is left furious is the ability of truth to crack it down and unveil itself 
 
through Angra Mainyu itself. In other words, what renders Angra Mainyu furious is 
 
that its deception can easily be made visible. Although Angra Mainyu ''like many 
 
trickster and evil figures, of other creation myths- many, for instance, in Central Asia 
 
and Native North America- contributes to the creative process‘‘(Leeming 295). its 
 
acts are concealed and hidden. And once they are revealed and unveiled, his fury 
 
increases. Yet this process of opening  and revelation continues as '' the conflict 
 
between Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, and his great enemy, the evil Angra Mainyu, 
 
lies at the heart of all existence‘‘ (Stookey, 177). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Angra Mainyu written upside down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore it should be stressed that as the source of wrath and destruction 
 
(anger), aēšəma, or ḵašm in New Persian, it bears both interior and exterior facets of 
 
reactive forces. Yet the fact that Angra Mainyu is the god of deception and Druj (to 
 
lie) is highly significant. The demonological elements lead us to the social and ethical 
 
sides as there is a state in which deception becomes revealed and known or visible 
 
and this is in effect the reason for its anger and wrath. Therefore there is a pivotal 
 
element which renders deception and Druj visible. 
 
He sows [...] he groans when he no longer sees the form. Light is born 
in the sphere: she gives it to the higher Powers. The dirt and dross 
flows from him to the earth. It clothes itself in all phenomena, and is 
reborn in many fruits. The dark Demon of Wrath is ashamed, for he 
was distraught and had become naked. He had not attained to the 
higher, and had been bereft of what he had achieved. He left the body 
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an empty shell and descended in shame. He covered himself in the 
womb of the earths, whence he had risen in brutishness (Boyce, 99). 
 
 
In the Gathas, which are believed to be composed by Zarathustra, the 
opposite of asha is not a simple negation, such as is the case with Rig Veda anrta. The 
contrary ethos to asha is Druj- the deception that brings chaos to the good, ordered 
creations of Ahura Mazda (2.45.4). Druj confuses the true nature of the workings of 
the world, so that one is unable to make the right choices, as did the daevas, the 
unnamed ‗'false or erroneous gods'', who, in confusion, made bad choices in 
opposition to asha. Druj is usually translated as 'the Lie' in the sense of the deception 
or a misrepresentation of the reality. The one who follows Druj- the dregvant-chooses 
evil thoughts, words and actions (Rose, 1.32.5). Druj as it is based on fabrication, 
deception and lies, it is the point for evil divinities. However more importantly, it can 
be unveiled through light. 
 
Repeated in a variety of different Manichean scripts and beyond its mythic side, 
the ontological facet of such conflict has it that the Light uses the nature of Darkness 
against itself. It can help us come closer to an understanding of a realist humour 
which unveils deception and hypocrisy using similar techniques. Following the 
conception of Druj, the fool puts deception to shame by primarily shaming himself 
and even humiliating himself. 
 
Beyond the mythic and demonological polarization, all this can be seen in an 
immanent mode to elaborate how inhuman humour functions. In effect, inhuman 
humour bears the same ability in deriding those who avoid its minuscule 
materialization. In fact the only result of rejecting humour, as one can see in Angra 
Mainyu, is a state of ontological humiliation. In such a state, where an assemblage 
strives to profess as serious as possible its deeds, thought and words, it is likelier to 
avoid humour. Although as mentioned earlier, we should stress that there is another 
feature that is closely related to such demonology and as the leader of demons in 
Angra Mainyu. In effect, Angra Mainyu deceives due to this characteristic of āz 
(greed). Angra Mainyu can provoke āz to produce more and more, and keep 
fabricating. 
 
In a formal analysis, Donald C. Klein divides the very process of humiliation of 
what he calls ‗dynamics of humiliation‘ into three parts: humiliator/ witness/ victim. 
Humiliator according to him is the one that inflicts humiliation, witness is the one 
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who sees the disparagement and agrees with it and victim is the one that experiences 
humiliation as being disparaged. This can be applied to assemblages in relation to 
inhuman humour. When an assemblage avoids humoureme it undergoes humiliation, 
but this does not mean that the two other sides, namely witness and humiliator, are 
excluded or exempted from applying humoureme to themselves. An assemblage 
cannot keep being witness of humiliation or the very humiliator; especially when it is 
blind to the signs that emanate out of one assemblage being humiliated, this renders it 
the next victim of humiliation. Such inhuman ethics of humoureme will be discussed 
in the next chapter where it will be shown that as far as such likely humiliation is 
concerned, wit and wittiness cannot play the role humoureme plays which is undoing 
humiliation. 
 
What a fool does is asking for humiliation before it occurs to him: in effect a 
fool secures himself against the humiliating tendency of such inhuman laughter by 
humiliating himself before he is compelled to. Fools can show, at least in a subjective 
and individual scope, the ability of auto-derision. Yet this should equally be seen in 
relation to the power that holy fools target. Having humiliated themselves, fools act as 
medium of inhuman laughter and inhuman laughter can make use of them to 
humiliate those who avoid humoureme. Thus, there is always a power reservoir angry 
at fools since fools by applying humoureme unexpectedly are able to unveil the 
ridicule at the heart of any serious gesture that has avoided humour. Far from an 
aesthetics of asceticism that is not uncommon among holy fools, fools in the realist 
sense humiliate themselves voluntarily rather than deciding to produce laughter (as in 
witticism), giving themselves over to becoming an object of laughter. Fools' acts 
certainly target hypocrisy and morality of different forms of knowledge and 
humoureme is among their most common techniques. This said, the significance of 
holy foolery in its actual contemporary form is not laid in the exclusion from society 
(as in desert fathers and mothers) but rather in the very utility of humour towards 
themselves. As a template for inhuman humour, holy foolery presents us with 
elements of humour in relation to self. Extending this trajectory further in a realist 
conception of humour highlights the deep relation between humility and humiliation. 
Humour towards oneself is the very pivotal point of subjectification and although it 
gives rise to momentary humiliation, it does not culminate in a shocking unexpected 
rush of humiliation from inhuman humour. This means a lot in terms of assemblages 
where an assemblage, by keeping humour inside, is safe from any shock of 
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humiliation from its encounter with other assemblages. On the other hand, simply 
 
witnessing the humiliation of other assemblages and taking pleasure (schadenfreude) 
 
can lead an assemblage to a contingent phase when it is humiliated as the next victim 
 
of inhuman laughter. Humiliation as an element in laughter was already present in 
 
ideas of Plato. From Plato to Bergson this idea of derision is noticeable. For them the 
 
human being is derided in laughter and whenever we laugh we laugh at somebody's 
 
derision. Although this idea has been given attention in Hobbes‘ theory of laughter, it 
 
has been underestimated as a theory of humour that's based on human degradation. 
 
Nevertheless if we think of humiliation as an integral part of human life, then not only 
 
we find a deep relation between humour and humiliation, we can also see how these 
 
two mechanisms are interrelated. 
 
Lydia B. Amir, in her Pride, Humiliation and Humility, points out humour as a 
 
mechanism to diminish this inherent trait of human existence. Her innovative 
 
approach is laid in the ability to see humour beyond a simple entertaining facility and 
 
rather as an attitude to existence. By highlighting the human condition as humiliating, 
 
Amir asks if humour can play a role in this regard. Using three known theories of 
 
humour, Amir longs for humour as a mechanism to reduce the humiliating condition 
 
of human being. Amir‘s main attempt in her crucial paper is that the main bulk of 
 
humour theories are either too broad in thinking with humour or too narrow in its 
 
application. An example for her is the major humour theorist John Morreall who, 
 
according to Amir, oversimplifies the human condition throughout his theories of 
 
humour. 
 
Morreall as a theoretician of humor is not alone in neglecting the 
potential humor of life and concentrating on humor in life - if one can 
express the parallel in a somewhat awkward language. Humor in life is 
a wonderful thing, but treated as a means to amusement, it is lowered 
to the level of other pleasures (Amir, 18). 
 
 
Amir insists on the fact that developing a theory of humour to help the human 
 
condition should not result in ignoring the essence of human condition as frustrating, 
 
if not humiliating. Amir maintains this view and argues that: 
 
But in my view, we should not deprive humor of its unique 
characteristics, by ignoring them; and we should not oversimplify the 
problem of human condition by assuming that if life will be more 
agreeable - by using humor, for instance - human condition will 
change for the better. If we want humor to remain an instrument of 
survival, we would have to adapt it to the problem that stems from 
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man's growing awareness of his condition. I am confident that 
eventually we will find a way to do so, for we are too proud to remain 
humiliated too long (Amir 18). 
 
 
Yet she doesn't see humiliation and humour as two inherently connected 
mechanisms in an ontological sense. For Amir, humour is something to be inserted to 
human condition in order to decrease the very pain of humiliation that is inherent to 
life. In other words, for Amir there is an ultra-human humiliating condition on the one 
hand and on the other hand humour is a human mechanism in order to do away or at 
least decrease this pain. One can say that to Amir, humour is not an immanent entity 
that is utterly influential to human condition. Amir gives this impression that 
humiliation is the only immanent feature of human life, and humour seems to be only 
an external or transcendent factor. The argument here based on a participatory 
immanence of life is that if humiliation is at the heart of life, hubris makes its 
application even more painful. Humiliation maintains itself until one transforms it. 
Such transformation is impossible except by opening oneself to humoureme. 
Therefore, humoureme and humiliation in their micro and macro levels are so 
interdependent that they form one ontology. In other words what Amir claims is 
reversed; rather than acknowledging humiliation and insisting on humour to heal this 
existential pain, one can start with humour as a no less immanent characteristic of life, 
to transform, and not only reduce the very humiliation. Any assemblage can ignore 
humour and ascend to a hubris status that functions efficiently and productively, but 
once this assemblage is faced with what Bergson called cessation, it undergoes a 
deeper humiliation. 
 
Izutsu in his Sufism and Taoism describes a Perfect Man as something beyond 
joy and anger and even indifferent to them. 
 
Sometimes he is coldly relentless like autumn; sometimes he is warmly 
amiable like spring. Joy and anger come and go as naturally as the four 
seasons do in Nature. Keeping perfect harmony with all things (which 
endlessly go on being 'transmuted' one into another) he does not know 
any limit (Izutsu, 454). 
 
 
Although this seems an obstacle to elaborate humour in its oriental sense, one 
should add that this state is rather the state of the absolute rather than a human one. 
Although the human can approach such state by increasing its immersion in 
humoureme, it is the absolute that is fully humorous. In effect, this leads us to a very 
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crucial facet of a materialist analysis of humour. The absolute does nothing but laugh, 
but the opposite affect in the absolute, namely anger should be set free from the 
Manichean conception where anger not only has an independent entity, but also is 
utterly anthropocentric. Although Izutsu attributes these two sides to that of Perfect 
Man, one can use it to go beyond the Manichean dichotomy of humour/ anger 
mentioned earlier and think of it as the very interdependence of humour and anger in 
its broad ontological sense. Thus, rather than analysing anger in the absolute, we need 
to investigate its absence of humour. Still sticking to a transcendent (absence of) 
humour does not satisfy a materialist conception of laughter—for that we stress the 
significance of understanding inhuman laughter in a corporeal mode. Like human 
laughter, inhuman laughter is audible, yet for this flow or air of laughter to be 
produced inhuman laughter utilizes various organs such as mouth or throat to produce 
it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Salvador Dalí and Philippe Halsman‘s In Voluptas Mors.  (1951) 
 
 
Inhuman laughter can make use of various humans as object/ organs of its 
laughter. Unless one embraces mirth, he will be used for mirth, similar to what 
Shakespeare puts it in Julius Caesar: 
 
Must I observe you? must I stand and crouch Under your testy 
humour? By the gods You shall digest the venom of your spleen, 
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Though it do split you; for, from this day forth, I'll use you for my 
mirth, yea, for my laughter, When you are waspish (145). 
 
 
All assemblages act morally, but Self-Humiliating Assemblage (SHA) actualizes 
its residuals and is constantly open to humiliating itself. What is this residual? It is the 
rift between knowledge and deed, or between visible and invisible. SHA constantly 
reveals this residual of ethics that is eclipsed under moral and social acts and this way 
humiliates itself. This has a binary function; on the one hand it causes SHA to be 
closer to truth and on the other hand it causes humour for other assemblages. 
However, if the other assemblages do not think of this humour as a sign to commence 
humiliating themselves, they will be humiliated unknowingly and unwantedly. 
Although SHA is made to cause humour for others, the same assemblage can cause 
fear for other assemblages as they see their inability to produce self-humiliation. 
 
In effect, one can argue that from a moral perspective and its relation to 
hypocrisy as incontestable and indisputable, or the relation between different 
moralities that contest each other, tragicomedy is the most appropriate genre to shed 
light on what is morally given or said and what is immorally done; tragicomedy 
shows the rift between ethics and morality as a comic gesture replete with 
inconsistencies, or as Marx and Engels put it the contrast between ‗‘illusions‘‘ and 
their ‗‘achievements‘‘ (Zwart, 68). 
 
This chapter was an attempt to introduce a more practical manifestation of 
realist humour in comedy which once again emboldens the difference between wit as 
the linguistic and discursive mode in humour production and a pragmatic humour. If 
in chapter three and through the application of Bohrer‘s idea of suddenness to 
 
Brooke-Rose we came across a kind of humour that integrates and transforms pain, this 
chapter was a more dramatic and pragmatic addition of the same idea where suddenness 
invites the moment in the very production of the humour. However by linking this idea 
with that of foolery, we concluded that this humour does not need to start with the serious 
issues, rather it imports the banal in the serious, a process which forms the production of 
the humoureme. This way not only the difference between wit and humour can be 
highlighted but more importantly the difference between irony and humour can also make 
a better sense. Nevertheless a realist project of humour leads to the ubiquitous functioning 
of the inhuman humour which forms in the very absence of the humoureme, in other 
words when subjects discard applying humoureme to the 
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serious two phenomena are feasible. First, the either wit is introduced in an utter 
linguistic sense to play the role of humoureme which results in the very substitution 
of foolery with the buffoonery as well as the emergence of the inhuman humour. In 
other words, inevitability of humour necessitates that the discarding of humour in 
relation to the serious culminates in the inhuman humour. In other words, the inability 
of activating the subjective humour in its everyday mode results in the objective 
laughter that emanates from the inhuman humour. Therefore, ontologically speaking, 
the realist project of humour claims that in the ubiquity and inevitability of humour 
two positions are plausible, either one is the subject of humour or one becomes an 
object of humour. The latter is best manifested in the acts of the fools in which they 
prepare and embrace humour in the heart of the serious which has the ethical side of 
unveiling hypocrisy. However there is the second part of being an object of laughter 
or being derided by the inhuman humour that will be discussed in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Inhuman Humour 
 
 
 
Um Ernst, nicht um spiel wird gespielt. (Paul and Hale, 307) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In our discussion of the distinction between humour and irony in the previous chapter, we 
tried to make it clear that the difference between the two is, following Deleuze (1994), 
that humour aims to descend and fall, whereas irony is an attempt to ascend or transcend. 
It has been discussed throughout this dissertation that humour and laughter have usually 
been emptied of a materialist notion and been reduced to a linguistic one. In effect, one 
notices once again that by equalizing humour and jokes, the dominant incongruity 
theories eclipse the possible materialism and reduce humour to mind and language. One 
main aspect in the materialist production of humour is repetition and this chapter is an 
analysis of this feature in a realist project of humour. However, it should be stressed that 
repetition as a component of humour has normally been conceived of as a linguistic 
repetition that provokes laughter (Norrick, 1993). Even when scholars such as Maurice 
Charney say that ‗'repetition may be the single most important mechanism in comedy'' 
(82), this repetition is nothing more than a verbal linguistic one. Admittedly, for Freud the 
fact that young children like repeating words when they are learning how to speak was 
symptomatic of a relation between repetition and pleasure (1989. 128), yet when he came 
to jokes he did not fully exploit this aspect until over a decade after publishing his essay 
The Uncanny (1919). Freud, in his book Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious is 
drawn to an analysis of play, in particular in the sense of children‘s play. There Freud 
prioritizes repetition over pleasure in the very construction of play. Freud‘s attention is 
mainly drawn toward the pleasurable effect produced by discovering what is similar and 
repeating what is similar (Freud, 123). However, Freud‘s analysis hardly goes beyond a 
linguistic analysis of 
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jokes and the linguistic role of repetition in the very construction of jokes. In the same 
vein, although Deleuze‘s later attempts open vistas towards a more pragmatic 
conceptualisation of subjects and assemblages, Deleuze‘s analysis of humour in his 
 
Logic of Sense does not succeed in going beyond such a linguistic mode. However, even 
in that book his analysis seems to promise a psychoanalytic and unconscious analysis in 
the production of humour, but this analysis does not satisfy fully a materialistic 
conception of humour beyond language as elucidated with the help of Carroll‘s Alice in 
Wonderland. It is only in his later works such as A Thousand Plateaus where the 
Unconscious is set free from a linguistic horizon and humour can be seen in a more 
materialist sense. The aim of this chapter is to show how a realist conception of humour 
addresses repetition beyond a linguistic mode in a practical sense, and how the ethical and 
ontological consequences of such an understanding of humour can be reflected in 
sociopolitical dimensions. Therefore, a large bulk of the introduction to this chapter is an 
attempt to see if what is applied to laughter in a corporeal sense in the ideas of Georges 
Bataille and others are equally applicable to humour in its collectivity as well as its 
materialism, and how such an ontology can be defended. Such analysis draws us to the 
role repetition plays in the construction of humour, for as we discussed earlier, repetition 
is the kernel for the production of humour in a materialist sense. 
 
Chapter four was mainly focused on the role fools play in the construction of a 
persona for realist humour. Fools, as we tried to show, have a specific usage of humour 
which makes it very different from simple linguistic wit. But are fools the only way the 
inhuman humour unveils itself? In analysing different aspects of inhuman humour in 
Gary Shteyngart‘s novel Super Sad True Love Story (2011), the main part of this chapter 
focuses on the absence of fools. In relation to a materialist conception of humour and in a 
more actual and contemporary mode, we argue that the absence of fools renders humour 
more inhuman. In effect, one reason for this as we will argue is that the humoureme is 
made less possible and less frequent in the absence and exclusion of fools and this makes 
the very production of humour more inhuman. Subjects and assemblages losing contact to 
the humoureme offered by foolery will undergo an inhuman experience of humour as will 
be discussed in Super Sad True Love Story. Fools play the intermediary role as an 
interzone in the very communication between the serious and the humorous and their 
absence or their exclusion makes such communication harder and even cruel. 
Furthermore, the highlighted difference between 
 
 
 
162 
 
linguistic wit and realist humour leads us to the conclusion that a world, such as the 
one in Super Sad True Love Story, which is replete with various serious subjects and 
assemblages depict such a materialist humour. The subjects in the novel utilise witty 
remarks and deeds to lubricate their communication without being less serious and as 
a consequence, another humour, a less subjective and an indifferent humour, namely 
the inhuman humour, occurs to them. In effect, a framework is offered where in a 
world filled with wit and witticism but bereft of any practical invitation of humour in 
its ethical mode, the subjects are led to an eventual and constant state of being 
ridiculed by an immanent but inhuman humour. 
 
Super Sad True Love Story happens in a near future setting. The United States is 
at war in Venezuela, and its national debt has soared to the point that the Chinese have 
become a threat. Everywhere around New York, there are National Guard checkpoints, as 
well as riots that take place in the city‘s parks. People and especially youngsters know 
perfectly well how to text-scan for data, using some machines that make them give up 
their privacy. Books, on the other hand, are regarded by such young people as disgusting 
objects. Everybody is supplied with an äppärät device that is carried everywhere and can 
live-stream its owner‘s talks and thoughts, and broadcast a degree of ―hotness‖ quotient 
to those around. There are other issues that equally obsess characters’ minds, among them 
health, which leads us to the main character of the novel, Lenny. He works as a Life 
Lovers Outreach Coordinator for life extension. The other main character in the novel is a 
girl with whom Lenny is in love and furthermore who is the reason for him to want to live 
eternally. Eunice Park, the slim, slender and moody girl of an abusive Korean-American 
podiatrist from Fort Lee, N.J. Eunice is, unlike Lenny, very much a child of her time: an 
avid on-line consumer, a believer in images and sensations, a lifelong mistruster of 
words, written or spoken. Eunice is a sweet and desperate girl who keeps corresponding 
with a social network called GlobalTeens. People in this novel are not only connected but 
they are 
 
‗hyper-connected‘ through their progressive media and this makes it easier to see how 
their relations with one another works. They are people who have access to an 
unimaginable amount of data through various modes and media but do not know much 
about themselves. While Media and Credit are the most visible components of this 
society‘s consumerism, money, health and entertainment, what stands out in this society 
is the ridiculous world they inhabit. Such elements in an atmosphere that ranges 
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from American military adventurism to the "national security" measures depicted in the 
 
novel, provide the reader from the very beginning with a grotesque witticism.In effect, 
 
this entertaining and witty ambiance contributes to a situation where different subjects 
 
unveil their ridiculousness more and more. This is most evident in the melancholic and 
 
more dystopian mood of the novel towards its end where Shteyngart's prose becomes 
 
more and more serious and the characters look more and more ridiculous. Yet the 
 
crucial point concerning this novel in this study is the fact that such a state of risibility, 
 
in its dystopian sense where every subject is being humiliated as a result of their deeds, 
 
is the very result of repetition. What looks witty, funny and entertaining can turn out to 
 
be a trap to be ridiculed.  It will be argued that every subject in an assemblage 
 
communicates with other subjects; for instance Lenny communicates with Eunice but 
 
the fact is that the witticism of each subject makes it difficult to be affected by another 
 
subject. 
 
I focused on the loving animal in front of me and tried to make her 
love me. I spoke, extravagantly and, I hope, sincerely. Here’s what I 
remember.  
I told her I don’t want to leave Rome now that I had met her.  
She again told me that I was a nerd, but a nerd who made her 
laugh. I told her I wanted to do more than make her laugh.  
She told me I should be thankful for what I had. I 
told her she should move to New York with me. 
She told me she was probably a lesbian.  
I told her my work was my life, but I still had room for 
love. She told me love was out of the question.  
I told her my parents were Russian immigrants who lived in New 
York. She told me hers were Korean immigrants who lived in Fort 
Lee, New Jersy.  
I told her my father was a retired janitor who liked to go fishing.  
She told me her father was a podiatrist who liked to punch his wife and 
two daughters in the face (Shteyngart, 24). 
 
It is hardly possible that any authentic communication takes place between 
 
them simply because their knowledge of the world (which is tightly connected to their 
 
apparatus and the credit) is fixated and affects cannot be given sufficient chance to 
 
intervene and change subjects. Being closed to the outside leads to a miserable life 
 
where the characters do not laugh but provoke laughter as we laugh at them due to the 
 
very repetition of their deeds and this repetition simultaneously renders their misery 
 
inhumanly humorous. 
 
This brings us to another main feature for the inhuman humour, namely that of the 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
relation between humour and truth. Witticism in Super Sad True Love Story leads to the 
 
extreme liquidation of assemblages: 
 
And yet Lenny Abramov, your humble diarist, your small nonentity, 
will live forever. The technology is almost here. As the Life Lovers 
Outreach Coordinator (Grade G) of the Post-Human Services division 
of the Staatling-Wapachung Corporation, I will be the first to partake 
of it. I just have to be good and I have to believe in myself. I just have 
to stay off the trans fats and the hooch. I just have to drink plenty of 
green tea and alkalinized water and submit my genome to the right 
people. I will need to re-grow my melting liver, replace the entire 
circulatory system with ―smart blood,‖ and find someplace safe and 
warm (but not too warm) to while away the angry seasons and the 
holocausts (Shteyngart, 5). 
 
There is a witticism which despite the vulnerability of the subjects remains in 
 
a mere linguistic sphere and does not embrace affects as the same linguistic wit makes 
 
communication of affects to one another redundant. This witticism, we argue makes the 
 
humoureme redundant and repeats itself towards the second part of the novel. The 
 
second  part  reveals  the  serious  and  cruel  depth  which  this  witticism  has  been 
 
suppressing. Any relation to truth is blocked and this makes an immanent derision and 
 
humiliation of such assemblages possible. Such humiliation is not emanated through a 
 
transcendental agency but rather takes place in a relational mode between assemblages. 
 
One can suggest that on the opposite side of such determined liquidation in 
 
witticism, which suppresses any sort of anxiety in a playful witticism and leads to an 
 
ultimate humiliation towards the end of Super Sad True Love Story, stands the very 
 
discourse of terror and terrorism. The discourse of terror on the other hand suppresses 
 
any humour as it is filled with anxiety. This discourse also has cut its relation to any 
 
experience of the humoureme but not through witticism rather through a rigid 
epistemological gesture towards truth. If witticism loses its relation to the humoureme 
in order to mass-produce laughter in a linguistic sense, a terrorist blocks the 
 
humoureme as there is nothing funny in his assumed truth and his transcendent doxa 
 
should be maintained as seriously as possible. Therefore, against such a dystopian 
 
liquidation depicted in Super Sad True Love Story. There exists the extremely brutal 
 
solidification and suffocation of truth (the angry state in Angra Mainyu) that, far from 
 
any immanent humour is determined to humiliate other subjects. What these discourses 
 
share is at least their will: one will‘s liquidation of humour whereas the other is the 
 
result of willing the constant refusal of humour. In this regard, through Super Sad True 
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Love Story we analyse a liquidation of humour which culminates in a materialist 
humiliation of different assemblages that have been excluding humour (and replacing 
it with wit). We aim to show that such humiliation equally takes place quite gradually 
and via repetition. 
 
Not only the ethical and ontological facets of the absence/ exclusion of 
humoureme of foolery in a dystopian model is significant; furthermore foolery is 
given here a realist and pragmatic role. While the linguistic and cognitive frameworks 
of humour normally attribute a two-level analysis to humour, namely that of 
incongruity-resolution, we attribute the function of resolution to fools but such a 
resolution is seen in a pragmatic mode where fools act as the mediators of humour by 
being the generators of the humoureme. However immediately next to such pragmatic 
role, there is an ethical role attributed to the fools. The Fool is the persona who is able 
to not only provoke laughter in face of the existential incongruities, but more 
importantly fools are able to make visible what is concealed between the serious 
moral or hypocritical zones and that of humour. Therefore, foolery obtains a 
resolutionary task not in language but in the middle of social relations. Yet as 
discussed earlier and as it will be shown in Super Sad True Love Story, any attempt 
towards excluding foolery will only result in a more inhuman intervention of humour. 
The liquidation of humour renders any relation to truth impossible whereas the 
solidification of truth renders any humour impossible. The assemblages in Super Sad 
True Love Story maintain a fluid relation where almost everything is possible: in a 
network of assemblages, if assemblage A causes a ridicule to assemblage B, the same 
assemblage A can be ridiculed by an assemblage C and so on. The absence of foolery 
does not eliminate humour from social relations, it only makes it more cruel as 
assemblages could be mocked without such an interzonic foolery. 
 
Super Sad True Love Story represents a world bereft of foolery which makes an 
immanent and cruel humour between assemblages possible. Using a materialist concept 
of repetition and imitation, we argue that assemblages keep repeating themselves and 
keep encountering one another. Repeating one‘s difference without being affected by 
others’ differences can result in getting rid of foolery and suppressing the humoureme and 
this can cause any assemblage that solely repeats itself or its difference to be derided in 
its relation to other neighbouring assemblages. It is through such repetition and such 
subsequent encounters that assemblages, in an immanent and 
 
 
 
166 
 
unconscious mode, reveal what they have kept inside: the serious inside turns out to 
be the ridiculous outside. 
 
In effect, another form of humour is hypothesised which takes place in a 
materialism which is less subjective and more inter-subjective and relational. In his 
 
Phantom of the Ego (2013), Nidesh Lawtoo shows very well that the development of 
the ego is a contagious phenomenon whose roots can be traced back to Nietzsche. The 
way subjects are influenced by each other and the way they are connected entails an 
intermezzo which is largely affective. For this purpose, Lawtoo gives priority to 
Nietzsche rather than to Freud and argues that Nietzsche introduces us to the ego‘s 
phantom. The Ego‘s phantom is an unconscious process of communication that 
 
‗spreads contagiously‘ from one subject to another, prior to communicating thoughts, 
values and knowledge that turns the ego to a phantom of the ego. Therefore, not only is 
the ontogenesis (the development of the child) a result of such affective communication 
but more importantly phylogenesis (the development of the human species) is a mimetic 
process that precedes language. Lawtoo attaches significance to Georges Bataille‘s 
conception of laughter as the first thing a baby learns imitating its parents or its 
caregivers. Bataille brings laughter to a zone where the initial communications between 
the newborn and parents take place and this way prioritises it over other forms of 
communication which are linguistic and Oedipal. Although our knowledge and thoughts 
gradually try to surpass this form of communication and strive for a more coherent 
intellectual mode of communication, laughter, in its contagious and infectious form, 
remains with us forever. However such mimetic forms of laughter can also direct us to 
yet another mechanism of laughter that is replete with scorn and derision. In the same 
way that children can mimic laughter and undergo its contagion, subjects can imitate such 
laughter, which is usually nothing more than a wit that targets others. In our framework, 
the inability to experience humour in its tiny manifestations (humoureme) is one 
requirement for the emergence of the inhuman laughter. 
 
Humour not only communicates in this scope between subjects and 
assemblages, but also it is a pivotal component in the formation and creation of subjects. 
By reducing this interzone to a linguistic lubricant, subjects and assemblages will be 
devoid of affective communication that causes their becomings. Super Sad True Love 
Story, as a dystopian novel, is introduced as a sphere for such kind of humour where this 
mode of communication to create new subjects takes a new path, the path of 
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derision rather than humour. This path links the Bataillian emphasis on contagion to a 
Bergsonian laughter of derision where humour between subjects is replaced with a 
witty communication. This culminates as in Super Sad True Love Story in an inertia 
of derision which includes the unbecoming of subjects. Subjects by avoiding humour 
have access to wit as a similar but utterly linguistic phenomenon, unaware of the fact 
that excluding humour in its molecular sense (humoureme) gradually results in the 
inhuman laughter where such subjects will be humiliated and derided. Such a gradual 
logic of the intervention of inhuman laughter, which is borrowed from Leibniz‘ 
treatment of monads has been seen against the background of the repetition 
mechanism. The role attributed to repetition means that subjects and assemblages 
constantly repeat themselves and it is by such repetition that they gradually obtain the 
qualities of a victim for the humiliation of inhuman laughter. Therefore, far from a 
transcendent logic, inhuman laughter has utterly materialistic requirements and the 
main condition for it as explained earlier is the deep connection between the interior 
and exterior. It means that when the humoureme as an interior gesture of a subject of 
an assemblage can no longer function, the exterior facet namely inhuman humour 
takes action whereas on the other hand, any experience of the humoureme makes the 
emergence of the inhuman laughter less and less likely. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Ethics of the Humoureme 
 
 
 
In a very rich study, Hub Zwart makes an attempt to elaborate a historical and 
conceptual trajectory of laughter (and humour) in relation to morality. In his study 
 
Ethical Consensus and the Truth of Laughter, Zwart delineates laughter as an act that 
precedes morality. Zwart argues that against the very common notion that laughter and 
morality exclude each other, they have a lot in common. Admittedly such a relation 
between morality and laughter has been maintained by different thinkers from 
Kierkegaard to Nietzsche and Foucault. But Zwart‘s point is that ‘’morality‘s beginning is 
of a relative nature and that there is no absolute transition from ‗the non-moral‘ to 
 
‗the moral.’’ Based on this claim, Zwart argues that morality is a ‗world we enter‘ (9). 
Rather than being explored or invented by a subject, we are created by the moral life we 
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are involved in. As our moral worlds are not all in harmony with each other and there is 
 
not  sufficient  ‘’consensus’’ between  these  worlds,  we  might  be  ‘’discontent  with 
 
discourse of the others’’ (Zwart, 9) and this is already the source of tension and conflict 
 
between different forms of morality. The significance of Zwart‘s analysis lies in his 
 
conception of moral philosophy which is not one to justify different moral worlds. The 
established moral worlds or ‘’platitudes’’, rather than consolidation and justification, 
require contestation. And here laughter reveals its significance as a strategy prior to 
 
morality as morality is based on a non-controversial consensus. Gay laughter or what 
he calls parody is a strategy in relation to any truth-regime ‘’which present[s] itself as 
 
indisputable and beyond contestation’‘ (Zwart, 70). Laughter in this regard reveals the 
 
very vulnerability of such moral platitudes and more importantly the relation to truth. In 
 
effect, as Zwart emphasizes via the shift from tragic to comic in Nietzsche or the shift 
 
from the Birth of Tragedy to that in Gay Science, jest obtains an intimate relation to 
 
truth: 
 
 
 
However, even in earlier writings, when he took science‘s claim to 
knowledge more seriously than during his final episode, Nietzsche 
recognized that the buffoon had a special task as a herald of new 
truths. When he refers to the first volume of his Human, All Too 
Human as a fool‘s book, ein Narrenbuch, he does not consider the fool 
someone who is denied access to truth. On the contrary, it is in the 
fool‘s discourse that new truths first make their appearance. The fool is 
granted the privilege of uttering them for the first time. While being 
excluded from the old established truths, the fool‘s cap allows him to 
introduce new unprecedented ones (Zwart, 75). 
 
 
 
Zwart‘s aim to prioritize laughter over morality is one that is immersed in the 
 
notions offered by Nietzsche, Bakhtin and other scholars of laughter, yet his analysis 
 
remains bound to a discursive approach to laughter. Nevertheless there are implications 
 
for a realist project on humour and laughter where Zwart attributes a significance to 
 
laughter in the ability to subvert different forms of morality and their ‘’vulnerabilities’’, 
 
something that has been missed in the Aristotelian view of morality that is based on 
 
‘’reconstructing and consolidating established morality’’. Instead Zwart opts for the 
 
Socratic view of morality which is based on contestation and one that takes morality as 
 
the outcome of moral experience. 
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It entails a particular understanding of moral life which, rather than being 
indisputable or self-evident, must be considered the temporary outcome of 
a certain historical development, an outcome whose basic ‗platitudes‘ 
(Rorty) are bound to find themselves exposed to laughter. Furthermore, it 
presupposes, instrumentalizes and reinforces certain forms of moral 
subjectivity, disqualifying others as primitive, unreasonable or immoral. 
Yet, this moral regime which managed to become established and now 
seems unable to recognize its own deficiencies, still finds itself 
accompanied by a sense of uneasiness which already points to something 
which is hidden or neglected, a moral truth about to reveal itself in the 
experience of laughter - an experience which entails a challenge to the 
established consensus (Zwart, 11). 
 
 
 
Sigmund Freud in his Der Humor elaborates specifically the very function of 
 
humour in relation to oneself as well as in relation to others. In Der Humor, he does not 
 
make an attempt to delineate the psychological economy of humour (which he had 
 
already approached in his Jokes and Its Relation to the Unconscious), but rather focuses 
 
on a neglected aspect of humour in relation to the super-ego. Freud commences with 
 
the fact that humour is a mechanism which transforms the expected negative affects to 
 
jest or as he puts it, ‘’There is no doubt that the essence of humour is that one spares 
 
oneself the affects to which the situation would naturally give rise and dismisses the 
possibility of such expressions of emotion with a jest’’ (2001. 4542). In other words, 
 
humour is an act that ‘’asserts itself against the unkindness of real circumstances’’ 
 
(ibid), and it operates according to a mechanism that Freud emphatically distinguished 
from the one in jokes as jokes are run by an act to ‘’obtain a yield of pleasure’’ (4543). 
The core of Freud‘s argument lies in the attitude behind humour. If a humorist, 
 
according to Freud in his Jokes and Its Relation to Unconscious, acts in relation to 
 
others as an adult towards children, and this way obtains a sense of superiority, then 
 
‘’One asks oneself what it is that makes the humorist arrogate this role to himself ’’ 
 
(4543). The paradox presented by Freud is that if a person is treating oneself as a child 
 
in the experience of self-mockery, then should we admit that a part of him plays the role 
 
of the super-ego, or parents? After all, ego in the eyes of super-ego appears ‘’tiny and all 
 
its interest trivial’’ (4544). Therefore, although the pleasure taken in humour is less 
 
intense than the one in jokes and the comic (Jokes and its Relation to the Unconscious), 
 
this ‗liberating‘ and ‗elevating‘ act in humour, which says ‘’Look! ‗Look! here is the 
 
world, which seems so dangerous! It is nothing but a game for children - just worth 
making a jest about!’’(4545). This analysis finally brings Freud to the conclusion that 
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even the super-ego, as merged with the ego in a blurred sphere, renders the experience 
of humour possible in order to protect it from the sufferings of reality. 
 
The Freudian conception of humour suggests that humour, more than a 
linguistic joke, is the capacity to deal with reality as it is. But it also implies the fact 
that reality as it is makes one laughable or even more precisely, reality is able to make 
us objects of humour. As there is seldom a way to stop reality from being painful and 
tragic, humour enters the scene. What Freud discusses as self-humour or self-mockery 
should be elaborated in relation to an understanding of reality, where according to 
Lydia Amir, the Aristotelian idea of humans as homo ridens co-exists with the other 
rarely studied attitude of the human as homo risibilis (2015, 262). 
 
As one step toward a better definition of the inhuman laughter, we could say 
that the fool not only maintains the ability of sich lächerlich machen, but also helps to 
make the forms of morality protected against laughter and humour risible—hence the 
socio-political function of holy fool in relation to morality, including the monastic 
ascetics of the church fathers. However, what a holy fool does to fulfil this function is 
of extreme significance. In effect, a fool undergoes an experience of humour before 
reality humiliates him or her. This entails an understanding of reality as ridiculing the 
human. Being aware of this tacit tendency in reality, a fool makes something look 
hilarious before the arrival of real hilarity in it. As it goes beyond a theoretical or 
rhetorical representation of ridicule, the fools engage themselves in this experience of 
ridicule by self-humiliation. When fools humiliate themselves, they undergo a process 
of subjectification or of creating themselves anew. Although through creating 
themselves anew they are likely to become the object of laughter for other subjects 
(devenir risible), they also provide other subjects a chance to be able to humiliate 
themselves. When other subjects are reluctant to experience humoureme, the fools 
produce it through having themselves mocked. Therefore such self-humiliation 
already implies an urgency for other subjects who are too engaged with their 
established moralities, fixed and formed subjectivities to experience humour. 
 
The German word Mut might be of help to explain the state of such 
humiliation (Demütigung). Mut that comes from Muod and implies the state of 
courage, has also connotations for anger as in erregt sein, nach etwas trachten, auch 
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zornig sein
11
. Therefore Demut functions not necessarily as the state of being empty of 
 
bravery, but more importantly as an affective transition of anger to other affects. When 
 
humiliation shifts from targeting oneself to targeting others, such anger finds its way 
 
through derision. Humiliating or simply deriding others as the direct result of denying 
 
humoureme culminates in inhuman humour. Ontologically, when an assemblage just 
 
uses other assemblages as an object of humour without implementing the emitted 
 
humoureme to its own framework, the assemblage will be used sooner or later by 
 
inhuman humour as an object of humour. There is a correspondence between the 
 
adamant and intractable act of an assemblage in avoiding self-humiliation and the 
 
unexpectedness of the humiliation that befalls it. Such inhuman humour is likelier to 
 
happen in the absence of the fools in a yet more cruel mode. The world depicted in 
 
Super Sad True Love Story provides us with a world that shows how wit in the absence 
 
of humour culminates in derision. 
 
 
 
DO NOT GO GENTLE  
FROM THE DIARIES OF LENNY 
ABRAMOV JUNE 1  
Rome- New York 
Dearest Diary  
Today I‘ve made a major decision: I am never going to die. 
Others will die around me. They will be nullified. Nothing of their  
personality will remain. The light switch will be turned off. Their lives, 
their entirety, will be marked by glossy marble head-stones bearing false 
summations (‗‘her star shone brightly,‘‘ ‗‘never to be forgotten,‘‘ ‗‘he 
liked jazz‘‘), and then these too will be lost in a coastal flood or get 
hacked to pieces by some genetically modified future-turkey.  
Don‘t let them tell your life‘s a journey. A journey is when you end up 
somewhere. When I take the number 6 train to see my social worker, 
that‘s a journey. When I beg the pilot of this rickety united-Continental 
Deltamerican plane trembling its way across the Atlantic to turn 
around and head straight back to Rome and into Eunice Park‘s fickle 
arms, That’s a journey (Shteyngart, 3). 
 
 
 
The novel is made up of the diaries of Lenny Abramov and the 
 
correspondences between Abramov, Eunice and her parents or sister. This form helps 
 
to see the relation between subjects in the shape of their diaries which to some extent 
 
represent their minds. Yet it is the very repetition of themselves and their disposition to 
 
one another in a witty mode that gradually brings them to a state of derision. The novel 
 
11
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starts with a diary of Lenny which is written on June 1, between Rome and New York. 
 
The following is an extract of the first part from the novel and contains the post of 
 
Eunice on the website GlobalTeens. 
 
SOMETIMES THE LIFE IS SUCK  
FROM THE GLOBALTEENS ACCOUNT TO EUNICE 
PARK JUNE 1  
Format: Long-Form Standard English Text  
GLOBAL TEENS SUPER HINT: Switch to Images today! Less 
words= more fun!!!  
EUNI-TARD ABROAD TO GRILLBITCH: 
 
Hi, Precious Pony!  
What‘s up twat? Missing your ‗tard? Wanna dump a little sugar on 
me. I am so sick of making out with girls. BTW, I saw the pictures on 
the Elderbird alum board with your tongue in Bryana‘s, um, ear. I hope 
you‘re not trying to get Gopher jealous? He‘s had way too many three-
somes. Respect yourself, hoo-kah! So- guess what? I met the cutest 
guy in Rome. He is exactly my type, tall, kind of German-looking, 
very prep-pie, but not an asshole (Shteyngart, 27). 
 
 
There are elements in such passages that make the characters expose and 
 
display their wit. The usage of words such as tard or twat as terms of affection or other 
 
derogatory terms or absurd ones such, ‘’Respect yourself, hoo-kah’’ delineate this wit in 
 
a repetitive manner. The materialist justification of such humour and humiliation is of 
 
extreme significance simply because it is the lack of the humoureme that results in the 
 
ultimate communication of a witty form which results in their derision, the humoureme 
 
that is the direct result of an affective communication with the outside. The task for a 
 
materialistic understanding of such derision is what causes the first witty, funny part of 
 
the novel to be gradually so sombre and dystopian. 
 
The novel opens itself to such cruelty in the middle of its witticism quite gradually. 
 
Therefore what is of extreme significance is this shift from the absurd and witty 
 
situations towards the cruel, dystopian and inhuman setting. 
 
My armored personnel carrier bearing the insignia of the New York Army 
National Guard was parked astride a man-sized pothole at the busy 
intersection of Essex and Delancey, a roof-mounted. 50-caliber Browning 
machine gun rotating 180 degrees, back and forth, like a retarded 
metronome along the busy but peaceable Lower East Side streetscape. 
Traffic was frozen all across Delancey Street. Silent traffic, for no one 
dared to use a horn against the military vehicle. The street corner emptied 
around me until I stood alone, staring down the barrel of 
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a gun like an idiot. I lifted up my hands in panic and directed my feet 
to scram (Shteyngart, 56). 
 
Beyond the linguistic repetition, repetition of deeds in which characters repeat 
constantly what they are busy with, can function as the kernel of such mechanism towards 
derision and humiliation, an element which already implies that what counts as a realist 
humour is practical and real acts rather than the rhetorical gestures towards humour. For 
this the contagion inherent in laughter has been readdressed as the materialist and gradual 
path towards such derision. This not only maintains the affective significance of humour 
but also reconciles it to a more political and contemporary conceptualization of ethics that 
targets subjects and assemblages that are constantly in touch with one another. The 
mimetic conceptualisation of realist humour entails the fact that subjects undergo an 
experience of propagating and repeating some acts or words and it makes them, 
unconsciously, derided in their relation to one another. Therefore by excluding the 
humoureme, the derision of the inhuman emerges in such inhuman humour, but it takes 
place only in relations one has with other assemblages around him or her. In an analogy, 
one can think of the way laughter is produced and heard and the way laughter uses other 
organs (for instance of a face and a mouth) to be produced. In the same vein, in its 
emission and manifestation, inhuman humour utilizes various subjects to be heard and 
produced. Seen this way, inhuman laughter clears its throat, tightens the cords, opens the 
lips and so on to produce its laughter, to burst out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Organs involved in the production of Laughter. 
 
 
 
All such organs in the very moment of laughter lose their common utility and 
serve the breath that is going through the vocal cords. Speaking and communicating is 
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more often than not impossible when all these organs are mobilized; the contraction 
of the muscle below the lungs (the diaphragm) to expel air in a rhythmic pattern, and 
the breath that moves out of the cords to be heard outside. However, this analogy is 
not sufficiently descriptive of inhuman humour, as for inhuman humour the organs at 
work to produce laughter are the assemblages that are in relation to one another, 
rather than some fixed organs with designated and determined roles. Any relation and 
communication between organs can transform an organ or an assemblage to serve the 
breath or the air that exits the body by losing its normal function (derision). 
 
Gabriel Tarde in his Laws of Imitation (1903) introduces the concept of 
propagation as the kernel to his sociological studies which shows how reproduction 
functions in social milieus. According to his notion of mimetics, the acts of individuals 
are replicable and this can make such acts habitual, or transform them to practices. 
However, such practices are by nature social and take place in a very reciprocal realm, 
and as such they invite a relational notion of action to social milieu. The reason why 
Gabriel Tarde is significant to this study is that according to him, propagation is the key 
in understanding social phenomena while we are attributing social characteristics to 
humour. But this directs us first and foremost to the process in which humour is formed. 
The process or the production of humour in its social domain might look less important 
than the function of humour, but with a bit of scrutiny based on a relational conception of 
humour, we realize that the very production of humour in its social domain and in its 
relation between subjects as well as assemblages is as important as its function. In order 
to elaborate propagation, Tarde claims that, 
 
At the moment when this novel thing, big or little as it may be, is 
conceived of, or determined by an individual, nothing appears to 
change in the social body, - just as nothing changes in the physical 
appearance of an organism which a harmful or a beneficent microbe 
has just invaded,- and the gradual changes caused by the introduction 
of the new element seem to follow, without visible break, upon the 
interior social changes into whose current they have glided (Tarde, 2). 
 
Tarde, following Leibniz, insists on a gradual mechanism in the formation 
of change in different organisms. Bringing this to humour means that the realist 
humour claims its production to be based on a gradual propagation which is quite 
similar to contagion in the case of laughter. The propagation of the new element in the 
organism causes a regularity which ‗‘is not in the least apparent in social things until 
they are resolved into their several elements, when it is found to lie in the simplest of 
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them, in combinations of distinct inventions, in flashes of the genius which have been 
 
accumulated and changed into commonplace lights‘‘ (Tarde, 3). The link that connects 
 
understanding humour in its subjective mode or its assemblage form to Tarde‘s notion 
 
of social change is laid in the link that Tarde himself, inspired by M. Espinas, makes 
 
between human societies and natural organisms. In effect, Tarde aims to show that the 
 
rules and laws that cause human societies to change are not different from those that 
 
show initiatives in natural organisms and ‗‘ both animal and human societies may be 
 
explained from this point of view‘‘ (Tarde, 4). 
 
Repetition in the construction of humour should be pursued in a practical 
 
sense and it lends itself to humour in a gradual sense which is not as visible. By 
 
borrowing another of Tarde‘s aspects introduced in his Laws of Imitation, we can 
 
extend the whole argument in relation to causality 
 
But as a matter of fact, the mind does not fully understand nor clearly 
recognise the relation of cause and effect, except in as much as the 
effect resembles or repeats the cause, as for example, when a sound 
wave produces another sound wave, or a cell, another cell (Tarde, 6). 
 
 
Tarde highlights the formation of innovation out of imitation, or as Deleuze 
 
takes it and introduces it in his own philosophy, to say that difference is the result of 
 
repetition. Tarde maintains his materialist approach and continues that if such 
 
innovation and its link to repetition is so incoherent and chaotic to us it is because we 
 
refrain  from  taking  the trivial and  minuscule parts  into  account,  the  fact  that 
 
resembles Leibniz emphasis on petites perceptions. ‗‘Indeed, parts of this science 
 
exist in the petty experiences of each of us, and we have only to piece the fragments 
 
together‘‘(Tarde, 12). What was once an invention or an innovation forms the reality 
 
now, but this could not have been fulfilled unless by repeating this invention. 
 
Moreover, the social forces of any real importance at any period are 
not composed of the necessarily feeble imitations that have radiated 
from recent inventions, but of the imitations of the ancient inventions, 
radiations which are alike more intense and more widespread because 
they have had the necessary time in which to spread out and become 
established as habits, customs or so-called physiological 'race instincts 
(Tarde, 19). 
 
The target for this analysis is the imitation in the social form of humour and 
 
laughter. Bataille places emphasis on the contagious mode of laughter that unsettles 
 
knowledge and rigid consciousness at least temporarily. According to him, rational 
 
discourse speaks of ‗‘the heterogeneous elements in so symbolic and so abstract a 
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way that the act of envisaging them no longer even involves a simple phenomenon of 
practical clearing like laughter‘‘ (2014, 425). However such clearing should be seen 
collectively and taken beyond a personal realm and an individual laughter. Here with 
Tarde we aim to see how this is applicable to humour but instead of starting with 
subjects who are challenged by a chaotic moment of laughter, we need to redefine 
humour in its own rationality, in its collective contagion. What does humour think of 
us? Or even better, what does humour do to us? How does humour burst upon us and 
how does it even deride us? 
 
Society defined as ''a collection of beings as they are in the process of 
imitating one another'' (Tarde, 54) is the basis of definition of society by Tarde. This 
conception, which has for long been overshadowed by the Durkheimian analysis of 
society, stresses the significance of imitation in the formation of society. A mimetic 
conception of society such as Tarde‘s can introduce us to a mimetic framework of 
humour in its realist mode. We argue that humour plays such a mimetic role between 
various assemblages that exist in the same society. Imitation as the kernel of such a 
materialist conception of humour means repeating acts, deeds of subjects. 
 
Considered in the abstract, an imitation is no more than a repetition, an 
infinite reproduction of the same. Considered in concrete terms, 
however, imitation becomes pluralized. Multiple flows emerge, within 
variable relations of composition or substitution. In this context, 
repetition becomes variation (Candea, 50). 
 
 
Framing it in a materialist conception of humour the derision in its 
immanent mode arises out of repetition of what a subject does/ says in relation to the 
other subjects in a reciprocal inter-subjective manner or a network of relation. One 
can notice in Tarde that such communication between different forms functioning in a 
society is based on a contagion from one form to another until it overwhelms the 
entire organism. However, such contagious communication is unconscious and the 
organism as a whole is not aware of it. It is through repetition that such an organism 
lets such an unconscious element develop until it becomes conscious and visible. 
 
Candea (2010) maintains that the significance of Tarde‘s idea of imitation is 
that instead of doing away with the individual side and embracing the social part, it 
brings them together as an inter-individual bridge. Imitation is an inter-individual 
relation and as such does not give us purchase on what is properly termed a social 
relation, since the latter should be conceived of as breaking with and external to the 
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individualities it connects (Candea, 44). And that is why the realist project of humour 
 
starts with the interior humoureme as the pre-individual and molecular moments of 
 
becoming and emphasises that humoureme determines the way the inhuman humour 
 
intervenes. Putting it differently and as a criterion, it is only through neglecting and 
 
understating  the  role  that  such  pre-individual  elements  of  humoureme  play  the 
 
inhuman humour acts out. 
 
 
What we call the subject is nothing more than the place where these 
relations play out and come together. It is the internal milieu which 
opens onto an external milieu peopled with other subjects, as well as a 
plurality of other beings which inhabit our vital experience and 
determine it fundamentally as an affective experience (Candea, 49). 
 
 
 
 
While it is common to start with the whole and prioritise it over the parts, Tarde 
 
defines a conception of sociology that is inter-psychological and starts with the tiny 
 
parts. However, inter-psychological does not mean ‗‘a sub-set of psychology; rather it 
 
aims at studying psychic phenomena which are beyond the individual and yet are not 
 
subsumed into collective representations‘‘ (Candea, 44). This already stands against 
 
both the representative understanding of humour as well as a subjective reduction of it 
 
and leads us to see this inhuman humour as the interzone between subjects and 
 
assemblages  because  as  Carsenti  puts  it,  in  this  framework  ‗‘beliefs  and  desires 
 
imitate each other, not individuals‘‘ (Candea, 45). 
 
For Tarde, imitation allows us to analyze a concrete social situation, 
however complex it may be, because it allows us to distinguish and to 
sort different processes of assimilation and resistance, of accumulation 
and substitution, of alliance and conflict between distinct imitative 
flows (Candea, 49). 
 
If repetition in its subjective or linguistic form makes humour possible, 
 
inhuman humour functions in relations between subjects. Tarde, using the concept of 
 
imitation, tries to dispense with the conscious/ unconscious dichotomy of subjects 
 
which  divides  their  actions  into  voluntary  and  involuntary  ones.  For  Tarde,  the 
 
‗imperceptible degrees‘ of any action, regardless of our consciousness of it is as 
 
significant as the voluntary ones, or a univocity in our actions. This enables us, using 
 
Tarde‘s framework, to see the interrelation between the interior and exterior facets in 
 
the production of humour once more. Humoureme and its rejection are the main 
 
criteria for the inhuman humour to act upon subjects. The infinitesimal mechanism 
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inherent in humoureme renders such brutal derision less likely, whereas its rejection is 
 
possible only through opening oneself to it. 
 
There is an echo here of Leibniz‘s theory of small perceptions: as with  
Leibniz, it is not the cumulative phenomenon which allows gradation to 
emerge as transformation, but rather the opposite analytic movement, 
led by infinitesimal calculus. The infinite, in other words, is implied in 
the finite, it is not beyond the finite as a product of aggregation. This 
allows Tarde to add, in a note to the passage cited above: ‗the 
psychological is explained by the social, precisely because the social 
emerges from the psychological (Candea, 57). 
 
 
Humour in terms of imitation means that any repetition of an action in a 
 
subject, which is a result of its interior inclinations results in an exterior action led by 
 
inhuman  humour  and  in  relation  between  subjects.  It  helps  us  move  ‗‘from  the 
 
question of the subject of imitation to a question about what is imitated [ce qui 
 
s‘imite], about the matter of the process considered from an impersonal point of 
 
view‘‘ (Candea, 57). In this light, any action that a subject commits is, to a large 
 
extent, towards an accumulation of a tendency or a creation of new subject positions 
 
in  relation  to  the  other  subjects.  This  implies  that  what  makes  a  subject  is  not 
 
necessarily his or her resistance or consistency, rather ‗its insistence, its ever-repeated 
 
capacity to impose itself against facts of the same order‘. An insistence of this type, 
 
we argue, implies a repetition that drives inhuman laughter. As one can see in Super 
 
Sad True Love Story, even the material life can play a role in order to make such 
 
inhuman humour lead the subjects to their unbecoming, their inertia or their derision. 
 
Kell's apparat lit up the air around her, and she was plunged into the 
needs of a hundred clients. After the daily decadence of Rome, our 
offices looked spare. Everything bathed in soft colors and the healthy 
glow of natural wood, office equipment covered in Chernobyl-style 
sarcophagi when not in use, alpha-wave stimulators hidden behind 
Japanese screens, stroking our overactive brains with calming rays. 
Little humorous hints scattered throughout. 'Just Say No to Starch.'' 
''Cheer up! Pessimism Kills.'' ''Telomere- Extended Cells Do It Better.'' 
''NATURE HAS A LOT TO LEARN FROM US:'' And, fluttering in 
the wind above Kelly Nardl's desk, a wanted poster showing a cartoon 
hippie being hacked over the head with a stalk of broccoli.. 
(Shteyngart, 60). 
 
This passage is among the pieces in the novel which illustrates the role the 
 
material or the machine can play in the formation of such inhuman laughter. The 
 
absurd can emerge not only in relation between subjects but also through the relation 
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the  subjects  define  with  the  material  world.  Beyond  the  subjective  level  and  in 
 
relation to the assemblages, especially when as in Super Sad True Love Story foolery 
 
and its generous humoureme production are excluded, either an assemblage keeps its 
 
relation with other assemblages with humility or it will be compelled to descend 
 
cruelly by inhuman humour. By applying humoureme to itself, an assemblage will be 
 
secured against being humiliated by the inhuman humour. Assemblages are closed 
 
when it comes to humoureme, they apply it on their own, in their secrecy and privacy. 
 
This role can not be reduced to a linguistic will manifested in wit, because 
 
humoureme is more an ontological disposition. The following passage is an example 
 
in Super Sad True Love Story which shows even witty thoughts or words do not 
 
guarantee the inhuman derision. 
 
Finally, three hours later, the birds picking up a morning tune outside, 
she came into the bedroom. I pretended I was asleep. She took off most 
of her clothes and got in bed next to me, then pressed her warm back 
and behind into my chest and genitals, so that I ended up spooning her 
warm body. She was crying. I was still pretending to be asleep. I 
kissed her in a way that was consistent with my being supposedly 
asleep. I didn't want her to hurt me anymore that night. She was 
wearing those panties that snap right off when you press a button on 
the crotch (Shteyngart, 111). 
 
By  usurping  the  very  function  of  the  holy  fool  in  self-mockery  in  an 
 
asubjective domain, one can enlarge the view of humiliation beyond a psychological 
 
and subjective sphere. Assemblages which constantly avoid descending to earth will 
 
end in humiliation, they will be humiliated in a process where other assemblages 
 
willingly or unwillingly take part. Those assemblages that participate willingly in 
 
humiliating such an assemblage are also apt to be humiliated in upcoming stages of 
 
encounter between assemblages. An assemblage by cutting its connection to earth 
 
(humus) will collapse to earth and be humiliated. 
 
Any assemblage bears the virtual humoureme inside, and such humoureme 
 
can either be realized to experience joy or it can be suppressed and transmitted to 
 
linguistic wit which ends in activating the inhuman laughter. Whenever the assemblage 
 
is efficient in juxtaposing its difference or its becoming with its virtual humoureme it 
 
succeeds in obtaining an ethical relation with its socius. However, as all this makes 
 
sense in an ethical view, it  requires some elaboration here. The fool  inside any 
 
assemblage is the component of synchronizing what an assemblage does and what it 
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professes: the relation between visible forms and invisible tendencies. Humoureme 
 
emerges where the contradiction between these two materializes itself, a moment of 
 
suspension or paradox between visible forms and invisible. The clash between the 
 
visible and invisible is rooted in the relation between intention and body or thought 
 
inside and its extension on body. Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible 
 
(1968), his unfinished book, puts it this way: 
 
If there is an animation of the body; if the vision and the body are 
tangled up in one another; if, correlatively, the thin pellicle of the 
quale, the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension 
with an invisible reserve; and if finally, in our flesh as in  
the flesh of  things,  the  actual, empirical,  ontic  visible, by  a  sort 
of folding back,  invagination, or  padding,  exhibits  a visibility,  
a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but is its principle, that is 
not the proper contribution of a ‗thought‘ but is its condition, a style, 
allusive and elliptical like every style, but like every style inimitable, 
inalienable, an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the 
actual visible is a provisional partitioning and which, nonetheless, opens 
indefinitely only upon other visibles—then (the immediate and dualist 
distinction between the visible and the invisible, between extension and 
thought, being impugned, not that extension be thought or thought 
extension, but because they are the obverse and the reverse of one 
another, and the one forever behind the other) there is to be sure a 
question as to how the ‗ideas of the intelligence‘ are initiated over and 
beyond, how from the ideality of the horizon one passes to the ‗pure‘ 
ideality, and in particular by what miracle a created generality, a culture, a 
knowledge come to add to and recapture and rectify the natural generality 
of my body and of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 152). 
 
 
Humoureme is an instance of revealing this chasm between ideality of a 
 
knowledge and the animation of body. But when humoureme does not function to 
 
conjoin what is claimed (words) and what is done (deeds), it is through repetition that 
 
different subjects will be derided in their relation to other subjects. Any absence of 
 
humoureme can get accumulated and culminate in a state of hypocrisy simply because 
 
it  is  humoureme  that  brings  any subject  down  to  ‗earth‘.  The  hypocrisy of  any 
 
assemblage is defined when the assemblage develops a rift between intentions and 
 
deeds: riyā‘ as the Arabic word for ascetic hypocrisy is the target of foolery in the 
 
Persian poet, Hafiz. Yet more importantly, this word is made up of the root r-a-y which 
 
means visibility. The hypocrite utilises riyā‘ in order to dissimulate and pretend or 
 
even hide what he bears inside. When an assemblage fails to activate the molecular 
 
humoureme in its relation to itself, it deteriorates into a hypocritical gesture. Any 
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assemblage that opens itself to its humoureme can be ridiculed, whereas the 
assemblages that do not actualize their humoureme are doomed to be humiliated by 
the inhuman laughter that runs through assemblages. Acts of laughter by a subject or 
humoureme in an assemblage are moments of opening to humoureme and announcing 
the chasm or contradiction between what drives the assemblage inside and its public 
deeds. When an assemblage averts such molecular instances, it accumulates its virtual 
humoureme and ends in humiliation in its relation to other assemblages. 
 
Riyā‘ makes it possible for one to keep a smooth stance outside while there is 
already a rigidity and acerbity inside which renders any humour to itself impossible. This 
stays in opposition with a fool whose rigid look and appearance is only a cover to his 
smooth inside. riyā‘ is etymologically rooted in ra’y which means vision or visibility; an 
act which is a determination to look as moral as possible, to keep morality as visible as 
possible. As holy fools in Islam are utterly against such an attitude, one can notice the 
function such a tradition can have in its contemporary form and consider what holy fools 
are opposing through their own self-humiliation. In this regard, there is a vast area of 
varied traditions from West to East where different fools play a prominent role in 
unveiling what is normally concealed in their morality. A fool provokes humour at the 
cost of risking his entirety in order to show that a morality is filled with deceit. 
 
Holy fools long for their humiliation far before it happens to them as their 
acts are tinged in humour. Holy fools can show, at least in a subjective and individual 
scope, the potentials laid in auto-derision. Yet this should certainly be seen in relation 
to the power that holy fools act against. In other words, far from an aesthetics of 
asceticism that is not uncommon among holy fools, they humiliate themselves prior to 
the morality or power that surround them. The actions of the holy fools certainly 
target hypocrisy and morality of different forms of knowledge and humour is among 
their most common techniques. This said, the significance of holy foolery in its actual 
contemporary form is not laid in the exclusion from society (as in desert fathers and 
mothers) but rather in the very utility of humour towards themselves in city and in the 
middle of reality. As a template for realist humour, holy foolery presents us with 
elements of humour in relation to the self. Humour towards oneself is the very pivotal 
point of subjectification and although it gives rise to momentary humiliation, it does 
not culminate in a shocking unexpected rush of humiliation from inhuman humour. 
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Figure 15. Hans Bellmer 
 
 
 
 
 
This means a lot in terms of assemblages where an assemblage by keeping 
humour inside is safe from any shock of humiliation from its encounter with other 
assemblages. On the other hand, simply witnessing the humiliation of other assemblages 
and taking pleasure can lead an assemblage to a contingent phase when it is humiliated as 
a victim of inhuman humour. It does not mean that auto-derision is the inhuman humour; 
it simply means that auto-derision is the very strategy of embracing humiliation that leads 
one to be less vulnerable to inhuman humour. Therefore, what an assemblage can do at 
best is produce constant humoureme in order to be prepared for a humiliating humour 
that arrives. When an assemblage avoids humoureme or when an assemblage participates 
without being a target of humour, it is likelier to be jolted as a victim of inhuman humour. 
It should be emphasized that such inhuman humour reveals itself immanently and 
between assemblages; it is not imposed from above and this will be described in the 
participatory mode of humiliation in this chapter and in relation to a dystopia bereft of 
humoureme in Super Sad True Love Story. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 The Deriding Assemblages 
 
 
Laughing always implies a secret or unconscious…an unavowed 
intention to humiliate…(Bergson, 1911, 135). 
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The  very  argument  based  on  a  participatory  model  of  humour  is  that  although 
 
humiliation is at the heart of life, hubris makes its application even more painful. What 
 
Lydia B. Amir, in her Pride, Humiliation and Humility claims is keeping humour at 
 
hand in order to make humiliation more tolerable, rather what the derisive realism 
 
suggests is that by adding humour makes humiliation less probable. Any assemblage 
 
can ignore humour and ascend to a hubris status of fluent function, but once this 
 
assemblage  is  faced  with  what  Bergson  called  cessation,  it  undergoes  a  deeper 
 
humiliation. An assemblage that humiliates itself is sooner or later excluded from 
 
participation with other assemblages. The reason for this is that a self-humiliating 
 
assemblage is more in contact with its residuals than other assemblages. All 
 
assemblages act morally, but a self-humiliating assemblage constantly actualizes its 
 
residuals in form of humoureme. What is this residual? As mentioned before, it is the 
 
rift between knowledge and deed, between visible and invisible. To explain this we 
 
have resorts to Leibniz‘s conceptualization of petites perceptions as applicable to 
 
assemblages. Leibniz argues that at every single moment, there are infinite things in us 
 
that are infinite perceptions in us and go beyond our perception, which are named 
 
petites perceptions. In sum, these tiny perceptions are what build complex sensations in 
 
us and they ‗unfold in the fullness of time.‘ (Leibniz, 246) 
 
Leibniz tells us that we all know that we have perceptions, that for 
example, I see red, I hear the sea. These are perceptions; moreover, we 
should reserve a special word for them because they are conscious. It‘s 
perception endowed with consciousness, that is, perception perceived as 
such by an "I" , we call it apperception, as a-perceiving. For, indeed, it‘s 
perception that I perceive. Leibniz tells us that consequently there really 
have to be unconscious perceptions that we don‘t perceive. These are  
called minute perceptions, that is, unconscious perception (Deleuze, 
1980
12
). 
 
 
By tackling the common notion of perceptions as fully conscious phenomena, 
 
petites perceptions compose the relation our mind makes with reality without us 
 
knowing them. They are molecular instances that elude our knowledge and yet they 
 
determine our behaviour and orient or tilt us in this or that way. Petites perceptions are 
 
inseparable components of our being and yet they elude our attention and 
 
12
  http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=55&groupe=Leibniz&langue=2 
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consciousness and can be accumulated in us. According to Leibniz in his New Essays 
 
on Human Understanding: 
 
It is these tiny perceptions that often determine our behaviour without 
our thinking of them, and that deceive unsophisticated people into 
thinking that there is nothing at work in us that tilts us one way or 
another—as if it made no difference to us, for instance, whether we 
turned left or right (6). 
 
 
Arguably, such can be the case of laughter and tears in a release model where 
 
someone sets free what has overwhelmed him. Yet the attempt here is to define it 
 
beyond a psychological and behavioural viewpoint and in terms of assemblages the 
 
humoureme is defined here as an attempt to actualize the petites perceptions collected 
 
in one assemblage. This helps us enormously to see humour and humiliation in an 
 
immanent manner. Any assemblage, by producing humoureme by itself, activates and 
 
realizes its petites perceptions in its relation to other assemblages. Leaving such petites 
 
perceptions passive and not activating them through elements of humoureme can make 
 
an assemblage a more delicious prey for inhuman laughter. In Super Sad True Story, we 
 
might not immediately notice the humiliation of assemblages that have been ignoring 
 
their petites perceptions but the inter-subjective derision paves the way to display how 
 
the inhuman humour can function materialistically and immanently. 
 
The consular line for the visa section was nearly empty. Only a few of 
the saddest, most destitute Albanians still wanted to emigrate to the 
States, and that lonely number was further discouraged by a poster 
showing a plucky little otter in a sombrero trying to jump onto a 
crammed dinghy under the tagline ―The Boat Is Full, Amigo 
(Shteyngart, 7). 
 
Assemblages obtain such petites perceptions not in a conscious act but in relation 
 
and participation with other assemblages and these petite perceptions render a slithery 
 
and continual change in assemblages possible. Moreover, it is through these little 
 
perceptions that the apparently trivial habits construct individuality. The habits which 
 
seem to play no significant role can be accumulated gradually and give rise to a change 
 
in  assemblages.  Such  is  the  way how  assemblages  proceed  to  live  together  and 
 
participate in their being. However what should be stressed is the way these tiny 
 
perceptions come into existence in relation to other assemblages. In effect, if Leibniz 
 
attributes pregnancy to monads as a main characteristic, assemblages can also bear 
 
such  ‗laden‘ or  pregnant  virtuality.  The  argument  here  is  that  assemblages  are 
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humiliated in accordance to such potentialities that they bear. The less conscious an 
assemblage is of its tiny perceptions, the likelier it is to be ridiculed in relation to other 
assemblages. Another concept of Leibniz that helps us defend the plurality of these 
different subjects and their relation to Kant‘s philosophy especially in ‗The Principle of 
Sufficient Reason‘ where everything must have a reason. The principle of causality as 
Leibniz introduces it implies that everything has a cause while Kant emphasizes that for 
everything there is a reason. Causality by maintaining a series of causes for something 
implies the necessary cause of something and not the sufficient reason for it. Getting rid 
of the principle of sufficient reason is significant to analyse the immanence of humour 
because this principle introduces us to a reason that holds for the thing, its relation to 
other things and its cause and effects. In effect, every single subject through its ‗point of 
view‘ comprehends the totality of the world. All subjects are constituted by their points of 
view and not the other way round: perspectivism versus relativism. Here every 
assemblage is expressing something in the world, in its singularity. Nevertheless not 
everything is expressed clearly because there are infinitely small or petites perceptions or 
minute perceptions which are not given distinctly to conscious perception. Thus, any two 
assemblages have different points of view and zones of perceptions. 
 
Self-humiliating assemblage constantly reveals this residual of ethics that is 
eclipsed under moral and social acts and this way produces humoureme in itself; this 
way it renders humour possible for other assemblages. However, as long as other 
assemblages do not think of this humour as a sign to commence producing 
humoureme in themselves, they would be humiliated unknowingly and 
unintentionally by inhuman laughter. In effect, assemblages can translate their 
inherent humoureme into tickling of other assemblages. This way, rather than 
deriding its own identity, it is likely that an assemblage commences tickling the other 
neighbouring assemblages which ultimately provokes inhuman humour based on its 
contagion. 
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Figure16. Hans Bellmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his book The Pleasures of Abandonment: Jean Paul and the Life of 
Humor (2006), which is a unique attempt to introduce a lesser known figure in 
Romanticism, Jean Paul, to the English-speaking world, Paul Fleming claims that 
humour for Jean Paul has three demands. Among them there is a demand that 
approximates Bataille and his non-cognitive approach to humour which is stated as 
 
‗Was wir aber ewig fordern ist...weniger die Erklaerung als die Ergänzung unsers 
 
Wesens.‘ According to Fleming this means humour is a tool to expand life rather than 
explain it. Seen this way, Jean Paul is among the pioneers of a theory of humour 
which takes the pleasure of humour to existence itself. According to Fleming, 
 
‗‘humour is neither a strictly epistimological category nor a purely linguistic 
enterprise as is the case in recent exegeses of Romantic Irony‘‘ (22). This statement is 
 
 
 
187 
 
already a maxim that we have tried to define in the realist project of humour which 
surpasses the linguistic and cognitive domains of wit. Humour in its real gesture is 
something that, instead of trying to explain being, expands being and this way ‗'asks 
less for an explanation of life (that will be lacking) and demands instead its expansion. 
Humour charts neither a hermeneutics of understanding nor a poetic of 
incomprehensibility, but rather the aesthetic attempt to expand experience itself‘‘ 
 
(Fleming, 23). In the construction of a subject, humoureme can play an essential role 
which is not separable from its interaction with other subjects it confronts. In effect, 
every subject receives a trace and gets shaped through every molecular instance of 
humour. To illustrate the rudiments of such a construction one can think of a topology 
of one specific subject A as is shown below. A as an abstracted entity bears influences 
on it in the form of humoureme in its encounter with various subjects and proceeds 
forward in its becoming. Any encounter provides this subject with a curve, a new line 
or a paradox while it is affected by the new humoureme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure17. A Hypothetical Depiction of Humoureme 
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As we can see through any experience of humoureme a subject obtains a 
new curve, is affected anew, and becomes a new subject, starting from the zero state 
of cessation as a line of idea bereft of humour (or knowledge bereft of humour) and 
continuing toward becoming multiple. Neither Fleming, nor Jean Paul, reach this 
systematic conception of humour since for both humour goes beyond any sort of 
knowledge. Yet one can claim that there is a possibility for delineating a negative 
system that rejects humour. 
 
The cruelty of inhuman humour necessitates a target, an object or an 
addressee. Where the holy fools open themselves to inhuman humour they are aware 
of its virtual cruel humour and its possible derision. Such possible cruelty causes the 
holy fool to start self-humiliation before being derided by the inhuman humour. The 
holy fools, before being humiliated by inhuman humour, open themselves to self-
humiliation by targeting their morality or the morality surrounding them. In this 
regard, the fools are pioneers in embracing the cruelty that is embodied in self-
humiliation. What is left for others is the molecular stances manifested in humoureme 
which can be applied in any assemblage in its production of difference. Assemblages 
which embrace humoureme are able to experience, at least on a microscopic level, 
inhuman humour. Yet the rationality of inhuman humour is immanent in relation to 
assemblages which avoid applying humoureme to themselves. The fool‘s function of 
making what is invisible in any morality visible, is to address the hypocrisy tacit in 
any assemblage; assemblages which by sticking to their identity avoid humour as an 
unsettling and cruel instance, and consequently are not able to communicate with 
other assemblages‘ differences and replace this urge with a moral and hypocritical act 
of tolerating and co-existing with other assemblages: a co-existence devoid of affect 
and without being affected. The fools experience the joy of inhuman laughter 
although it is cruel enough to castigate them and unsettle their identity. Those 
assemblages that avoid humoureme will also be treated cruelly except that they do not 
enjoy the inhuman humour. Such assemblages will be an object, an organ for inhuman 
humour and they experience humiliation without benefiting from the joy of humour in 
themselves. Super Sad True Love Story is one example of a life bereft of foolery, a 
foolery which embraces inhuman humour and dismantles it to 
 
 
189 
humoureme. In such a state, inhuman humour enters in a relational mode where 
 
different assemblages are constantly being humiliated without taking a pleasure of 
 
laughing with inhuman humour. 
 
 
 
Therefore the epistemological kernel in the realist humour is that rather than 
 
linguistic or rhetoric incongruity as the very constructive of humoureme, one needs to 
 
place emphasis on ignorance as the principal pillar of humoureme. This emboldens the 
 
participatory and active mode inherent in the construction of humoureme. Humoureme 
 
is made possible through the ignorance which befalls an assemblage in relations and 
 
encounters. Such self-ignorance, which is rooted in an existential conception of 
paradox and difference or real inconsistencies in relation to other assemblages, is to 
be distinguished from any epistemological attempt of understanding a paradox 
dialectically. 
 
Jean Paul's idea of humour, which according to Hale is very similar to 
Schlegel’s and Schiller's notion of irony, is an attempt to show that humour is in 
 
effect the ''inverted sublime’'. In Vorschule der Aesthetic (1963), Paul introduces 
 
humour as the very result of confrontation of the infinite world of reason with the 
 
finitude of the subject. This umgekehrte erhabene or inverted sublime sparks a 
 
negative  infinity;  the  clash  between  the  infinity  of  reason  and  the  finitude  of 
 
experience causes such a negative infinity. Putting it in Deleuzian terminology, such 
 
a clash can be ascribed to the relation between desire and any specific assemblage. 
 
Thus beyond the subjective delineation of romantic humour which Paul suggests, 
 
one can speculate about such a mechanism in its inhuman mode between desire and 
 
its infinity and any assemblage. According to Peter Banki, Jean Paul's idea of the 
inverted sublime implies an ''underlying earnestness’' in humour. In other words and 
 
according to Banki, while for Kant jest is more a question of the ‘'sensible rather than 
 
contemplative’', for Jean Paul humour has an annihilating trait. 
 
The understanding and the object-world know only finitude. In the 
romantic we find only the infinite contrast between the ideas (or reason) 
and all finitude itself. But suppose just this finitude were imputed as 
subjective contrast to the idea as objective contrast, and instead of the 
sublime as an applied infinity, now produced a finitude applied to the 
infinite, and thus simply infinity of contrast, that is a negative infinity. 
Then we should have humor or the romantic comic (2014, 88). 
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The holy fool‘s function should be seen against any authority that claims the 
ability of derision of others, of ridiculing others through its difference. The holy fool 
is part of the mechanism to humiliate any derision machine. Any authority that tries to 
mimic the inhuman laughter would be the very victim of it. Holy fool is the most 
human representation of the inhuman laughter. Though in this part we will argue that 
in the absence of fools, it is the very immanent relation between assemblages that 
renders this humiliation possible between assemblages. In other words, where there is 
no fool to embrace his own humiliation in order to revitalize morality, such 
humiliation occurs to assemblages in the relation they create to one another. This time 
humiliation does not unveil itself from a clear-cut source of foolery, rather it emanates 
from the very relation the assemblages are involved in. 
 
Using Pierre Janet‘s concept of socius, we will see the mechanism by which 
such immanent humiliation can be traced, especially with regard to Super Sad True 
Love Story. The ego, according to Janet is not an isolated apparatus that exists outside 
its relation with others. There is a larval socius in the very formation of the very 
genesis of ego which already determines him in the midst of society. This way, socius 
functions as the very ally of any subject formation. It implies an inter-subjective 
relation between different members in a society. As Nidesh Lawtoo emphasizes, 
 
That is, a mimetic, inter-subjective psychology which transgresses 
precisely this metaphysics insofar as it considers the ‗‗other‘‘ with 
whom I communicate as already interior to myself, already constitutive 
of what I am, so intertwined with myself that metaphysical distinctions 
between ‗‗self‘‘ and ‗‗other,‘‘ ‗‗interior‘‘ and ‗‗exterior,‘‘ no longer 
hold – in short, already a socius (2011, 74). 
 
 
This, we argue, not only holds for subjects but also and more importantly is the 
very plateau on which assemblages communicate. As mentioned earlier, what Deleuze 
and Guattari conceive of assemblage dispenses with the existence of any fixated 
ontology, instead of the normal procession from smaller to larger entities whatever exists 
in relation to social world is made up of complex configurations as assemblages. The 
prime implication of such a depiction of social world is the way it avoids any 
representation of social world as a range of discrete objects and entities which maintain 
(territorialisation) and dissipate (deterritorialisation). We argue that the role humour plays 
is nothing but a dissipation of a fixated disposition in assemblages which can be defined 
as a body that deterritorialises itself. Yet this does not provide a 
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sufficiently convincing outline of the manner in which assemblages that avoid humour 
 
can be figured. In an immanent mode, if assemblages experience humour on their way 
 
to becoming what they were not, those which avoid such humour not only get frozen 
 
and fixed, but they de-become, they get humiliated. Yet the mechanism for this 
 
humiliation or collapse (which recalls the Bergsonian moment of automatism) should 
 
be seen immanently and in relation to other assemblages. Yet these other assemblages 
 
have not desired and intended such humiliation, but humiliation takes place and an 
 
assemblage gets impaired and ridiculed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 The Dystopian Humour 
 
 
 
 
What are your lines? What map are you in the process of making or 
rearranging? What abstract line will you draw, and at what price, for 
yourself and for others? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 203). 
 
Humour functions by exploiting the gap between being a body and 
having a body, between -- let us say -- the physical and metaphysical 
aspects of being human. What makes us laugh, I would wager, is the 
return of the physical into the metaphysical, where the pretended tragic 
sublimity of the human collapses into a comic ridiculousness which is 
perhaps even more tragic (Critchely, 2011, 43). 
 
 
 
 
Super Sad True Love Story represents wit and a witty society of people. Yet this wit not 
 
only cannot save them from being constantly ridiculed, but also nourishes the inhuman 
 
humour. The novel which is depicted in some series and in a diary form and raises 
 
various  themes  in  the  conversations  that  occur  between  various  characters,  and 
 
especially between Lenny and Eunice. Although the novel is composed of different 
 
episodes, these episodes are ranged in a process which increasingly move from a love 
 
story to a dystopian world. Lenny, a Life Lovers Outreach Coordinator for Post-Human 
 
Services of Russian and Jewish descent, who works as a salesman attracting clients to 
 
buy  services  to  help  let  them  live  forever.  Lenny  who  has  fallen  in  love  with 
 
twenty-four year old Eunice, who is living abroad and studying Assertiveness in 
 
university. All these provide a platform for these subjects to encounter one another and 
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be derided by one another without even meaning it. From the start it may look as if the 
novel is replete with characters and settings which can make one laugh; they are even 
unintentionally absurd and funny and beyond that every character utilise a witty language. 
Even Eunice‘s family, who are Korean and sometimes struggle to communicate in 
English, turn out to be funny and witty. Yet, by the passage of time, it is no more this 
funny language that surfaces in the novel. The novel does not simply offer a form of 
humour and maintain it throughout the novel and its various episodes. Beyond the 
witticism of the narrator and characters, there is a humour that runs through the entirety 
of novel and in relation between different characters and different series. 
 
Beyond a transcendent irony, it is through the relation of different characters/ 
series/ assemblages that the humour emerges. Although characters reveal a degree of 
ludicrousness and hilarity, this is not the what provides the reader with the humour in the 
whole work. It goes without saying that the humour in the work is a compilation of such 
minuscule spots scattered in the novel, yet as no character means to be humorous, the 
only reveal their stupidity. The sovereign laughter becomes purely immanent and flows 
throughout the entirety of assemblages. The post-human setting depicted in 
 
Super Sad True Love Story is filled with undesired ludicrousness of assemblages that has 
been made possible only in relation to other assemblages. By shifting from a series of 
hierarchical sets towards a flattened model where assemblages co-exist and sit along each 
other peacefully, the laughter of summit as Bataille described will transform to an 
immanent laughter that sparks ridicule inside. This is no more a laughter formed in order 
to make detachment possible; this is the laughter of humiliation which is precisely the 
result of dispensing with a detaching laughter. There is no fool left in 
 
Super Sad True Love Story to help subjects/ assemblages detach from their 
ridiculousness and participate in laughing at themselves. The characters in the 
absence of foolery are sounds of laughter; they are transformed to reactive forces to 
render laughter possible without being part of it. However towards the end of the 
novel such derision becomes increasingly conscious and concrete to the characters, as 
if they notice their being an object of laughter. 
 
 
No, this is the most glorious grave marker to a race of men ever built. 
When I outlive the earth and depart from its familiar womb, I will take 
the memory of this building with me. I will encode it with zeros and 
ones and broadcast it across the universe. See what primitive man has 
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wrought! Witness his first hankerings for immortality, his discipline, 
his selflessness (Shteyngart, 6). 
 
 
The novel presents characters that are humiliated in relation to one another. Although 
the ridiculousness of one triggers laughter in another, the moment they make an attempt 
to hold that humour they get humiliated. In other words, the novel unveils a relation 
between humour and humiliation. Without falling in the depiction of humour in Jean Paul 
which instead of reinforcing a politics of humour, maintains a play of finitude/ infinity at 
the heart of humour, one can argue that the very inhuman nature of humour has a dual 
relationship with humour. On the one hand, any humiliation can cause humour, but when 
it is another person's humiliation, any attempt to maintain that humour ends in 
humiliating oneself. The frame Jean Paul offers is bereft of any dynamism that defines 
humour in between assemblages or even subjects. Fleming's introduction also suffers 
from the same static and aesthetic notion where there is a schism between the despicable 
world and lightness that humour yields. 
 
The romanticism tacit in Jean Paul's understanding of humour eclipses the 
innovative and novel view of humour as a lived experience mechanism that surpasses 
linguistic and cognitive approaches. The realist project of humour instead of ascribing 
any full and total trait to life ( as Fleming attributes to jean Paul's romantic notion of 
life as despicable) makes an attempt to explore humour in its immanence. Such an 
attempt avoids attributing any common romantic trait to being as tragic or comic and 
instead commences with an indifferent notion of being. Yet this indifferent being 
constantly renders humour possible. Any assemblages can experience the clash 
between its finitude and infinity (as Jean Paul describes) and experience humour. Thus 
humour has its own rationale running and flowing between assemblages. Yet although 
there is no preemptive description of how humour reveals itself, one can claim in a 
Bergsonian sense that rigidity and automatism is where humour appears. Yet when this 
automatism occurs to one assemblage, it can cause humour for other assemblages. 
Other assemblages notice how an assemblage falls, slides and stops functioning; they 
notice how inhuman humour can befall an assemblage and causes laughter. Yet if any 
assemblage makes an attempt to maintain the way an assemblage is humiliated (or falls 
back to earth), the same would be applied to it. Therefore, we argue that while 
humiliation of assemblage A can cause humour for other assemblages, keeping it as a 
spectacle leads the witness of humour 
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to another state of humiliation. I argue that this is the chain of humiliation that depicts 
 
the constant laughter of being throughout various assemblages. 
 
Yet  these  spots  become  increasingly  inefficient  as  the  novel  unveils  its 
 
dystopian side through its post-human face. It goes without saying that Super Sad True 
 
Love Story is a witty book, yet one can make a difference between the wit that is uttered 
 
by characters and in particular the narrator or Lenny himself and the humour that 
 
emanates from the entirety of novel. While the former is a linguistically agile trick that 
 
characters are able to produce, the latter is rather a laughter that passes through the 
 
characters/  assemblages  in  relation  to  other  characters.  In  other  words,  we  can 
 
distinguish two different tendencies in the novel. First, there are (mainly conscious) 
 
moments of witticism that produced by characters, and second there is the humour that 
 
characters perform without being aware of it. The former is more of an independent 
 
nature and is revealed in the middle of a dismal and critical situation and in an 
 
entertaining linguistic form, whereas the latter depends on the whole the network of the 
 
novel and takes almost all parts into account. This is the surprising ability of an 
 
immanent laughter that only the omniscient reader is able to perceive for it does not 
 
depend on one specific character, rather it is the result of interrelation between all 
 
subjects/ assemblages who are being ridiculed. The following passage is emblematic of 
 
the way laughter of subjects (at other subjects)should be distinguished from their 
 
experience of humour (towards oneself). In this text Lenny’s parents who travel around 
 
and even laugh at the neighbours are being derided towards the end of the novel. 
 
 
Mrs. Fine made a distasteful face. She had helped drag my parents into 
the American continuum, had taught them to gargle and wash out sweat 
stains, but their inbred Soviet Jewish conservatism had ultimately 
repulsed her. She had known me since I was born, back when the 
Abramov mishpocheh lived in Queens in a cramped garden apartment that 
now elicits nothing but nostalgia, but which must have been a mean and 
sorrowful place all the same. My father had a janitorial job out at a Long 
Island government laboratory, a job that kept us in Spam for the first ten 
years of my life. My mother celebrated my birth by being promoted from 
clerk/typist to secretary at the credit union where she bravely labored 
minus English language skills, and all of a sudden we were really on our 
way to becoming lower-middle-class. In those days, my parents used to 
drive me around in their rusted Chevrolet Malibu Classic to neighbors 
poorer than our own, so that we could both laugh at the ragtag brown 
people scurrying about in their sandals and pick up important lessons 
about what failure would mean in America. It was after my parents told 
Mrs. Fine about our little slamming forays into 
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Corona and the safer parts of Bed-Stuy that the rupture between her 
and my family truly began. I remember my parents looking up ‗cruel‘ 
in the English-Russian dictionary, shocked that our American mama 
could possibly think that of us (Shteyngart, 11). 
 
 
 
Yet the question that remains is what makes this novel a humiliation of 
 
subjects,  among them  witty characters. After all  why should witty characters be 
 
ridiculed? Isn‘t the wit they produce a component of the humoureme we have already 
 
discussed? I think the question to this answer and the crucial difference we should make 
 
between humoureme and witticism is laid in the nature of society or the network of 
 
relations these subjects are entangled in. Super Sad True Love Story depicts a near 
 
future society, if not a world which is utterly engaged in an Information age and finance 
 
network of relations. Ironically enough, the lines that the characters are producing, the 
 
‗map‘ or the cartography as Deleuze and Guattari would put it, are not an solely an 
 
imposition that descends from the state. In effect, although many subjects as depicted in 
 
Super Sad True Love Story have been able to transcend the state boundaries and have 
 
succeeded in deterritorialisation, they can be ridiculed. The reason is  offered by 
 
Deleuze‘s Postscript on Control Societies. In effect, any act that transcends state 
 
boundaries is not equal to freedom, it can result in a new mode of control as pictured in 
 
Super Sad True Love Story. By applying this to humour, one can state that although the 
 
book is replete with wit, this whole witticism is not enough to resist humiliation. This 
 
gets more interesting when one notices that these various layers involved make a 
 
collective humour possible and participate in its production without desiring it. As 
 
folds in a Deleuzian conception, a cartography can be imagined to show that it is in the 
 
relation between assemblages that a collective humiliation takes place. 
 
 
 
I did not have a girl waiting for me in New York, I wasn‘t sure I even 
had a job waiting for me in New York after my failures in Europe, so I 
really wanted to screw Fabrizia. She was the softest woman I had ever 
touched, the muscles stirring somewhere deep beneath her skin like 
phantom gears, and her breath, like her son‘s, was shallow and hard, so 
that when she ―made the love‖ (her words), it sounded like she was in 
danger of expiring (Shteyngart, 16). 
 
 
 
The nonsensical repetition of the deeds, words and thoughts of the characters 
 
in the novel which are sufficiently entertaining, can be regarded as the absence of 
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humoureme or the direct result of the inability to detach from themselves or laugh at 
 
themselves. All assemblages are deeply engaged with themselves and even if there is 
 
witticism at work, it is through unavoidable repetition that such partitioned socius 
 
presents itself. Such a state in which humoureme is made impossible paves the path for 
 
a state of humiliation which renders nearly all assemblages involved ridiculous. Super 
 
Sad True Love Story offers various formal and linguistically functional paths to 
entertain the reader with its wit, yet what makes the reader laugh more is the 
 
cartography of humiliation different assemblages involved inflict on one another. This 
 
cartography is made possible through the relation of assemblages to one another. While 
 
the wit inherent in one-liners is determined to be entertaining, the cartography of 
 
humour in such a setting as in Super Sad True Love Story shows that assemblages 
 
involved are not determined to be humorous and even entertaining, yet they turn out to 
 
be ridiculed. Somber and serious assemblages, even gloomy with a tip, a sharp tip can 
 
make humour possible, the tip that connects one assemblage‘s point if view to another. 
 
 
I told her she should move to New York with me. She told me she was 
probably a lesbian. I told her my work was my life, but I still had room 
for love. She told me love was out of the question. I told her my 
parents were Russian immigrants who lived in New York. She told me 
hers were Korean immigrants who lived in Fort Lee, New Jersey. I told 
her my father was a retired janitor who liked to go fishing. She told me 
her father was a podiatrist who liked to punch his wife and two 
daughters in the face (Shteyngart, 24). 
 
None of the settings described in the Super Sad True Love Story such 
 
as streets replete with soldiers or the threatening invasion of China to the US, is 
 
as horrific and yet constructive in the formation of this inhuman humour as the 
 
insane and overwhelming information which has the upper hand upon all 
 
subjects. They prefer streaming information through their apparati or their 
 
extremely smart phones. The novel is playful both in language and 
 
performances depicted, but it also reveals a constant juxtaposition between its 
 
subjects to unveil a new derision. Lenny and Eunice, for instance in being open 
 
to one another both in their diary or in their daily communications, display a 
 
playful subject but in the face of their derision they picture how vulnerable they 
 
are. 
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Eunhee, How are you today. I hope you do not worry yourself. It is 
nice you write to Sally. Little sister always look up to big sister. Me 
and Daddy went to church and we talk together to Reverend Cho. I 
make sorry to Daddy that I all the time am unconsiderate of how hard 
he work and that he need everything just perfect, specially soon-dubu 
which is his favorite! Daddy promise that if he not feel well FIRST we 
pray together to GOD for guide us THEN he hit. Then Reverend Cho 
read to us Scripture which say woman is second to man. He say man is 
head and woman is leg or arm. Also we pray together and specially I 
unclude you and Sally because you and sister are all Daddy and me 
have. Otherwise we never leave Korea which is now richer country 
than America and also not have so much political problem, but how we 
were to know that when we leave? Now even in Fort Lee we see tank 
on Center Avenue. Very scary for me, like in Korea in 1980 long time 
ago when there was Kwangju trouble and many people die. I hope 
nothing happen in Manhathan to Sally.  
So because we leave for you everything behind, you now have big 
responsibility to Daddy and Mommy and Sister. :)  
I just learn how to make happy sign. Do you like it? Haha. Make me 
pride of you and expect of you like before.  
I love you always. 
Mommy (Shteyngart, 46). 
 
 
 
Inhuman  humour  is  able  to  juxtapose  what  has  been  said  far  earlier  to 
 
something else unexpectedly to make it humorous, as if there is memory beyond the 
 
memory of characters at work throughout the novel, a long term memory. The presence 
 
of a fool normally dispenses with the urge for having such long-term memory simply 
 
because he is constantly unveiling the hypocrisy involved in different assemblages and 
 
he does it spontaneously; hence there is no accumulation of the rift as is absorbed in this 
 
long-term memory humour. The dystopian world which arises gradually out of the 
 
witty and amusing atmosphere of the novel is emblematic of the fact that such wit 
 
cannot play the role of humoureme. But more importantly is the mechanism inherent in 
 
wit which excludes anxiety rather than re-orientating it towards a vital force. 
 
 
My sadness filled the room, took over its square, simple contours, 
crowding out even Joshie's spontaneous rose-petal door. ''I didn't mean 
that,'' Joshie said. ''Not just a lot of life. Maybe forever. But you can't 
fool yourself into thinking that's a certainty.''  
''You will see me die someday,'' I said, and immediately felt bad for 
saying it. I tried, as I had done since childhood, to feel nonexistence. I 
forced coldness to run through the natural humidity of my hungry second-
generation-immigrant body. I thought of my parents. We would be all 
dead together. Nothing would remain of our tired, broken race. My 
mother had brought three adjoining plots at a Long Island Jewish 
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cemetery. ''Now we can be together forever,'' she had told me, and I had 
nearly broken down in tears at her misplaced optimism, at the notion that 
she would want to spend her idea of eternity- and what could her eternity 
possibly comprise?-- with her failure of a son (Shteyngart, 126). 
 
 
 
There is a material facet to this inhuman humour: what has been said, what is 
known or the difference an assemblage is maintaining can be the material for such 
inhuman humour in relation to another knowledge or different point of view. In an 
abstract absolute dystopian sense, all particles of difference take part in the production 
of such inhuman humour and yet Super Sad True Love Story depicts a majority of 
viewpoints involved in the production of such undesired laughter. What has been 
appreciated long before can be located in a new apparatus and a new relation where 
this juxtaposition makes it look ridiculous. Yet since there is no subject in charge of 
this humour, the same can be applied to the new point of view that makes the old one 
look hilarious later after a while. 
 
 
What is happening in Super Sad True Love Story as a post-human state where 
diaries of Lenny Abramov and the online posts of Eunice illustrate an oscillation between 
a tragic setting towards a comic one. One reason is that emotions play a less significant 
role and this fits the Bergsonian depiction of the comic as bereft of humour. The fact is 
that the assemblages are able to produce humoureme (as is shown in some instances) but 
it is implemented in regard to others rather than to themselves and their own difference. 
This accumulates virtual humour for inhuman laughter in a more abrupt manner. Putting 
it differently, when an assemblage which is always able to produce humoureme avoids 
applying it inside and takes its knowledge and difference for granted, despite its will, it 
becomes a victim of inhuman laughter. Instead of an active kinetic laughter where an 
assemblage is able to enjoy its own mockery, the sound of a dystopian laughter that is 
emblematic of humiliation is constantly heard. 
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Figure 18. Unica Zürn.Untitled. 1966 
 
 
 
When Eunice is presented as a full, autonomous subject or when Lenny is a 
shaped and independent creature, their encounter or their relation makes both look 
ridiculous. Super Sad True Love Story presents almost perfectly a state where nobody 
is able to produce humoureme and yet they do not manage to avoid humiliation as in 
their relation to other assemblages they becomes objects of humour, they are 
humiliated by one another without even desiring it. The inhuman laughter that is able 
to insert humour in relations and humiliate can make use of any materialistic 
accessories: the accessories that one can never imagine can play a role in one‘s 
humiliation. Humiliation, which plays a prominent role historically and in today‘s 
various confrontations, be it interpersonal or international, can be seen in relation to 
the immanent and materialistic abilities of such laughter. 
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Appendix : Frank. Manfred. Transcript from his Vom Lachen. Über Komik, Witz und Ironie. 
 
Überlegungen im Ausgang von der Frühromantik. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vom Lachen. Über Komik, Witz und Ironie. Überlegungen im Ausgang 
 
von der Frühromantik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wird von einer Theorie der Intelligenz geurteilt, sie sei selbst intelligent, so gilt das 
als schmeichelhaft. Aber eine Theorie des Lächerlichen soll selbst nicht lächerlich 
sein – auch wenn in diesem Sammelband viel, ja alles versucht wurde, Sie durch 
Theorie(n) zum Lachen zu bringen. Dafür sind wir den Akteuren gewiss dankbar. 
Aber Hand aufs Herz: Was haben wir dadurch übers Lachen gelernt? 
 
 
Eine lächerliche Theorie des Lachens scheint etwas Unangemessenes zu sein. Das 
geben wir ohne Weiteres zu. Womit begründen wir aber unsere spontane 
Zustimmung? 
 
 
Offenbar fallen die Sätze einer Theorie, und zumal einer philosophischen, nicht selbst 
in den Skopus dessen, worüber sie sprechen. Die Theologie ist nicht (notwendig) 
selbst fromm, die Kriminologie (normalerweise) nicht selbst kriminell, die Unschärfe-
Relation (wahrscheinlich) nicht selbst unscharf, und – obwohl das den politischen 
Wächtern unserer Wissenschaftspraxis nur schwer beizubringen ist – die Theorie des 
Neomarxismus ist per se nicht marxistisch. Dergleichen Verwechslungen 
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nennt man in meinem Fach bald ‚Kategorienfehler‘ (category mistakes), bald ‚Fehler 
durch Typensprünge‘. Bei Kategorien-Verwechslungen werden Tatsachen eines 
bestimmten Sachbereichs so dargestellt, als gehörten sie zu einer bestimmten 
logischen Kategorie, während sie in Wirklichkeit unter eine andere fallen. Denken Sie 
sich einen Ausländer, der nach Oxford kommt. Man zeigt ihm der Reihe nach 
Colleges, Bibliotheken, Sportplätze, Museen, Laboratorien und Verwaltungsgebäude. 
 
Er sagt: „Schön, jetzt weiß ich, wo ihr die Post beantwortet, Gutachten schreibt, 
Tierversuche durchführt, Seminare abhaltet und Tennis spielt – aber wo zum Teufel ist 
denn eigentlich die Uni?― Oder: Ein Südseeinsulaner – so einer muss es sein: sonst 
würde der Rassismus unserer Beispiele arbeitslos – sieht seinem ersten Fußballspiel zu. 
Man erklärt ihm die Funktion des Torwarts, der Stürmer, Verteidiger, des 
 
Schiedsrichters usw., und er sagt nach einer Weile: „O.k., aber da ist doch niemand, 
der den berühmten Mannschaftsgeist beisteuert. Ich sehe, wer angreift, wer verteidigt, 
wer die gelbe Karte zeigt und pfeift, aber niemanden, der den Mannschaftsgeist 
verbreitet.―
13
 Der Irrtum besteht in der Unfähigkeit der beiden Sprecher, gewisse 
 
Begriffe (wie „Universität― oder „Mannschaftsgeist―) richtig zu verwenden, sie 
nämlich nicht als Klassifikationsausdrücke, sondern als Namen zu behandeln. 
 
 
Die andere Konfusionsquelle (von Russell und Whitehead aufgedeckt) sind „die 
Fehler durch Typensprünge―: In ihnen werden Regeln (höherer Stufe) nicht auf das, 
was unter sie fällt, sondern auf sich selbst angewandt, also sich selbst als ihre eigenen 
 
Prädikate zugelegt. Dadurch entstehen Paradoxe wie „Der Begriff ‚imprädikabel‘ ist 
prädikabel― oder „was ich hier gerade behaupte, ist gelogen―. Solchen Fehlern 
haftet grundsätzlich etwas Komisches an, wie – pars pro toto – aus dem Beispiel des 
 
13
  GILBERT RYLE, Der Begriff des Geistes. Stuttgart 1969, S. 13 ff., 19 ff., passim. 
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Sophisten Protagoras erhellt: Protagoras hat mit seinem Schüler Euathlos einen Vertrag 
abgeschlossen, wonach Euathlos, gewinnt er nach der Ausbildung auch nur eine einzige 
Streitsache, seinem Lehrer dafür bezahlen muss. Nun gewinnt er, wie abzusehen war, 
keine einzige und hat damit, sagt Protagoras, soeben eine gewonnen, nämlich die gegen 
den Lehrer selbst: Also muss er in die Tasche greifen und löhnen.
14 
 
 
Gewöhnlich scheuen die Philosophie die Lächerlichkeit wie die fromme Seele den 
Teufel. Was wäre auch komischer als ein lächerlicher Weltweiser? Über diese 
Grenzmöglichkeit wacht das Emblem des auf allen Vieren durch den Hof Philipps 
von Makedonien kriechenden Weiberhassers Aristoteles, den die schöne Hetäre 
Phyllis reitend mit einem Peitschlein traktiert. Und doch sind die Anekdoten-Bücher 
voll von Witzen über lächerliche Philosophen. Würde ich auch nur einige davon 
erzählen, so bräuchte ich Platz für einen weiteren Aufsatz. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fast alle mir bekannten philosophischen Theorien des Lachens (von Cicero über 
Hutcheson bis Bergson) sind sich über eine Bestimmung einig: Das Lachen reagiert 
auf eine Unangemessenheit. Schopenhauer bestimmt sie 1819 präziser als die 
 
„plötzlich wahrgenommene Inkongruenz zwischen einem Begriff und den realen 
Objekten, die durch ihn, in irgend einer Beziehung, gedacht worden waren.―
15
 Ein 
Beispiel liefert das folgende Epigramm: 
Bav‘ ist der treue Hirt, von dem die Bibel sprach: 
Wenn seine Heerde schläft, bleibt er allein noch wach. 
 
 
14 H. DIEHLS/W. KRANZ, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin/Dublin 71954, Protagoras 80 A1, A4. 
 
15 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. I Band, § 13 (= Werke in zehn 
Bänden, Zürcher Ausgabe [zit.: ZA], Zürich 1977, I, S. 96.
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Hier wird unter den Begriff eines bei der schlafenden Herde wachenden Hirten der 
langweilige Prediger subsumiert, der nach seiner Art die Gemeinde einschläfert „und 
nun―, wie Schopenhauer sich ausdrückt, „ungehört allein fortbelfert― //ZA III, 
111). Eine ähnlich komische Wirkung tut die Grabschrift eines Arztes: „Hier liegt er, 
wie ein Held in der Schlacht, und um ihn her ruht das Heer der Erschlagenen.― Die 
 
Inschrift subsumiert unter den für Helden ehrenvollen Begriff des 
 
„Ein-ganzes-Heer-geschlagen-Habens― die Leistung des Arztes, was zwar 
(wenigstens damals) durchaus 
 
realistisch, aber nicht im Geiste des Lebens-Erhaltungs-Gebots der Ärztekammer ist (l. 
c.). – Oder wenn „Einer an ein eben getrautes Paar, dessen weibliche Hälfte ihm 
gefiel, die Worte der Schiller‘schen Ballade― richtete: „Ich sei, erlaubt mir die Bitte, | 
In eurem Bunde der Dritte―, so ist die Wirkung des Lächerlichen unausbleiblich, weil 
unter den Begriff eines von Schiller als moralisch edel gedachten Verhältnisses das 
eines menage à trois subsumiert wird, was logisch nicht unmöglich, aber dem 
Comment der gutbürgerlichen Ehe eher unangemessen ist (l. c., 114 f.). Viele witzige 
Oxymora sind von dieser Art, so die Rede von der „freien Lohnarbeit― oder dem 
 
„zwanglosen Zwang des besseren Arguments― oder der „Autonomie der 
Hochschule― oder der „Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre―. 
 
 
Halten wir jetzt nur die Struktur dieser Inkongruenz fest. Sie besteht – noch einmal – in 
der „paradoxe[n] Subsumtion eines Gegenstandes unter einen ihm übrigens heterogenen 
Begriff―. Mit Lachen – einer spontan und unverabredet sich einstellenden Reaktion – 
drücken wir aus, dass wir eine „Inkongruenz [wahrgenommen haben] zwischen einem 
solchen Begriff und dem durch denselben gedachten realen 
Gegenstand, also zwischen dem Abstrakten und dem Anschaulichen― (l. c., 109). Die 
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Inkongruenz kann – wie wir eingangs sahen – auch auftreten als Effekt der 
Selbstanwendung eines Prädikats unter Vernachlässigung des Typensprungs 
(zwischen Objekt- und Meta-Ebene): dann haben wir den kompromittierenden Fall 
der selbst lächerlichen Lach-Theorie oder des antiken Philosophen, der die These 
vertrat, Lachen sei ein geselliges Phänomen. Als er von seinem Diener einmal in 
seinem einsamen Arbeitszimmer schallend lachend angetroffen und gefragt wurde, 
warum er denn lache, da er doch ganz allein sei, antwortete er: „Eben drum.― 
 
 
So hat uns die Wahrnehmung der Kluft zwischen einer Philosophie des Lachens und 
einer selbst lächerlichen Philosophie auf einen Gedanken geführt, bei dem wir einen 
Augenblick verweilen wollen. Wie viele richtige Überlegungen ist er überhaupt nicht 
originell, auch wenn der stark paranoische Schopenhauer ihn mit den folgenden 
Worten einführt: 
 
Kants und Jean Pauls Theorien des Lächerlichen sind bekannt. Ihre Unrichtigkeit 
nachzuweisen halte ich für überflüssig; da Jeder, welcher gegebene Fälle des 
Lächerlichen auf sie zurückzuführen versucht, bei den allermeisten die Ueberzeugung 
von ihrer Unzulänglichkeit sofort erhalten wird (l. c., 109). 
 
Das wollen wir doch einmal an den geschmähten Texten überprüfen. Kants berühmte 
Erklärung des Lachens findet sich in einer Anmerkung am Schluss der Deduktion der 
 
ästhetischen Urteile (§ 54 der „Kritik der Urteilskraft― von 1790). Den Kontext 
bildet einer resümierende Reflexion über den Unterschied des ästhetisch (im 
reflektierenden Urteil) Geschätzten vom bloß in der Empfindung Gefallenden (dem 
Vergnüglichen als einem dem Lebensgefühl förderlichen Affekt). Musik (nach ihrer 
reizenden Seite hin) sowie Scherz und Witz finden (wenigstens teilweise) ihren Ort in 
der Sphäre des Angenehmen und Vergnüglichen; darum glaubt Kant, von ihnen nur 
eine psychologisch-physiologische Erklärung (im Stile Burkes und Humes) geben zu 
können. Das Lachen, heißt es dort, ist „ein Affekt―, der entsteht „aus der plötzlichen 
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Verwandlung einer gespannten Erwartung in nichts― (l. c.). Diese Verwandlung mag 
 
für den Verstand enttäuschend sein, körperlich wird sie erlebt als eine (wie Freud es 
 
nennen wird) Energieeinsparung oder –abfuhr, die den Kopf entlastet und dem Leib 
 
zugute kommt. Kant belegt seine These mit einigen Beispielen. Ich will sie hier 
 
wiedergeben, da Schopenhauer ihre Triftigkeit so arrogant bestritten hat und weil sie 
 
dem Vorurteil vom trockenen Stubengelehrten Kant, der vielmehr von seinen 
Studenten und Kollegen „magister elegantissimus― genannt wurde, launig zu 
 
widersprechen helfen: 
 
Wenn jemand erzählt: daß ein Indianer [man achte übrigens wieder auf den latenten 
Rassismus unserer wissenschaftlichen Beispiel-Sätze!], der an der Tafel eines 
Engländers in Surate eine Bouteille mit Ale öffnen und alles Bier, in Schaum 
verwandelt, herausdringen sah, mit vielen Ausrufungen seine große Verwunderung 
anzeigte, und auf die Frage des Engländers: was ist denn hier sich so sehr zu 
verwundern? Antwortete: Ich wundere mich auch nicht darüber, daß es herausgeht, 
sondern wir ihrs habt hineinkriegen können; so lachen wir, und es macht uns eine 
herzliche Lust: nicht, weil wir uns etwa klüger finden als diesen Unwissenden, oder 
sonst über etwas, was uns der Verstand hierin Wohlgefälliges bemerken ließe; sondern 
unsre Erwartung war gespannt, und verschwindet plötzlich in nichts. Oder wenn der 
Erbe eines reichen Verwandten diesem sein Leichenbegängnis recht feierlich 
veranstalten will, aber klagt, daß es ihm hiermit nicht recht gelingen wolle; den (sagt 
er): je mehr ich meinen Trauerleuten Geld gebe [,] betrübt auszusehen, desto lustiger 
sehen wie aus; so lachen wir laut, und der Grund liegt darin, daß eine Erwartung sich 
plötzlich in nichts verwandelt. Man muß wohl bemerken: daß sie sich nicht in das 
positive Gegenteil eines erwarteten Gegenstandes – denn das ist immer etwas, und 
kann oft betrüben –, sondern in nichts verwandeln müsse. Denn wenn jemand uns mit 
der Erzählung einer Geschichte große Erwartung erregt, und wir beim Schlusse die 
Unwahrheit derselben sofort einsehen, so macht es uns Missfallen; wie z. B. die von 
Leuten, welche vor großem Gram in einer Nacht graue Haare bekommen haben sollen. 
Dagegen, wenn auf eine dergleichen Erzählung zur Erwiderung, ein anderer Schalk 
sehr umständlich den Gram eines Kaufmanns erzählt, der, aus Indien mit allem seinem 
Vermögen in Waren nach Europa zurückkehrend, in einem schweren Sturm alles über 
Bord zu werfen genötigt wurde, und sich dermaßen grämte, daß ihm darüber in 
derselben Nacht die Perücke grau ward; so lachen wir, und es macht uns Vergnügen, 
weil wir hier unsern eignen Missgriff nach einem für uns übrigens gleichgültigen 
Gegenstande, oder vielmehr unsere verfolgte Idee, wie einen Ball, noch eine Zeitlang 
hin- und herschlagen, indem wir bloß gemeint sind ihn zu greifen und festzuhalten (l. 
c., B 226 f.). 
 
 
Ich habe immer gefunden, dass Kants Definition besonders gut auf die Physiognomie 
 
des Kölner Humors passt. Ein Stück von dessen Charme besteht ja darin, dass er 
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hochfliegende Weltveränderungs-Wünsche auf eine unreaktionäre Weise an die 
Unabänderlichkeit der Wirklichkeit verweist: Die Pointe der Witze ist oft der 
Nachweis, dass wir die Wirklichkeit fast immer auf die Weise verändern, dass wir 
unsere Einstellung zu ihrer Veränderbarkeit verändern. So in dem Witz von Tünnes, 
der traurig ist, weil er „in ‗e Botz maach‘―. Schääl verschreibt ihm hellsichtig eine 
 
Analyse beim Psyscho-Psyscho―. Als er ihm nach drei Monaten Analyse, vor Freude 
von einem Bein aufs andere hüpfend, wieder begegnet, fragt er: „Bisse nu nisch mehr 
truurisch?― „Enee.― „Maach‘ se nisch mer in ‗e Botz?― ―Edoch!― „Ja, waröm 
bisse denn dann so fröhlisch?― „Isch machen mer nix mer druss!― – Und da ich 
einmal dran bin (und selbst aus dem Rheinland komme): Ein rheinisches Ehepaar hat 
Besuch und erzählt den Gästen: „Kürzlisch warem mer em Restorang. Da hän mer en 
Schwiinebroote jekresch, dä‗ wor so fätt, dat ma e‗ nisch ässe kunt.― Es entsteht ein 
peinliches Schweigen, dann fragen die Gaste: „Jo, un wat häät ehr dann mit dem fätte 
 
Schwiinebroote jemaach‘?― – „Na, mer han ‗e dann doch jejässe.― – Hier wird eine 
Erwartung hochgespannt (beide Mal durch die Behauptung der Unerträglichkeit eines 
Zustandes), und die Erwartung bricht mit dem Nachweis der Doch-Erträglichkeit 
buchstäblich in nichts zusammen. 
 
 
Noch ein Witz, den mir der Kölner Karl Heinz Bohrer erzählt hat, als ich ihm von der 
Grundthese meines Vortrags in einem Turiner Café berichtete: Tünnes trifft Schäl, der 
eben von einer Safari in Afrika zurück gekommen ist. „Jou, Schäl, wievill Löwe hässe 
denn jeschosse?― Antwort: „Kein.― „Wie, kein?― „Ei, för Löwe is dat vill!― 
 
 
So hat denn die breite Diskussion um die Ursachen des Lachens Kants Theorie nicht 
im Positiven widersprochen, sondern nur in dem, was von ihr nicht erklärt wird. 
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Werfen wir blitzschnell einen Blick auf die Tradition: Das Lächerliche (gelo¡on) – der 
 
Gegenstand beziehungsweise Grund des Gelächters – ist von Platon und Aristoteles 
 
als  „ein  Mangel  oder  etwas  Schimpfliches―  („Poetik―  1449  a  33  f.)  –  freilich 
 
harmloser Natur – behandelt worden. In der rhetorischen Tradition zählt es wesentlich 
 
unter strategischen Gesichtspunkten (es gilt, den Gegner dem Gelächter auszusetzen). 
 
Soviel ich weiß, gibt es erst seit dem 17. und 18. Jahrhundert so etwas wie eine 
 
Analyse des Phänomens als solchen – unabhängig von den Gefühlen, die es in uns 
 
auslöst; und von La Bruyère bis Hegel und später verständigt man sich auf dem 
 
Aspekt  der  „Inkongruenz―  zwischen  Sein  und  Anmaßung  einer  Person  –  womit 
 
übrigens zugleich meine Behauptung der Unoriginalität Schopenhauers erhärtet wird: 
 
„Ein lächerliches Objekt ist ein solches, was uns die Vorstellung einer 
unbeträchtlichen, uninteressanten und nicht allzu gewöhnlichen Ungereimtheit 
darbietet― (FRIEDRICH JUSTUS RIEDEL, Theorie der schönen Künste und 
Wissenschaften, 
2
1774, S. 105). 
 
„Les objets nous paroi[ss]ent ridicules toutes les fois que nous apercevons dans eux 
de l‘incongruité― [Die Dinge erscheinen uns jedesmal lächerlich, wenn wir  
Inkongruenz in ihnen entdecken] (ALEXANDER GERARD, Essai sur le got.. 
Paris/Dijon 1766, S. 82). 
 
„Das Lächerliche entspringt aus einem sittlichen Kontrast, der auf eine unschädliche 
Weise für die Sinne in Verbindung gebracht wird― (JOHANN WOLFGANG  
GOETHE, Die Wahlverwandtschaften, I. 2, Kap. 4). 
 
„Lächerlich  kann  jeder  Kontrast  des  Wesentlichen  und  seiner  Erscheinung,  des  
Zwecks und der Mittel werden, ein Widerspruch, durch den sich die Erscheinung in 
sich selbst aufhebt, und der Zweck in seiner Realisation sich selbst um sein Ziel 
bringt― (GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, Ästhetik, hg. von Friedrich 
Bassenge, Berlin 1955, S. 52). 
 
 
Solcher Einigkeit in der Phänomenbeschreibung entspricht nicht eine ebensolche in 
 
der Erklärung des Affekts, der sich im Lachen ausdrückt. Während viele Erklärer das 
 
Lachhafte für einen Zug der Sache selbst halten, hat zumal die mit Thomas Hobbes 
 
(1588-1679) einsetzende britische Tradition (z. B. Hutcheson und J. Beattie) das 
 
Lächerliche in die Auffassungsweise des betrachtenden Subjekts verlegt. Diese 
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Subjektivierung, in die sich auch Kants Definition des Lachens einfügt, ist in Jean 
 
Pauls Vorschule der Ästhetik von 1812
16
  für das ganze 19. Jahrhundert folgenreich 
 
auf den Punkt gebracht worden. Da das Lächerliche nicht aus einem Mangel des 
 
Herzens, sondern des Verstandes entspringt (so schon La Bruyère), kann es geradehin 
 
„das Unverständige― (l. c.) heißen. Es weist „drei Bestandteile― auf: den „sinnlichen 
 
Kontrast―, der anschaulich wird in einer Handlung oder Situation, den 
 
„objektiven―  Kontrast  als  „Widerspruch,  worin  das  Bestreben  und  das  Sein  des 
 
lächerlichen Wesens mit dem sinnlich angeschaueten Verhältnis steht―; endlich den 
 
„subjektiven― Kontrast, der den objektiven allererst erzeugt, weil nichts an ihm selber 
 
lächerlich ist: erst unsere „Seele und Ansicht― tragen diesen Zug in die Sache hinein (l. 
 
c., 114 u.): 
 
Wenn Sancho eine Nacht hindurch sich über einem seichten Graben in der Schwebe 
erhielt, weil er voraussetzte, ein Abgrund gaffe unter ihm: so ist bei dieser 
Voraussetzung seine Anstrengung recht verständig, und er wäre gerade erst toll, wenn 
er die Zerschmetterung wagte. Warum lachen wir gleichwohl? Hier kommt der 
Hauptpunkt: wir leihen seinem Bestreben unsere Einsicht und Ansicht und erzeugen 
durch einen solchen Widerspr5uch die unendliche Ungereimtheit [...], so daß also das 
Komische, wie das Erhabene, nie im Objekte wohnt, sondern im Subjekte (l. c., 110). 
 
 
Vor Jean Paul hatte insbesondere Ludwig Tieck in frühen Entwürfen eines 
 
unvollendet gebliebenen „Buchs über Shakespeare― 
17
 (Aufzeichnungen, deren 
 
Originalität in einem ungünstigen Verhältnis zu ihrer Unbekanntheit stehen) – ich 
 
sage: schon um 1794 hatte Tieck solch subjektive Einstellungs-Veränderung als einem 
 
Wesenszug menschlicher Subjektivität verständlich zu machen versucht. Es sei die 
 
innere Transzendenz des Subjekts, die alle Weltgegenstände überschreite und so einen 
 
Abstand zwischen ihnen selbst und dem auftue, als was sie im subjektiven Entwurf 
 
 
 
16 JEAN PAUL, Vorschule der Ästhetik. I. Abteilung, IV. Programm, § 28: „Untersuchung des Lächerlichen―. In:  
Ders., Werke in zwölf Bänden. Hrsg. v. NORBERT MILLER, München 1975, Bd. 9, S. 109 ff. 
 
17 LUDWIG TIECK, Das Buch über Shakespeare. Handschriftliche Aufzeichnungen von L. Tieck. Hrsg. 
v. HENRY LÜDEKE, Halle 1920 [zit.: BüSh].
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erscheinen. Dieser Abstand zwischen Sein und Entwurf kann eins von beiden unter 
Umständen lächerlich erscheinen lassen.
18
 Jedenfalls könnte ein Wesen, das nicht in 
ungleichen Momenten existierte, nie in eine spannungsreiche Beziehung zu seinem 
Gewordensein geraten. Es könnte nicht lachen; ja ihm wäre nicht einmal die 
Bedeutung des Ausdrucks „lachen― beizubringen. 
 
 
 
Tieck hat seine Überlegungen über „das Wesen des Lächerlichen― (BüSh, 18) beim 
Lesen von Shakespeare-Komödien entwickelt und mit dem (berechtigten) 
Überlegenheitsgefühl des (in Dingen der Theorie raffinierteren) Frühromantikers gegen 
eine ganze Tradition (z. B. „Hobbes―) abgesetzt. Die Tradition habe insgesamt die 
Erfahrung ek-statischen Selbstseins verdrängt und an die Darstellbarkeit von in sich 
gegründeten und gegründeten, vor Pausbäckigkeit wie ein Kinderpopo leuchtenden und 
von ihrer Entelechie determinierten Charakteren geglaubt: „So mußt du sein, dir kannst du 
nicht entfliehen―, wie der Olympier sagt. Gäbe es sie, so müsste ihnen die Zeit so 
äußerlich bleiben wir der aufgehenden Sonne der Uhrzeigerstand auf dem Zifferblatt. 
Aber etwas, das sich darin erschöpft, das zu sein, was es ist (ob Charakter oder Ding), ist 
nach unseren bisherigen Einsichten nicht lächerlich. Das Gelächter taucht in einer Welt 
von objektiven Bestimmtheiten erst durch ein solches Wesen auf, das über seine eigene 
Objektivität immer schon hinaus ist und darum im Abstand von sich selbst – ganz 
wörtlich: ek-sistiert, „aus sich heraussteht―. „Das Bewußtseyn―, notiert Tiecks Freund 
Novalis, „ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn―.
19
 Und er versäumt auch nicht, die 
„bedeutungsvolle Etymologie dieses Worts―, nämlich „ek-sistiert―, herauszustreichen: 
„Das Ich existirt― meint: „Es findet sich, 
 
18 Vgl. MANFRED FRANK, Das Problem „Zeit“ in der dt. Romantik. 1. Aufl. München 1972, 2. 
Aufl. München-Paderborn-Wien 1990, S. 300 ff.
 
 
19 NOVALIS Schriften, Hrsg. v. RICHARD SAMMEL u. a. Stuttgart 1965 ff. II. Bd., S. 106, Nr. 2, Z. 4 [zit.: NS]. 
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außer sich― (l. c.,, 199, Nr. 282; S. 150, Nr. 98). Nur ein Wesen, denn kompaktes Sein in 
ein Selbst-Verhältnis sich zersetzt, also ein Wesen, das, statt einfachhin da zu sein, nur im 
Abstand einer Selbstdeutung existiert, nur ein solches Wesen kann auch in die Dinge oder 
fremden Charaktere und die zwischen ihnen waltenden Verhältnisse den 
 
„Widerspruch― hineintragen, der sein eigenes Sein charakterisiert. Anders gesagt: 
weil wir als Subjekte nicht auf die Weise mit uns identisch sind, wie es der Granit-
Block oder dies Pult sind, darum sind wir dem Gelächter ausgesetzte Wesen. Tiecks 
ganzes Werk illustriert diese Grunderfahrung. 
 
 
Unter den idealistischen Philosophen hat nur Schelling eine mit Tieck vergleichbare 
 
Theorie des Komischen entwickelt. In seiner „Philosophie der Kunst― von 1802 setzt 
er das Wesen des Komischen in „einen allgemeinen Gegensatz der Freiheit und der 
 
Nothwendigkeit―. Während in der Tragödie die Freiheit ins Subjekt falle, das dem 
notwendigen Gang des Schicksals erliegt, falle in der Komödie die Notwendigkeit ins 
 
Subjekt. Natürlich kann diese „Nothwendigkeit nur eine prätendirte, angenommene 
seyn― – wie die des Majors Tellheim, der seinen ehrbaren Starrsinn mit Sachzwängen 
begründet, die nur in seinem freien Willen liegen. So entlarve sich die prätendierte 
Notwendigkeit des komischen Charakters, der nun mal nicht anders könne, weil er nun 
mal so gefräßig oder so gutmütig oder so grausam sei, als „eine affektirte Absolutheit―, 
„die nun durch die Nothwendigkeit in der Gestalt der äußeren Differenz zu Schanden 
gemacht wird―.
20
 Anders gesagt: wir lachen, weil wir wissen, das Subjekte, die nicht 
anders handeln zu können behaupten, unglaubwürdig sind, dass unser Herz bei allen 
unseren Zuständen und Dispositionen immer leer bleibt, dass nichts es ist, das uns zu 
diesen, statt zu jenen Taten zwingt, so wie auch nichts es ist, 
 
20
 F. W. J. SCHELLINGS sämtliche Werke. Hrsg. v. K. F. A. SCHELLINGS, Stuttgart 1856-61, Bd. I/5, S. 712 
f. [zit.: SW]. 
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das uns von ihnen abhält. Dieses uns mit uns entzweiende Nichts kann uns, wie Tieck 
 
an vielen unheimlichen Beispielen gezeigt hat, in einen wahren Möglichkeitstaumel 
 
stürzen. Aber es kann uns auch unserer Lächerlichkeit überführen.
21 
 
 
 
Tieck redet von „Situationskomik―, wenn der Widerspruch zwischen zwei Vorhaben 
 
oder Zwecken eines Subjekts oder zwischen dessen Charakter und seiner Umgebung 
 
auftritt; von „Charakterkomik―, wenn das Subjekt mit einem seiner selbst lancierten 
 
Entwürfe in Widerspruch gerät. Die Situationskomik interessiert ihn nicht, sie bleibt 
 
ja dem Charakter äußerlich und nimmt keinen, auch nicht den ernsthaftesten, aus. (So 
 
uns hier Versammelte, die wir in der objektiv komischen Situation sind, an einer 
 
Universität zu lehren oder zu lernen, die das aus sachlichen Gründen längst nicht 
 
mehr gestattet.) Dagegen macht „der komische Charakter [...] die Situation 
 
lächerlich― (l. c., 18), indem er sein eigenes Sein von seinem Entwurf (oder „seinem 
 
moralischen Wesen―) abtrennt und die Differenz als „Mangel― aufscheinen lässt: 
 
Ein Betrunkener an sich ist nicht lächerlich, aber er wird es, sobald ihn ein guter 
Freund begegnet, der sich ganz ernsthaft einen vernünftigen Rat von ihm ausbäte. 
Molières Geiziger ist am lächerlichsten, wenn er gern freigiebig scheinen möchte, 
Shakespeares Dummköpfe, wenn sie sich klug stellen. In Tiere oder leblose Wesen, 
sagt der Spectator, die wir belachen sollen, tragen wir erst den Verstand hinein, aber 
ebenso den Widerspruch mit sich selbst, oder wenigstens mit dem, womit sie ein 
Ganzes ausmachen (l. c., 19). 
 
Die Komik setzt also Bewusstsein voraus, und sie entspringt genauer einem 
Widerspruch desselben zu seinem eigenen Begriff oder Wesen, von dem her es sich 
versteht. Diesen Widerspruch bringt die Situationskomik von außen ins Spiel, 
während die Charakterkomik dem unangemessenen Überstieg eines Bewusstseins 
 
über „sich selbst― entspringt. 
 
 
 
21
  Das war übrigens auch HENRI BERGSONS Überzeugung. In „Le rire. Essais ur la signification du 
comique― (von 1900, Paris: PUF, 1940, S. 80) sagt er: „Ce qu‘il y a e risible dans un cas comme dans l‘autre, 
c‘est une certaine raideur de mécanique là où l‘on voudrait trouver la souplesse attentive et la vivante flexibilité 
d‘une personne.― 
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Tiecks Überlegungen sind von einer recht originellen Beobachtung angeregt: „Fast alle 
komischen Charaktere Shakespeares sind etwas phlegmatisch― (l. c., 18). Tieck findet 
das „sehr natürlich― und erklärt es aus der eben gemachten Beobachtung: Wenn 
 
Komik das Ergebnis einer tätigen Selbstentzweiung ist, durch welche ein in Zukunft 
vorlaufender Entwurf gegen eine zurückbleibende, gleichsam träge oder substantielle 
Natur des Selbst absticht, so muss 
 
der Dichter [...] eine Eigenschaft [aufsuchen], die allen seinen körperlichen Gefühlen, 
allen unentwickelten Charakteren gemein ist, die Seelenträgheit, ein gewisses 
Phlegma, daher diese phlegmatische Gleichmütigkeit in allen komischen Charakteren. 
Nimmt man dieses Phlegma hinweg, so [...] wird der Charakter entweder ein 
ernsthafter oder ein witziger, man kann nicht mehr über ihn lachen (l. c., 21). 
 
 
Mit anderen Worten: die tätige Selbstentzweiung, durch welche ein Charakter sich über 
sich selbst „hinwegsetzt―, kann als komisch nur dann empfunden werden, wenn das 
Woraufhin der „Hinübersetzung― von der Trägheit der zurückbleibenden Natur als bloße 
Prätention desavouiert wird. So, wenn ein glühender Liebhaber sich selbst wie folgt 
charakterisiert: „Du weißt, ich bin ein Liebhaber, ich habe daher Langeweile, um zehn 
Morgen Landes damit zu besäen―.
22
 Wir lachen, wenn wir sehen, wie sich aus der 
Schwerkraft der „Seelenträgheit― (eines „mental habit―, z. B. Gefräßigkeit und 
 
Faulheit), gleichsam verflüssigt, eine aktuelle Gefühlsaufwallung (etwa Liebesglut) so 
aufschwingt, dass das sich „erwärmende― Gefühl nie ganz seinen phlegmatischen 
 
Bodensatz verleugnet oder seiner Schwerkraft entkommt. Dies ist z. B. bei den 
philanthropischen Gefühlsaufwallungen des hemmungslos egoistischen Königs in 
 
Tiecks Komödie „Der gestiefelte Kater― der Fall, dessen Sinn auf den Verzehr eines 
 
Kaninchens gerichtet ist. Als der Koch es ihm verbrannt serviert, bekommt er einen 
grauenhaften „Zufall― – so grauenhaft, dass er den „Don Carlos― und „Hamlet― zitiert: 
 
22
  Ludwig Tiecks nachgelassene Schriften. Hrsg. v. RUDOLF KÖPKE. Leipzig 1855, Bd. I, S. 80. 
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 König: 
Das Kaninchen ist verbrannt! – 
O Heer des Himmels! Erde? – Was sonst noch? 
Nenn‗ ich die Hölle mit? – 
 
Prinzessin: 
Mein Vater – 
 
König: 
Wer ist das? 
Durch welchen Missverstand hat dieser Fremdling 
Zu Menschen sich verirrt? – Sein Aug ist trocken! 
 
Alle erheben sich voll Besorgnis, Hanswurst läuft geschäftig hin wieder, Hinze bleibt 
sitzen und isst heimlich. 
 
Gib diesen Toten mir heraus. Ich muß 
Ihn wieder haben! 
 
Prinzessin: 
Hole doch einer schnell den Besänftiger. 
 
König:  
Der Koch Philipp sei das Jubelgeschrei der 
Hölle, wenn ein Undankbarer verbrannt wird!
23 
 
Von diesem „Zufall― kann den Monarchen – der bis in groteske Einzelheiten nach 
 
Zügen Friedrich Wilhelms II. gebildet ist – nur der eigens für solche Eventualitäten 
 
angestellte „Besänftiger― erlösen, und zwar durch Papagenos Glockenspiel. 
 
 
 
 
Der Besänftiger tritt mit einem Klockenspiele auf, das er sogleich spielt. 
 
König:  
Wie ist mir? – Weinen: Ach, ich habe schon wieder meinen Zufall gehabt. – Schafft 
mir den Anblick des Kaninchens aus den Augen. – Er legt sich voll Gram mit dem 
Kopf auf den Tisch und schluchzt. (l. c., 532 f.). 
 
 
An sich, bemerkt Tieck, ist die Schwerkraft des Charakters nicht komisch, sie kommt 
 
auch dem „ernsthaften― Charakter zu. Das bloß Flüchtige der „Hinübersetzung― ist es 
 
ebenso wenig, wenn es das Band, das es an die seelische Disposition zurückbindet, 
 
 
23
  Phantasus, Hrsg. v. MANFRED FRANK. Frankfurt a. M. 1985, S. 532. 
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einfach durchschneidet, wie es bei den „witzigen― Figuren, etwa der Beatrice aus Viel 
 
Lärm um Nichts, der Fall ist. Im Kommentar zu diesem Stück bemerkt Tieck: 
 
 
 
 
Dieser Witz läßt sich leichter mit ernsthaften Begebenheiten verschmelzen, als das 
eigentlich Komische, denn er ist an sich schon über das Komische erhaben, und jenes 
Phlegma, das dem Komischen so unentbehrlich ist, steht der Verbindung im Wege: 
Der Witz ist an sich flüchtiger, er fesselt auch das Interesse nicht so, als die vis 
comica der Charaktere (BüSh, 298). 
 
 
Witzig sind oft die Narren (etwa in Tiecks „Blaubart―); der Spaß, den ihre Reden 
 
erregen, ist mit der Ernsthaftigkeit ihres Charakters durchaus verträglich, so, wenn der 
 
arme, verkrüppelte Narr Claus witzig, aber keineswegs lächerlich, über den Wert 
 
seines von Blaubart bedrohten Lebens räsonniert: 
 
 
Was ist denn also das Leben für mich? Nichts als der große Fettschweif des 
Indianischen Schafs, es ist mir nur zur Last: ich bin nicht fröhlicher, als wenn ich 
vergesse, wer ich bin, ich diene dazu, andre zum Lachen zu bringen, und zwinge mich 
selbst zum Lachen, ich bin eine Medizin für verdorbene Mägen, ein Verdauungsmittel, 
die Hunde sehn mich von der Seite an, und ich habe es noch nie dahin gebracht, daß 
mich einer geliebt hätte. Aus welcher Ursache, meint Ihr nun wohl, sollte ich das 
Leben lieben? Und was ist denn das Leben selbst? Eine beständige Furcht vor dem 
Tode, wenn man an ihn denkt, und ein leerer, nüchterner Rausch, wenn man ihn 
vergisst, denn man verschwendet dann einen Tag nach dem andern, und vergißt 
darüber, daß die Gegenwart so klein ist, und daß jeder Augenblick vom 
nächstfolgenden verschlungen wird. Jeder Mensch wünscht alt zu werden, und 
wünscht damit nichts anders, als mit tausend Gebrechen, mit tausend Schmerzen in 
Bekanntschaft zu treten. Da schleichen sie denn ohne Zähne und ohne Wünsche, mit 
leerem zitternden Kopfe, mit Händen und Armen, die ihnen schon längst die Dienste 
aufgekündigt haben, und die nur noch als abgeschmackte Zieraten von den Schultern 
verwelkt herunter hängen, ihrem Grabe keuchend und hustend entgegen, dem sie auf 
keine Weise entlaufen können. Wer würde sich die Mühe nehmen, mich zu bedienen, 
mich zu trösten? Nein, gnädiger Herr, lasst mich / immer frisch hängen, Ihr habt ganz 
Recht, das wird wohl der beste Rat sein. 
24 
 
 
Tieck hat schließlich, als dritte Möglichkeit des Komischen, die vollkommene 
 
Verdunstung der Charaktersubstanz in ihre Entwürfe vorgesehen: so, wenn, in der 
 
„Verkehrten Welt―, der eben noch in verzweifelten Lyrismen sich ergehende 
 
 
24
  Ebd., S. 410 f. 
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Seelmann sein Robinson-Schicksal auf einer öden Felsklippe im weiten Meer 
übergangslos als Abwesenheit von Leihbibliotheken, Maskeraden und Bällen und 
eine zu große Entfernung vom Souffleur charakterisiert (l. c., 642). Man könnte vom 
komischen Vergessen sprechen. So mault der Zuschauer Müller im „Gestiefelten 
Kater―: „[...] der König bleibt seinem Charakter gar nicht getreu. [...] Das Ganze ist 
ausgemacht dummes Zeug, der Dichter vergißt immer selber, was er den Augenblick 
vorher gesagt hat― (l. c., 510). Das Publikum vergisst freilich nicht und reagiert auf 
den aller Charakter-Psychologie aufkündigenden Posten ungünstigenfalls mit Pochen 
und Pfeifen, günstigenfalls mit Lachen. Die Aufkündigung der Charaktere-
Psychologie ist nun freilich kein Versehen, sondern Ausdruck einer Einsicht in die 
Freiheit der Menschenseele, die, wie Schelling schrieb, nicht eine Eigenschaft ist, die 
der Mensch hätte, sondern die sein Wesen selbst ist.
25
 Ist Freiheit das Wesen des 
Menschen, dann ist Mensch-Sein eben das, was Tieck das Sich-über-sich-
Hinwegsetzen nennt. Siegt in diesem Überstieg einer der Pole über den anderen, so 
ergibt sich ein komischer Kontrast. Die Unentschiedenheit, die Tiecks beste Dramen 
auszeichnet, ist nicht mehr rein komisch: hier ist die Freiheit als ein Sein-in-
Möglichkeiten poetischer Stil geworden. In der Flüchtigkeit jeder Charakterzeichnung 
und Motivation spricht kaum hörbar die Einsicht mit, dass ein jeder von uns auch 
anders sein und anders handeln könnte. Durch diese implizite Relativierung der 
Endgültigkeit und Eindeutigkeit jedes Wortes, jeder Geste, jeder Kausalverknüpfung 
entsteht jene Tiecks Sprache eigene Heiterkeit und Schwerelosigkeit, jener 
„Aethergeist―, der dem Dichter die größte Freiheit über seinen Stoff sichert und den 
die Frühromantik „Ironie― nannte.
26 
 
25 F. W. J. SCHELLING, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42, Hrsg. v. Manfred Frank. Frankfurt a. M. 1977, S.  
65 ff. 
 
26 Phantasus (wie Anm―. 11), 1188 im Kontext; L. Tiecks Schriften. Berlin 1828-1854, Bd. 6, S. XXVIII f. 
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Wie der Witz tut auch se nicht notwendig die Wirkung des Lächerlichen. Darum hat 
 
die  berühmte  „romantische  Ironie―  auch  nie  den  Weg  ins  Herz  der  Deutschen 
 
gefunden,  die  den  herben  Kontrast  und  die  drastische  Geste  bevorzugen.  In  der 
 
Germanistik  des  Dritten  Reichs  wurde  Tiecks  Ironie  als  „zersetzend―,  als  etwas 
 
„Intellektualistisches―  und  „Jüdisches―  identifiziert, 
27
  zumal  Heinrich  Heine  den 
 
Dichter „den wirklichen Sohn des Phöbus Apollo― genannt hat: 
 
 
 
 
[...] wie sein ewig jugendlicher Vater führte er nicht bloß die Leier, sondern auch den 
Bogen mit dem Köcher voll klingender Pfeile. Er war trunken von Lust und kritischer 
Grausamkeit, wie der delphische Gott. Hatte er, gleich diesem, irgendeinen 
literarischen Marsyas erbärmlichst geschunden, dann griff er, mit den blutigen 
Fingern, wieder lustig in die goldenen Saiten seiner Leier und sang ein freudiges 
Minnelied.
28 
 
 
Welche Bewandtnis hat es mit dieser unbeliebten (und von Hegel über Kierkegaard 
 
bis zu Gundolf und Emil Staiger gescholtenen) Ironie? Zunächst hat sie nichts zu tun 
 
mit der gemeinen oder rhetorischen Ironie, der einfachen „Umkehrung der Sache, daß 
 
das Schlechte gut, und das Gute schlecht genannt wird, wie [bei] Swift und 
 
andere[n]―.
29
  Gedacht  ist  auch  nicht  an  die  Selbstverlachung  der  in  ein  Gedicht 
 
investierten Sentimentalität, wie in Brentanos Godwi, wo der Held im 18. Kapitel auf 
 
einen Teich zeigt und sagt, das sei derselbe, in den er auf Seite 143 des ersten Teils 
 
falle; oder wie in Heines Versen vom lang und bang seufzenden Fräulein am Meere, 
 
die „so sehre― vom Sonnenuntergang gerührt wird und der der Dichter zuruft: „Mein 
 
Fräulein! Sein Sie munter, / Das ist ein altes Stück; / Hier vorne geht sie unter / und 
 
kommt von hinten zurück.― In diesen Beispielen haben wir eine Position zugunsten 
 
27 JOSEF VELDTRUP, Friedrich Schlegel und die jüdische Geistigkeit―. In: Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde 
52 (1938), H. 7, S. 409. Vgl. auch WALTER LINDEN, „Umwertung der deutschen Romantik―. In: 
Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde 47 (1933), H. 2, S. 65-91.
  
28 HEINRICH HEINE, Die romantische Schule. Zweites Buch, II. Kapitel, 1. Abschn., Kritische Ausgabe. 
Hrsg. von HELGA WEIDMANN. Stuttgart 1976. S. 75 f.
 
29 Ludwig Tiecks Schriften. Berlin 1828-54, Bd. 6, S. XXVII f. 
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einer anderen dem Gelächter preisgegeben. Die romantische Ironie ergreift dagegen 
beide Pole und führt so zu einer abgründigen Relativierung. 
 
 
Ironie ist die Einstellung, mit der das romantische Subjekt auf die Erfahrung seiner 
bodenlosen Selbst-Transzendenz reagiert. Damit ist schon klar, dass in den Texten der 
 
Frühromantik mit dem Ausdruck „Subjekt― nicht mehr jenes „cogito― assoziiert 
werden darf, das seit Descartes und Leibniz für ein unerschütterbar gewisser 
Stützpunkt des Wissens gegolten hatte und bei Kant und Fichte durch überzeitliche 
Identität ausgezeichnet war. Im Selbstbewusstsein wird vielmehr eine elementare 
Widerspruchs-Erfahrung ausgetragen. Die Zweiheit der Form, durch die wir die im 
Gedanken des Selbst beschlossene Einheit artikulieren (in der Reflexion, also in der 
bewussten Rückwendung auf uns selbst, trennen wir uns ja in ein gewahrendes 
Subjekt und ein gewahrtes Objekt) – die Form dieser Trennung, sage ich, widerspricht 
der vermeinten Einheit ihres Inhalts –, ja, sie verhindert dessen Erscheinung. Soll 
beiden Elementar-Erfahrungen Raum gegeben werden, so muss Selbstbewusstsein 
vorgestellt werden als abkünftig aus einer gründenden Identität, die das Band um die 
beiden Pole der Einheit und des Gegensatzes schlingt, aber in Denkverhältnisse nicht 
mehr übersetzbar ist. Die Frühromantiker sprach vom „Seyn―. 
 
 
Dieses Sein wird der Reflexion nun zu einem unausdeutbaren Rätsel, weil sie es nicht 
bearbeiten kann, ohne seine stets vorausgesetzte Einheit zum Verschwinden zu 
bringen. „Das eigentlich Widersprechende in unserem Ich―, sagt Friedrich Schlegel, 
„ist, daß wir uns zugleich endlich und unendlich fühlen―.
30
 Beide, Endlichkeit und 
Unendlichkeit, können wir nicht in Einem Bewusstsein repräsentieren. So finden wir 
 
30
 Kritische Schlegel-Ausgabe. Hrsg. v. Ernst Behler u. a. München-Paderborn-Wien 1956 ff., Bd. XII, S. 
334,4 [zit.: KA]. 
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uns als Wesen, die, ohne je im Unendlichen anzukommen, dennoch nie in den 
Grenzen der Endlichkeit Halt finden. Was aber im Nu als Kontradiktion sich darstellt, 
kann in der Zeit auf verschiedene Phasen verteilt werden: Losgelöst von einer immer 
schon verlorenen Identität, die zur Vergangenheit geworden ist, strebt das Subjekt 
durch seine Entwürfe, stets vergeblich, nach deren Wiederaneignung in der Zukunft. 
Die drei Zeitdimensionen sind nur dreifach nuancierter Ausdruck einer wesenhaften 
 
„Unangemessenheit― unseres Wesens an unsere Wirklichkeit (vgl. KA X, 550). 
 
 
 
 
Es ist wohl unübersehbar, dass wir damit dem Grundmerkmal des Lächerlichen wieder 
begegnet sind: eine Sache ist komisch, wenn Wesen und Wirklichkeit inkongruent 
sind. Dies Auseinanderklaffen ist aber jetzt verständlich gemacht nicht aus einem Zug 
der Sache, sondern aus der ekstatischen Verfassung des zeitlichen Selbst, das im 
Abstand zu sich existieren und so seine Entwürfe in einen (möglicherweise) 
komischen Kontrast zu seinem Sein bringen muss. Dabei kann das zeitlich-zerrissene 
Selbst entweder den Aspekt überwiegender Einheit oder seine Tendenz aufs 
Unendliche ins Licht stellen. Das erste geschieht im Witz, dessen punktuelles Zünden 
Schlegel als Aufscheinen der absoluten Einheit im Endlichen selbst interpretiert. Die 
überraschenden Synthesen des witzigen Einfalls lenken gleichsam die Bindekraft des 
undarstellbaren Absoluten ins Endliche ab, aber eben um den Preis, die Unendlichkeit 
zu verlieren. Auf diesen Verlust reagiert die Allegorie, die das Einzelne ans 
Unendliche rückverweist und als misslungene Manifestation des undarstellbaren 
Ganzen deutet. 
 
 
Allegorie und Witz sind also die blick- und Wende-Punkte der Reflexion, die nie 
zugleich bezogen werden können: Das Hin- und Her-Zucken des Gesichtspunktes, der 
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bald einigt, bald auflöst, ist das Werk der so genannten romantischen Ironie. Sie 
 
verlacht das Endliche, weil es endlich ist. Aber auch das Unendliche entgeht nicht 
 
ihrem lachenden Dementi, weil es, wie Novalis sagt, das identische Reine gar nicht 
 
gibt  (NS  II,  177,  Z.  10/11);  es  ist  „ein  leerer  Begriff  [...]  –  eine  nothwendige 
 
Fiction― (II, 179, Z. 17 ff. vgl. 269 f., Nr. 566). 
 
 
 
 
Um sich selbst fasslich zu werden, muss sich das Reine eingrenzen (so entstehen die 
 
überraschenden Synthesen des Witzes); die Grenze widerspricht aber seiner 
 
wesentlichen Unendlichkeit; also muss es die selbst gesetzte Grenze immer auch 
 
wieder überschreiten, sich neu begrenzen, auch diese Grenze wieder überschreiten 
 
und so immer weiter (darin kommt die allegorische Tendenz aufs Unendliche zum 
 
Austrag). Die Ironie, resümiert Schlegel, 
 
 
enthält und erregt ein Gefühl von dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten 
und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen 
Mitteilung. Sie ist die freieste aller Lizenzen, denn durch sie setzt man sich über sich 
selbst weg; und doch auch die gesetzlichste, denn sie ist unbedingt notwendig. Es ist 
ein sehr gutes Zeichen, wenn die harmonisch Platten gar nicht wissen, wie sie diese 
stete Selbstparodie zu nehmen haben, immer wieder von neuem glauben und 
mißglauben, bis sie schwindlicht werden, den Scherz gerade für Ernst, und den Ernst 
für Scherz halten (KA II, 160, Nr. 108). 
 
 
Etwas von diesem Schwindel kann uns ein hintersinnig-leichtes Liedchen von Tieck 
 
vermitteln: 
 
 
Mit Leiden 
Und Freuden  
Gleich lieblich zu spielen 
Und Schmerzen 
Im Scherzen 
So leise zu fühlen, 
Ist wen‘gen beschieden. 
Sie wählen zum Frieden 
Das eine von beiden,  
Sind nicht zu beneiden: 
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Ach gar zu bescheiden 
Sind doch ihre Freuden 
Und kaum von Leiden  
Zu unterschieden.
31 
 
 
Die Freuden, näher besehen, verlieren ihr distinktives Merkmal und werden ihrem 
Gegenteil, den Leiden, ähnlich, für die wieder das gleiche gilt. Es gibt also durchaus 
Bestimmtheit und Unterschiedenheit; die werden aber poetisch so behandelt, dass sich 
ihre Setzung geheimnisvoll überdeterminiert durch die Aufhebung des Gesetzten: dessen 
Überschreitung auf das hin, was es nicht ist. Der Überstieg, der stets aufs Neue sich 
hinwegsetzt über jene Selbstzusammenzeichnung, die die unendliche Tätigkeit im Witz 
vollzieht, macht sich zur Allegorie des Unbegrenzten; er öffnet Aussichtsfluchten, 
„échappées de vue ins Unendliche― (KA II, 200, Nr. 220). So wird die Ironie inmitten 
der endlichen Welt und angesichts der offenbaren Beschränktheit unserer 
Ausdrucksmittel „®pºdeijiq [Aufweis, Anzeige] der Unendlichkeit― (KA 
XVIII, 128, Nr. 76). 
 
 
 
 
Dieser Ausweis ist freilich – und da unterscheidet sich die romantische Ironie von der 
gemeinen – mit einer bodenlosen Relativierung verbunden: Nichts Bestimmtes hält stich, 
und auch das Unbestimmte liefert keine gangbare Alternative. So bringen sich die beiden 
Pole der Relation in die Schwebe. Das ist gar nicht immer komisch, wenn auch jederzeit 
vertrackt. Aber die romantische Ironie kann auch lustig sein – so in jener Szene des 
Gestiefelten Katers, da der Hanswurst und der Hofgelehrte sich darüber streiten, ob „ein 
neuerlich erschienenes Stück: der gestiefelte Kater― ein gutes Stück sei.
32
 Jener verneint 
das entschieden, dieser behauptet es um so energischer und zieht sich endlich auf 
folgende These zurück: „So ist, wenn ich auch alles übrige 
 
31 LUDWIG TIECKS Schriften (wie Anm. 17) Bd. 10, S. 96.  
32 Phantasus (wie Anm. 11), S. 546 f. 
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fallenlasse, das Publikum gut darin gezeichnet.― Worauf unter den (zum Stück selbst 
gehörenden) Zuschauern folgendes Gespräch entsteht: 
 
Fischer: 
Das Publikum? Es kommt ja kein Publikum in dem Stücke vor! 
 
Hanswurst: 
Noch besser! Also kömmt gar kein Publikum darin vor? 
 
Müller: 
Je bewahre! Wir müßten ja doch auch darum wissen. 
 
 
In der Fiktion des Stücks scheitert Der gestiefelte Kater an der Stupidität des 
Publikums. Man neigt – selbst nach kurzer Bekanntschaft mit diesem Publikum – 
dazu, die satirische Absicht des Autors Tiecks so zu fixieren, dass man das Verhältnis 
umkehrt und sagt: Das gilt nur für die Fiktion des Stücks; das in der Schlussszene 
eigentlich Durchgefallene ist (vor dem imaginären Appellations-Gremium des wahren, 
erleuchteten Publikums) das Publikum im Stück, das aus Borniertheit unfähig ist, auf 
seine Involviertheit in die Handlung zu reflektieren. Diese Satire wird aber 
durchkreuzt durch die doppelte Ironie, mit der Tieck das Stück im Stück selbst 
ausgestattet hat. Das taugt nämlich selbst nichts, und insofern hat der Hanswurst ganz 
recht. Ist das aber der Fall, dann kann man – wie so oft geschehen – die Absicht 
Tiecks nicht darauf reduzieren, die in die Märchen der Kindheit verliebte Romantik 
gegen die Döflichkeit eines sich aufgeklärt dünkenden, von den einfältigsten 
Kindervorurteilen und Kitschvorlieben dahin gerafften Publikums auszuspielen. Beide 
Positionen neutralisieren einander durch die vollkommen doppelbödige Ironie des 
Stücks, für dessen Grundhaltung in der Tat Solgers Rede von der überm Ganzen 
schwebenden, alles vernichtenden und alles überschauenden Heiterkeit ausgezeichnet 
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passt.
33
 Kurz: Der gestiefelte Kater ist eine Illustration romantischer Ironie darin, 
dass er Position und Gegenposition zueinander in ein negatives Verhältnis bringt und 
eins durchs anderes sich vernichten lässt. Für ein auf den Schulkanon der Klassiker 
konditioniertes Publikum ist das ein Überstand – denn die ‚Aussage‘, die ‚Botschaft‘ 
des Stücks ist, dass in ihm das Publikum gut gezeichnet ist: dasjenige, das erbaut und 
moralisch aufgerüstet nach Hause gehen wollte und mit einer Handvoll Nichts 
abziehen muss. – Aber leichter als an solch inhaltsbezogenen Beispielen lässt sich die 
romantische Ironie an Stil-Zügen aufweisen: an jenem gewichtslos-anmutigen Reden, 
das, indem es etwas Bestimmtes sagt, durch die Flüchtigkeit seiner Geste zugleich 
sich wieder aufhebt und so zeigt, dass alles Endliche eigentlich haltlos ist, das heißt – 
bei Lichte besehen – sich selbst zerstört. Ein hoher Aufwand führt zu nichts, ja bricht 
in nichts zusammen. 
 
 
Mit dieser Struktur zweier negativ aufeinander bezogener, miteinander 
unverträglicher und darum sich wechselseitig vernichtender Positionen setzen sich 
immer aufs Neue auch die Fragmente der Novalis und Friedrich Schlegel auseinander. 
Schon ihre Form liefert ebenso viele Beispiele romantischer Ironie: 
 
Es ist gleich tödlich für den Geist, ein System zu haben, und keins zu haben. Er wird 
sich also entschließen müssen, beides zu verbinden (KA II, 173, Nr. 53). 
 
Geist besteht aus durchgängigen Widersprüchen (l. c., 263, Nr. 74). 
 
Alles geht nach Gesetzen und nichts geht nach Gesetzen (NS III, 601, Nr. 291). 
 
Das eigentliche Philosophische System [muß] Freyheit und Unendlichkeit, oder, um 
es auffallend auszudrücken, Systemlosigkeit, in ein System gebracht seyn (l. c., II, 
288 f., Nr. 648). 
 
[...] das im gemeinen Leben gebräuchliche und darum durch die Erfahrung gelehrte 
Prinzip, daß das Leben und überhaupt alles auf Widersprüchen beruhe, und durch 
 
33
 K. W. F. SOLGES nachgelassen Schriften und Briefe. Hrsg. v. LUDWIG TIECK und FRIEDRICH 
VON RAUMER. Leipzig 1826, Bd. II, S. 387. 
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Gegensätze bestehe – (KA XII, 321). 
 
Da die Natur und die Menschen sich so oft und so schneidend widersprechen, darf die 
Philosophie es vielleicht nicht vermeiden, dasselbe zu tun (l. c., II, 240, Nr. 412). 
 
Alles widerspricht sich (l. c., XIII, 18). 
 
Jeder Satz, jedes Buch, so sich nicht selbst widerspricht, ist unvollständig (l. c., XVIII, 
83, Nr. 647). 
 
Der Mensch ist [...] nichts Bestimmtes – Er kann und soll etwas Bestimmte und 
Unbestimmtes zugleich seyn (NS III, 471, Nr. 1112). 
 
 
Sehnsucht,  Vielschichtigkeit,  Ungeborgenheit,  Inkonsequenz,  Widersprüchlichkeit, 
 
Verworrenheit sind die Leitmotive der Romantik. „So ist der Mensch―, ruft Theodor 
 
in den Phantasus-Gesprächen von Ludwig Tieck aus, „nichts als Inkonsequenz und 
 
Widerspruch!― 
34
 In den von Rudolf Köpke, Tiecks Eckermann,
 mitgeteilten 
 
Gesprächsäußerungen aus den letzten Lebensjahren findet sich folgende 
 
Bemerkungen: 
 
Einer der widerstrebendsten Gedanken ist für mich der des Zusammenhanges. Sind 
wir denn wirklich im Stande ihn überall zu erkennen? Ist es nicht frömmer, 
menschlich edler und aufrichtiger, einfach zu bekennen, daß wir ihn nicht 
wahrzunehemen vermögen, daß unsere Erkenntnis sich nur auf Einzelnes bezieht, und 
daß man sich resigniere?
35 
 
Damit sind erschreckend zeitgemäße Erfahrungen formuliert. Musils „Mann ohne 
 
Eigenschaften― macht aus ihnen ein Erzählprinzip. Seine Figuren spüren die 
 
Indeterminiertheit ihrer Handlungen, die unzureichende Kohärenz zwischen 
 
Lebensereignissen und die Inkonsequenz zwischen Gedanken.
36
  Sie zittern vor der 
 
Unbestimmtheit  eines  psychischen  Zustands,  der  seine  „Identität―  verliert,  noch 
 
während er dauert (l. c., 4, 1129, 1198). „Ein feiner Riß―, spaltet ihren von Zweifeln 
 
angefressenen Glauben (l. c., 6, 300) und macht ihn, der ganz und gar Glaube sein 
 
 
 
34 Phantasus (wie Anm. 11), S. 81.  
35 LUDWIG TIECK, Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Dichters. Leipzig 1855, Band 2, S. 250.  
36 ROBERT MUSIL, Gesammelte Werke. Hrsg. v. ADOLF FRISÉ. Reinbek 1978, Bd. 2, 650; 5, 1936. 
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will, zu einem „bloßen Glauben―, dem die „volle Überzeugung―, das letzte 
„Wissen― fehlt (l. c., 6, 306). Eine unstillbare Unruhe „befällt den Geist―, dem 
„eine letzte Überzeugung fehlt― (l. c., 6, 393). Darauf reagiert die Angst, die in 
entscheidenden Augenblicken oder besser: in Augenblicken der Entscheidung Musils 
 
Helden in eine Art Möglichkeitstaumel hineinreißt: beispielsweise als „panischer 
Schreck― vor dem „nicht-fest―-Sein der Dämme des Ich (l. c., 5, 1664), als „eine 
 
Ahnung von menschlicher Unsicherheit, vielleicht ein Bangen vor sich, vielleicht nur 
ein unfaßbares, sinnloses, versuchendes [...] Herbeiwünschen― (l. c., 6, 172); 
vielleicht ein Gefühl „dieser wehen, ungeschützten Gebrechlichkeit der innersten 
Menschenmöglichkeiten, die kein Wort, keine Wiederkehr festhält und in den 
 
Zusammenhang des Lebens ordnet― (l. c., 6, 190); eine „ungeheure Angst [...] vor 
dem Unbestimmten― (l. c., 5, 1745) und eine peinigende Beunruhigung über die 
 
Tatsache, dass, was man auch tut, „ohne einen festen Grund tut― (l. c., 4, 1025; vgl. 
3, 956 f.). Wir sind „vom Gesetz der Notwendigkeit, wo jedes Ding von einem 
anderen abhängt, befreit―, mit der Folge, dass wir „keinen festen Halt [finden] in der 
Welt― (l. c., 5, 1748 f.; vgl. 1767) und an ihr buchstäblich irre werden. Denn für den 
Schüler Ernst Machs gilt (auch für die physische Welt, den Gegenstand der 
 
Naturwissenschaften): „Nichts ist fest. Jede Ordnung ist nicht so fest, wie sie sich gibt, 
ein Grundsatz ist sicher, alles ist in einer nie ruhenden Umwandlung begriffen, das 
 
Unfeste hat mehr Zukunft als das Feste― (l. c., 5, 1879). – So und nicht heiterer ist 
die Erfahrung, die zur ironischen Einstellung führt. 
 
 
In der Tat ertappt man uns gern beim Lachen, wenn wir Zeuge werden, wie jemandem die 
Stütze aus der Hand geschlagen wird, wie unter ihm der Grund wankt, wie er sich fallend 
an einen Strohhalm klammert, den wir brechen sehen – vorausgesetzt natürlich, 
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das alles passiert nicht uns selbst. Um noch einmal dem Olympier die Begründung zu 
 
überlassen: „Weil im Bild man gern genießt, / Was im Leben uns verdrießt.― Die Seife, 
 
die in Dick-und-Doof-Film unweigerlich auf dem Weg liegt und zu einer ungewollten 
 
Gleitpartie führt oder sich, im Waschbecken ausgepackt und kräftig eingerieben, als 
 
ein halbes Pfund Butter herausstellt – das sind Illustrationen für unser schadenfrohes 
 
Amüsement über prätendierte Sicherheiten, die sich dann als grundlos herausstellen. 
 
Das Lachen ist die Kehrseite unserer Unsicherheit und Unfestgelegtheit: es kann uns 
 
(als Wesen, die sich ständig selbst überschreiten) jederzeit alles Mögliche zustoßen. 
 
Das Lachen, welches die höhere Ironie erregt, stellt sich ein, wenn wir der 
Grundlosigkeit unseres Tuns innewerden und die Unverlässlichkeit unserer 
Erwartungen ins Auge fassen. Solcherlei Lachen antizipiert die Enttäuschung über das 
Ausbleiben einer Begründung und wendet sie ins Grundsätzliche. Mit Kant 
 
gesprochen: eine hochgespannte Erwartung bricht in nichts zusammen: die nämlich, 
 
unser Leben könnte einen tieferen Zweck haben. Dies jedenfalls war eine der tiefsten 
 
Überzeugungen der Tieckschen Dichtung. Im 17. Kapitel der 1797 geschriebenen 
 
Sieben Weiber des Blaubart findet sich folgender Dialog zwischen Peter Berner (dem 
 
Blaubart) und seinem Förderer Bernard: 
 
Wenn Ihr es überlegt, daß im ganzen Menschenleben kein Zweck und kein 
Zusammenhang zu finden ist, so werdet Ihr es gern aufgeben, diese Dinge in meinem 
Lebenslauf hineinzubringen.  
Wahrhaftig, du hast Recht, sagte Bernard, und du bist wirklich verständiger, als ich 
dachte.  
Ich bin vielleicht klüger als Ihr, sagte Peter, ich lasse mir nur selten etwas merken.  
So wäre also, sagte Bernard tiefsinnig, das ganze große Menschendasein nichts Festes 
und Begründetes? Es führte vielleicht zu nichts und hätte nichts zu bedeuten, Thorheit 
wäre es, hier historischen Zusammenhang und eine große poetische Composition zu 
suchen, eine Bambocchiade oder ein Wouvermanns drückten es vielleicht am 
richtigsten aus.
37 
 
Ludoviko sagt (im Sternbald von 1798), man könne „seinen Zweck nicht vergessen 
 
 
 
37
  LUDWIG TIECKS Schriften (wie Anm. 17), Bd. 9, Berlin 1828, S. 193. 
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[...], weil der vernünftige Mensch sich schon so einrichtet, daß er gar keinen Zweck 
hat. Ich muß nur lachen, wenn ich Leute so große Anstalten machen sehe, um ein 
Leben zu führen. Das Leben ist dahin, ehe sie mit den Vorbereitungen fertig sind.―
38 
 
 
Aus dieser abgründigen Laune erwächst de romantische Ironie. Sie wettet darauf, dass 
wir auf keine Weise und durch keinen Trick zu rechtfertigenden Wesen sind, und 
gewinnt die Wette durch den Nachweis, dass das eigentlich hochkomisch, ja zum 
Totlachen ist. Und zu dieser Einsicht sollte uns der Ausgang von der Frühromantik 
schließlich führen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
  L. c., Band 16, Berlin 1843, S. 336,6. 
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